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Attitude of the population of Ukraine to Russia and the population of Russia to Ukraine, November 2021
The press release contains the results of a joint project of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Russian non-governmental research organization “Levada - Center”, which has been carried out since 2008. (“Levada - Center” autonomous non-profit organization has been forcibly included in the register of Russian non-profit organizations acting as foreign agent. Statement of the director of the “Levada - Center”, who does not agree with this decision, see here)
Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) during November 2-11, 2021, conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion poll "Omnibus". By the method of computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) based on a random sample of mobile telephone numbers (with random generation of telephone numbers and subsequent statistical weighing) were interviewed 2003 respondents living in all regions of Ukraine (except AR of Crimea). The sample is representative of the adult population (18 years and older) of Ukraine. The sample does not include territories that are temporarily not controlled by the authorities of Ukraine - the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, some districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In Luhansk and Donetsk regions, the survey was conducted only in the territory controlled by the Ukrainian authorities. Statistical sampling error (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.1) does not exceed: 2.4% for indicators close to 50%, 2.1% for indicators close to 25%, 1.5% - for indicators close to 10%, 1.1% - for indicators close to5%. “Levada - Center” conducted a survey by a representative sample of the population of Russia, 1603 people aged 18 years and older, in the period from November 25 to December 1, 2021 by the method of personal interview. The statistical error during the sample of 1603 people (with a probability of 0.95) does not exceed: 3.4% for indicators close to 50%, 2.9% - for indicators close to 25% / 75%, 2.0% - for indicators close to 10% / 90%, and 1.5% - for indicators close to 5% / 95%
Summary In Ukraine in February 2021, 39% of Ukrainians treated Russia well and 47% - badly. Compared to February 2021, there is a deterioration in attitudes towards Russia (in February, the ratio was 41% to 42%). In Russia, 45% of the population treated Ukraine well and 43% - badly. Compared to the previous wave of the survey, there is a significant deterioration in attitudes (previously 54% treated well, 31% - badly). At the same time, the majority of respondents from both countries have a bad attitude towards the leadership of the neighboring country and a good attitude towards the ordinary population of these countries. At the same time, among the respondents who generally have a good attitude towards Russia, the majority have a bad attitude towards the Russian leadership. In other words, their positive attitude is a consequence of the fact that Russia is primarily associated with ordinary people. Moreover, 2 out of 5 respondents in Ukraine reported that they have close relatives in Russia. 88% of Ukrainians and 75% of Russians support Ukraine’s independence from Russia, and 6% of Ukrainians and 18% of Russians support Ukraine’s unification with Russia. The number of Ukrainians who want closed borders with Russia is 39% (and Russians - 24%), and the number of Ukrainians who want independent relations, but without borders and customs, is 49% (and Russians – 51%).
Attitude in Ukraine to Russia and in Russia to Ukraine
In the course of the research, Ukrainians were still asked a question "How do you feel about Russia in general now?" And "How do you feel about Ukraine in general now?" During the entire observation period (except September 2019 and our latest data in February and November 2021), Ukrainians treated Russia better than Russians treated Ukraine (see Graph 1). In September 2019, the attitude of Russians towards Ukraine was somewhat better, perhaps due to the expectation that the new Ukrainian government will change the attitude of Ukrainians to Russia. After the annexation of Crimea and the start of hostilities in the Donbas, Ukrainians 'positive attitudes toward Russia fell sharply (from 90% to 30%), but after the end of active hostilities, Ukrainians' attitudes toward Russia improved somewhat again. Now, from the beginning of 2021, Russians treat Ukraine better than Ukrainians treat Russia (although between February and November 2021 there were fewer Russians who treat Ukraine well). Methodological remark. From April 2020, surveys are not completely equivalent, as in Russia surveys are conducted by the method of personal (face-to-face) interview, and in Ukraine by the method of telephone interview (computer-assisted telephone interviews).
Graph 1. Dynamics of good attitude of the population of Ukraine to Russia and Russia to Ukraine
In addition, respondents to study the issue in more depth were also asked a question "How do you feel about Russians (residents of Russia) in general now?" and "How do you feel about Russia's leadership in general now?". In the case of both countries there is a similar tendency, when respondents have a mostly good attitude to the population of the neighboring state and mostly bad - to the leadership of the neighboring state (at the same time, in Russia the attitude to the leadership of Ukraine and Ukrainians living in Ukraine is slightly better than in Ukraine to the leadership of Russia and Russians living in Russia). At the same time, in the regional dimension, the attitude towards Russians living in Russia varies much less - from 71% of good attitude in the West to 82% in the East. Good attitude towards Russia's leadership is growing from 5% in the West to 27% in the East.
Graph2. Attitudes of respondents separately to the leadership and separately to the population of another state
Graph 3 shows the data how the leadership of Russia and the Russians are treated by those who generally treat Russia well or badly. Respondents-Ukrainians who generally have a good attitude towards Russia, almost all (95%) have a good attitude towards Russians-residents of Russia. At the same time, only 29% of them have a good attitude towards the Russian leadership. At the same time, among Ukrainian respondents who generally have a bad attitude towards Russia, 95% have a bad attitude towards the Russian leadership, but 59% have a good attitude towards Russians living in Russia. Obviously, for some respondents the question of the general attitude towards Russia is primarily associated with the leadership of Russia and, as a result, such respondents are more likely to say about bad attitude. For the rest of the respondents, "Russia" is primarily associated with ordinary Russians, so they are more likely to have a generally good attitude towards Russia.
Graph3. Attitude of Ukrainians towards the Russian leadership and Russians living in Russia, depending on how they treat Russia in general
Presence of close relatives in Russia and connection with the attitude to Russia
43% of respondents said that they have close relatives in Russia (another 14% said that they have relatives in Russia, but they do not consider them close). The share of respondents who have such relatives is growing from 33% in the West to 53% in the East.
Graph4. Distribution of answers to the question "Do you have close relatives in Russia?"
Graph 5 shows how those who have and do not have close relatives treat Russia in general. As you can see, first of all, those who have relatives have a better attitude towards Russia in general. At the same time, this tendency persists within each region separately. In both the West and the East, respondents who have close relatives in Russia are better at Russia in general than other residents of the same region but who do not have such relatives. Secondly, even with this factor in mind, there is a tendency for attitudes towards Russia to improve from West to East.
Graph5. Attitude of Ukrainians towards Russia in terms of having close relatives in Russia
Opinions of Ukrainians on whether ordinary Russians can influence the policy of the Russian leadership
The vast majority of Ukrainians (76% in total, 73-77% depending on the region) believe that ordinary people in Russia have no influence on the policy of Russia's leadership.
Graph6. Distribution of answers to the question "Do you think ordinary Russians have an influence on the policy of the Russian leadership towards Ukraine?"
Graph 7 shows the general attitude towards Russia of those who believe that ordinary people in Russia have an influence on Russia's leadership, as well as those who believe that they do not. In the West and in the Center, there is a tendency for a slightly better attitude among those who do not believe that ordinary people have an influence. At the same time, in the South and East, the tendency is reversed - those who believe that ordinary people have an influence have a slightly better attitude.
Graph7. Attitude of Ukrainians towards Russia in terms of whether ordinary Russians have an influence on the policy of the Russian leadership
Figure 8 shows the data as for the relationship with the attitude towards Russians living in Russia. In this case, the tendency for the West and the Center is more pronounced that those who believe that ordinary people have an influence on the leadership have a worse attitude towards Russians living in Russia.
Graph8. Attitude of Ukrainians towards Russians living in Russia in terms of whether ordinary Russians have an influence on the policy of the Russian leadership
Opinions of Ukrainians as to what relations between Ukraine and Russia should be
Dynamics of answers to the question "How would you like to see Ukraine's relations with Russia?"
Graph9. What kind of relations with Russia do want in Ukraine?*
* The line on the graph "Ukraine and Russia should be independent" is the sum of the first two columns in Table 6, ie the percentage of those who want independence with borders and customs, and those who want independence but without borders and customs (see tables below).
Annex 1. Formulation and order of questions from the questionnaire
How would you like to see Ukraine's relations with Russia? ONE ANSWER
How do you feel about Russia in general now?
How do you feel about Russians in general now)?
How do you feel about the Russian leadership in general now?
Do you think that ordinary Russians have an influence on the policy of the Russian leadership towards Ukraine?
Do you have close relatives in Russia?
Annex 2. Composition of the regions of Ukraine
Western macroregion - Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytskyi, Chernivtsi regions;
Central macroregion – Kyiv city, Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Chernihiv regions;
Southern macroregion - Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson regions;
Eastern macroregion - Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk regions (districts controlled by Ukraine)
Annex 3. TABLES
Table 1. How do you feel about Ukraine/Russia in general now?
Table 2. How do you feel about Russia in general now? Distribution by regions, November 2021, %
Table3. How do you feel about Russians (residents of Russia) in general now? Distribution by regions, November 2021, %
Table4. How do you feel about the Russian leadership in general now? Distribution by regions, November 2021, %
Table5. Do you think that ordinary Russians have an influence on the policy of the Russian leadership towards Ukraine? Distribution by regions, November 2021,%
Table6. Do you have close relatives in Russia? Distribution by regions, November 2021,%
Table7. How would you like to see Ukraine's relations with Russia?
Table8. How would you like to see Ukraine's relations with Russia? Distribution by regions, November 2021,%
17.12.2021
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