The press release was prepared by the Executive Director of KIIS, Anton Hrushetskyi

From May 26 to June 5, 2023, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus". Bythemethodofcomputer-assistedtelephoneinterviews(CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting), 984 respondents living in all regions of Ukraine (except the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) were interviewed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived on the territory of Ukraine (within the boundaries controlled by the authorities of Ukraine until February 24, 2022). The sample did not include residents of territories that were not temporarily controlled by the authorities of Ukraine until February 24, 2022 (AR of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left the country after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.1) did not exceed 3.4% for indicators close to 50%, 3.0% for indicators close to 25%, 2.1% - for indicators close to 10%, 1.5% - for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. In particular, if in May 2022, among all the respondents we interviewed, 2.5-4% lived in the territories occupied after February 24 (and this corresponded to the percentage of those who live there, because the generation of telephone numbers was random), now due to the occupiers turning off the telephone connection, not a single respondent who currently lives in occupied settlements was included in the sample (along with this, out of a total of 984 respondents, 32 respondents lived in a settlement that is currently occupied until February 24, 2022). It is important to note that although the views of the respondents who lived in the occupation were somewhat different, the general trends were quite similar. That is, the impossibility of interviewing such respondents does not significantly affect the quality of the results. There are other factors that can affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions (see Annex 2).

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of public moods of the population.

For more than 15 years, KMIS has been asking respondents a monitoring question about how Ukrainians see Ukraine's relations with Russia. In May 2023, KMIS again asked this question in its survey, and it is appropriate to consider the dynamics of views over 10 years. To illustrate, we offer to see how Ukrainians responded in February 2013 (long before the Revolution of Dignity and the occupation of Crimea and part of Donbas), in February 2022 (after the occupation of Crimea and part of Donbas, but before the large-scale invasion), in July 2022 (after several months after a large-scale invasion) and in May 2023 (current mood).

As can be seen, before the Revolution of Dignity, the vast majority of Ukrainians (70%) wanted to see the countries as independent but friendly states. Only 15% insisted that relations should be like with other states - with closed borders, visas, and customs. Moreover, quite a significant share of respondents (12%) even wanted unification into one state. After the occupation of Crimea and the start of the war in Donbas, the share of those who believed that relations should be like with other states increased significantly (from 15% to 44%), although 48% still believed that the countries should remain friendly (the share of those who advocated unification decreased to 5%).

Ultimately, after the large-scale invasion, the share of those who want to have closed borders, visas and customs with Russia increased to 79% (an identical indicator in July 2022 and May 2023). Only 10% would now like the countries to be friendly, and only 1% would like to unite the countries into one.

Graph 1. How would you like to see Ukraine's relations with Russia?

In the graph below, the data is shown in a regional dimension with a comparison between February 2022 and February 2013. Until 2014, in all regions (including in the West and in the Center), the vast majority saw countries as friendly with open borders, without visas and customs. Even before a large-scale invasion in 2022, in the West alone, slightly more than half of the population favored closed borders, visas and customs (while 40% wanted the countries to be friendly). As of now, in all regions of Ukraine, the vast majority of the population wants to have closed borders, visas and customs with Russia. In particular, among residents of the East[1], 75% think so, and among residents of the South - 73%.

Graph2. How would you like to see Ukraine's relations with Russia in the regional dimension

Finally, on graph 3, the data are shown in terms of the language of communication at home. Among those who communicate mainly or only in Russian at home, 70% believe that with Russia should have closed borders, visas and customs.

Graph3. How would you like to see Ukraine's relations with Russia depending on the main language of communication at home

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

Long-term monitoring of public moods makes it possible to reliably argue what is the cause and what is the effect. Russian propaganda can endlessly say that "anti-Russian" / "Russophobic" sentimentmoods have been developing in Ukraine for decades (with, of course, developing into "real neo-Nazism") and that Russia's actions since 2014 have been directed against this.

However, the data of all surveys up to 2014 convincingly showed that in different years 80-90% of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards Russia and more than 90% had a good attitude towards Russians, and also wanted to live in independent, but friendly states. Therefore, the current indicators, which testify to a frankly negative attitude towards Russia and ordinary Russians and a desire to strongly "wall off", are precisely the result of Russia's aggression (and not the other way around).

In addition, it is appropriate to separately pay attention to the achievement of consensus among residents of different regions. Before the large-scale invasion, you could see quite noticeable differences in views in different regions, but now both Westerners and Easterners confidently insist on closed borders, visas and customs with Russia.

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

How would you like to see Ukraine's relations with Russia?

 (% among all respondents)

Annex 2. Methodological comments on the representativeness of telephone surveys conducted during the war

Even before the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, there were a number of factors that negatively affected the representativeness of the polls (for example, the absence of a census for more than 20 years). A full-scale war, of course, greatly affects representativeness and complicates the work of sociologists, but does not make it impossible. Access to reliable data on the state of public moods remains relevant both for Ukrainians themselves and for our foreign partners (who, as the events of recent months have shown, often underestimated and did not understand Ukraine and Ukrainians).

At the same time, in order to maintain objectivity, it is necessary to understand what limitations the war imposes on the conduct of sociological surveys. First of all, we pay attention to large-scale population movements. As of May, 2023, the UN estimates the number of Ukrainian refugees at almost 8.3 million. Obviously, due to various reasons, it is difficult to consider these data unequivocally accurate, but in general, the quite significant scale of departure from the country is understandable. There is no exact data on how many of them are adult citizens, but, most likely, it is about half. Among about 30 million adult citizens (estimated at the time of the full-scale invasion), it can be roughly estimated that about 15-20% have left the country, and it is impossible to reliably survey these citizens using telephone interviews. Even more citizens have become internally displaced persons, but they have a much smaller impact on the quality of telephone surveys, since almost all of these citizens have mobile phones and are reachable to participate in the survey (in fact, 16% of the respondents of this survey are IDPs).

Another important problem is the accessibility for the survey of the population of the territories that were occupied after February 24, 2022, due to the conduct of intensive military operations or due to interruptions in telephone communication. Now there is practically no connection. In May 2022, 2.5-4% of respondents lived in these territories, now the sample does not include a single respondent who currently lives in an occupied settlement (together with this, out of a total of 984 respondents, 32 respondents lived in a settlement that is currently occupied until February 24, 2022; now these respondents live in one of the settlements on the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine). According to our estimates, the territories that were occupied by Russia as of the beginning of September 2022 (occupied after February 24, 2022) accounted for about 9% of the total adult population. Taking into account the mass exodus of the population from these territories (most likely, we are talking about at least half of the population), as well as the fact that significant territories of Kharkiv and Kherson regions were liberated from this period, we estimate that no more than 3-5% of the total adult population of Ukraine were unavailable due to communication problems.

In our opinion, a more significant impact on representativeness can be either a generally lower willingness of citizens with "pro-Russian" attitudes to participate in surveys, or the insincerity of those who did take part in the survey (taking into account the obvious facts and prevailing opinions in the media regarding the Russian invasion , some citizens will not want to say what they really think "in public"). If to talk about the general willingness of respondents to participate in the survey, then in recent surveys we see either the same indicators or somewhat lower (although it should be borne in mind that the lower willingness to participate of "pro-Russian" citizens can be compensated by the higher willingness to participate of "pro-Ukrainian"-minded citizens).

We conducted a methodical experiment in May, which shows that the citizens who are currently participating in the surveys in terms of demographic characteristics and meaningful attitudes are close to those who participated in the surveys until February 24, 2022. Preliminarily, we see some shift in the direction of "pro-Ukrainian"-minded citizens, which is reflected in up to 4-6% deviations for individual questions (in the direction of more frequent selection of answers that correspond to the "pro-Ukrainian" interpretation of events). In our opinion, in the current conditions, this is a rather optimistic indicator.

However, this experiment does nnot give an answer as to how sincere the respondents are now in their answers. To assess the sincerity of responses to sensitive questions, in July we conducted another experiment using the "imagined acquaintance" method. The results showed that the respondents generally answered the survey questions honestly. That is, we have reason to say that during the interview, the respondents really answer our questions sincerely.