The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

From November 29 to December 9, 2023, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus". Bythemethodofcomputer-assistedtelephoneinterviews(CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting), 1,031 respondents living in all regions of Ukraine (except AR of Crimea) were interviewed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived on the territory of Ukraine (within the boundaries controlled by the Ukrainian authorities until February 24, 2022). The sample did not include residents of territories that were not temporarily controlled by the authorities of Ukraine until February 24, 2022 (AR of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), and the survey was not conducted with citizens abroad.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.1) did not exceed 3.4% for indicators close to 50%, 3.0% for indicators close to 25%, 2.1% - for indicators close to 10%, 1.5% - for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. KIIS previously cited factors that can affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow for a fairly reliable analysis of the public mood of the population.

The last few weeks have been very tense due to the blocking in the US Congress of the allocation of additional aid to Ukraine, as well as in view of the problems with receiving adequate aid from other Western partners. According to our previous research (October 2023), in the period from September 2022 to October 2023, there was an increase from 15% to 30% of those who believe that the West is tired of Ukraine and wants concessions from Ukraine in favor of Russia[1]. Also, from February 2023 to October 2023, there was an increase from 22% to 49% of those who believe that Russia has too many resources and can wage war against Ukraine for a long time[2]. Although Ukrainians retain optimism, it is evidently becoming more and more restrained.

At the beginning of December 2023, KIIS asked Ukrainians a question: can Ukraine achieve success at all with proper support from the West (weapons, finances, sanctions)? Or, on the contrary, regardless of the support of the West, Russia has too many resources? The absolute majority of Ukrainians - 87% - believe that if the West will properly help Ukraine with weapons, finances, and sanctions, then Ukraine will be able to inflict setbacks on Russia and achieve an acceptable result. Russia is considered too strong regardless of the support of the West - 7%. The remaining 6% were undecided.

Graph 1. And what is your opinion about Ukraine's ability to succeed in the war, provided that the West supports it properly?

In all regions, the absolute majority of the population believes that with proper support from the West, Ukraine can cause failure to Russia. In particular, 79% of them are in the East, 85% in the South (against 9% and 10%, respectively, who consider Russia too strong).

Graph2. Possibility of Ukraine achieving success with the proper support of the West in the regional dimension

At the same time, due to the high risk of a significant decrease in support from the West, we asked the question of what strategy of actions would be better for Ukraine. We are fully aware that there are dozens, if not hundreds, of different parameters that can determine complex action strategies with their own benefits and risks. However, for the convenience of the respondents and to understand the general trends in public moods, we formulated two such conditional strategies for the respondents:

• Hostilities cease. Ukraine retains control over the territories it currently controls, and the occupied territories are not officially recognized as part of Russia. The West provides Ukraine with serious security guarantees or even membership in NATO. However, the liberation of the occupied territories is postponed for an indefinite future;
• Fighting continues. Ukraine continues to try to put pressure on the Russian occupiers and look for weak points, which prevents them from consolidating their power in the occupied territory. There is also an opportunity to liberate the territories, albeit slowly, little by little. But there is also a threat to the territories currently controlled by Ukraine.

The majority of respondents - 58% - are currently inclined to the opinion that even in the event of a significant reduction in Western aid, it is still worth continuing hostilities to put pressure on the occupiers, even taking into account the risks to the territories currently controlled by Ukraine. At the same time, every third respondent (32%) believes that it is better to go to the cessation of hostilities under the conditions of really serious security guarantees from the West, even if the liberation of the occupied territories will be delayed indefinitely. The remaining 10% could not decide on their opinion.

Graph 3. In the West and in Ukraine, you can find opinions that the West can significantly reduce its aid to Ukraine. If indeed the West significantly cuts aid, which of these action strategies of Ukraine would you support to a greater extent?

With regard to the strategy of actions in the event of a significant reduction in Western aid, there are certain regional differences. In the West and in the Center, more respondents (respectively, 64% and 65%) are in favor of continuing hostilities in any case. Although in these regions also a significant share (a quarter of the population) spoke in favor of the cessation of hostilities.

On the other hand, in the South and East, opinions were divided roughly in half, with only a slight predominance of opinion on the continuation of hostilities. Thus, 46% in the South and 47% in the East believe that even in the conditions of limited Western aid, the hostilities should continue. At the same time, respectively, 40% and 42% are ready for the cessation of hostilities.

It should be noted right away that in this case the factor of proximity to the front line plays an important role. The South and East are much closer to the zone of active hostilities, which to a large extent determines the higher readiness in the conditions of the limitation of aid for the cessation of hostilities (although, let's recall, the absolute majority in these regions believe that with proper help, Ukraine can succeed).

Graph4. Actions in the event of a significant reduction in aid from the West in the regional dimension

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion, many Western politicians, experts, and journalists have been surprised by the optimism of Ukrainians. One of the main factors that psychologically supported Ukrainians and allowed them to look more confidently into the future is the support of the West. Ukrainians did not feel alone in the struggle against Russia, but considered the struggle a common cause. Thus, in September 2022, against the background of the successful Kharkiv operation, 80% of Ukrainians considered the successes of the Ukrainian army to be a joint achievement and a joint result of the actions of Ukraine and the West. In February 2023, 81% of Ukrainians believed that cooperation between Ukraine and the West to repel Russian aggression is a "win-win" situation, when both Ukraine and the West benefit.

Even now, Ukrainians believe that proper support from the West will allow them to achieve a result. That is why it is regrettable and painful for Ukrainians to see that behind the pathetic "We stand with Ukraine" from countries with a combined GDP of trillions of dollars, real aid was not so quick, insufficient in volume and range, and recently has generally stalled. More and more Ukrainians (and not only) will see this as hypocrisy and betrayal by so-called friends.

Therefore, we call on the leaders and the public of the West to be responsible and give Ukraine everything it needs to survive and successfully repel aggression. The price is not only the survival of Ukraine and Ukrainians, but the preservation of the value core of Western civilization. The betrayal of Ukraine and the attempt to hand over Ukraine to a harsh aggressor will not pacify Russia, but will only prove the possibly irreversible erosion of the values and ideas of the West, its decay and the actual path to suicide.

Separately, it is worth commenting on the vision of actions in the event of a reduction in aid from the West. We see that the majority, even in such difficult conditions, keep faith in the importance of fighting and putting pressure on the enemy. However, it is very possible that in the case of a really significant restriction of aid and a greater feeling of the consequences of this by citizens, public opinion will quickly change. And in this case, the position of the West also remains fundamentally important - will Ukraine (at least the territories under control) really have serious security guarantees or does the West want to propose another version of the Budapest Memorandum again?

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

And what is your opinion about Ukraine's ability to succeed in the war, provided that the West supports it properly? RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER

In the West and in Ukraine, you can find opinions that the West can significantly reduce its aid to Ukraine. If indeed the West significantly cuts aid, which of these action strategies of Ukraine would you support to a greater extent? RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER