The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

During February 17-23, 2024, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus". Bythemethodofcomputer-assistedtelephoneinterviews(CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting), 1,052 respondents living in all regions of Ukraine (except AR of Crimea) were interviewed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived on the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the authorities of Ukraine, and the survey was not conducted with citizens who went abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.1) did not exceed 3.4% for indicators close to 50%, 3.0% for indicators close to 25%, 2.1% - for indicators close to 10%, 1.5% - for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. In particular, if in May 2022, among all the respondents we interviewed, 2.5-4% lived in the territories occupied after February 24 (and this corresponded to the percentage of those who live there, because the generation of telephone numbers was random), now due to the occupiers turning off the telephone connection, not a single respondent who currently lives in occupied settlements was included in the sample (along with this, out of a total of 1,052 respondents, 33 respondents lived in a settlement that is currently occupied until February 24, 2022). It is important to note that although the views of the respondents who lived in the occupation were somewhat different, the general trends were quite similar. That is, the impossibility of interviewing such respondents does not significantly affect the quality of the results. There are other factors that can affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions, which were cited by KIIS earlier.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow for a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

The issue of the Russian language has been used for a long time by Russia and certain internal Ukrainian subjects (and from different parts of the political spectrum, not exclusively by pro-Russian forces) to destabilize Ukrainian society, even though ordinary Ukrainians (in particular, Russian speakers) among the list of various problems always the issue of language was counted among the least important. The false narrative about the oppression and restrictions of Russian-speaking citizens was also used and is still used by Russia to justify the invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, according to the results of recent surveys by KIIS, 84% of Ukrainians in general and, in particular, 81% of Russian-speaking citizens believe that there is no oppression of the Russian-speaking population (year 2023).

However, the attitude towards the status of the Russian language after the invasion underwent significant changes. Thus, the share of those who believe that the Russian language should not be studied in schools at all has increased sharply (in all regions) (in 2019, there were only 8% of them, in 2023 – 52%). Since the 1990s, KIIS has been interested in different formulations, and what should be, in the opinion of Ukrainians, the status of the Russian language in Ukraine. We asked one of the questions in 1997, 2013, 2015 and again in 2024. Thus, we will be able to trace the dynamics of attitudes from the tentative 1990s to the period before the Revolution of Dignity, the period after, and also the period after the full-scale invasion. For each year, the data cover the entire territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine at that time. This may partly affect the dynamics (because in 2015 and 2023, the non-controlled territories were the ones where before that there were more people who wanted to give the Russian language official status). However, table 1 will show the dynamics for individual regions, which shows that drastic changes have indeed occurred in all regions.

To ensure a correct analysis of the dynamics, we used identical wording (although we are aware that since the 1990s the socio-historical context has changed significantly and some elements of the question could be adapted). We asked the respondents to answer the question "What do you think should be the state policy regarding the Russian language in Ukraine?" Russian language - ..." and choose one of the three options:

1. "it should be removed from official communication throughout Ukraine"
2. "it should be made a second official language only in those areas where the majority of the population wants it"
3. "it should be made into a second state language in Ukraine"

In 2024, we additionally asked the respondents who chose option #2 the question "Do you support or not support making Russian the official language in your region?". It is important to emphasize that we asked about the Russian language in the sphere of official communication (and did not ask about everyday domestic use).

In 1997, 18% were in favor of eliminating the Russian language from official communication. At the same time, 36% believed that the Russian language should be official in the regions where the majority want it, and 39% believed that it should be made the second state language in the country. Until 2013, the share of those who advocated removal from official communication practically did not change (19%). At the same time, there were significantly fewer people who advocated the state status of the Russian language (28%), and instead, the share of those who advocated for the Russian language to become official only in regions where the majority wanted it increased to 47%.

After the Revolution of Dignity, in 2015, there were even fewer people who advocated the state status of the Russian language (19%), and the share of those who supported the official status in certain regions, where the majority wanted it, increased slightly (up to 52%). The share of those who advocated total removal from the official sphere remained almost the same as before the Revolution (21%). (Between 2013 and 2015, the changes are to a large extent explained by the fact that the occupied territories, where a high proportion advocated the state status of the Russian language, were not included in the 2015 sample.)

Eventually, after a full-scale invasion, as of February 2024, the vast majority of Ukrainians - 66% - believe that the Russian language should be removed from official communication. Only 3% believe that the Russian language should receive the status of the second state language. And 24% believe that the Russian language can become official in regions where the majority want it.

Among the 24% who support the official status in certain regions, 15% are against Russian becoming the official language in their region. Would like it to become official in their region - 7% (another 1% have not decided on their position). Thus, by 2024, there are 10% of those in Ukraine who would like to see Russian either as an official language in their region, or even as a second state language. Instead, 81% either want it removed from official communication throughout the territory, or are against its use in their region.

Graph 1. What do you think should be the state policy regarding the Russian language in Ukraine? Russian language - ...?

The table below shows the dynamics during 2013-2024 in the regional dimension. Even in Western Ukraine in 2015, 44% of residents were in favor of Russian being the second official language, where the majority of the population wants it, and 6% supported state status. By 2024 in the West, 80% are in favor of complete elimination from official communication, and of the 15% who are ready to allow official status in certain regions, 14% are against official status in their region. In the Center of Ukraine, the share of those who advocate complete elimination from official communication has also increased to 69%, plus 18%, although they allow such a possibility for other regions, but are against seeing Russian official in their region.

The most noticeable changes are taking place in the South and East. For example, in the South of Ukraine in 2015, 37% wanted to see Russian as the second state language, and 43% believed that it could become official, where the majority of the population wants it. Only 13% answered that it should be removed from official communication. In February 2024, the majority of residents of the South - 54% - are in favor of the complete elimination of the Russian language from official communication. At the same time, the share of those who believe that the Russian language should receive state status has decreased to 6%. There are still 30% of those who believe that the Russian language can become official in some regions, but 15% of them are against the Russian language being official in their region. 12% would like to see it official in their region, 3% are undecided. So, in the South, 69% support either complete elimination from the official sphere, or at least oppose Russian being the official language in their region. In contrast, 18% either want the Russian language to be official in their region, or to become the state language altogether.

In the East of Ukraine, from 3% in 2015 to 40% now there are more people who support the elimination of the Russian language from official communication throughout the territory. At the same time, from 31% to 6%, those who advocate for the state status of the Russian language have decreased. At the same time, 43% now believe that the Russian language can be official in some regions, where the majority wants it. Of them, 12% are against the Russian language becoming official in their region, 28% support such an initiative, and 2% are undecided. So, in the East, 52% support either complete removal from the official sphere, or at least oppose Russian being the official language in their region. In contrast, 34% either want the Russian language to be official in their region, or to become the state language altogether.

It is important to pay attention to the fact that it is very possible that if we separately emphasized that we are not talking about banning everyday everyday communication in the Russian language, then even fewer people would talk about a certain official status of the Russian language. In any case, in fact, in all regions, the majority of the population does not support the granting of official status to the Russian language.

Table 1. State policy regarding the Russian language in the regional dimension

The table below shows the data in terms of the language used at home. Among respondents who mainly communicate in Russian at home, 54% are either in favor of the complete elimination of the Russian language from official communication (43%), or at least against its official status in their region (11%). Instead, 31% of Russian-speaking citizens either believe that the Russian language should be official in their region (21%), or that it should become the state language (10%).

Table 2. State policy regarding the Russian language in terms of the language of communication at home

In the table below, the attitude towards the status of the Russian language is given by age category. The younger the respondents, the more actively they insist on eliminating the Russian language from official communication. Among the youngest respondents (18-29 years old), 84% insist on the complete elimination of the Russian language from official communication. Among persons aged 30-59, the indicator is 66-69%, among persons aged 60-69 – 56%, among persons aged 70+ – 50%.

Table 3. State policy regarding the Russian language by age of respondents

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

Ukrainians have demonstrated a surprisingly tolerant attitude towards the Russian language and Russian-speaking fellow citizens since gaining independence. In the 1990s, in the 2000s, in the 2010s, and in the 2020s, Ukrainians in all regions recognized that there were no objective serious language problems in Ukraine and, in particular, had a normal attitude towards the use of Russian languages in various fields. Russian-speaking Ukrainians together with Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians were in the first places in terms of social distance in all regions (that is, they were perceived the warmest and closest).

Even the occupation of Crimea and certain territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions practically did not change this attitude. In 2020, we asked which of the two statements was closer, and only 30% answered that the Russian language poses a threat to independence, while 50% instead considered the Russian language to be a historical asset of Ukraine that should be developed (and in the same survey, 57% were convinced that in the future Ukrainians will mainly communicate in the Ukrainian language). Since the 1990s, we have indeed witnessed the process of formation of a modern Ukrainian civil nation, the formation of national consciousness, in the framework of which the Ukrainian language became an increasingly tangible state symbol, while leaving the presence of the Russian language and definitely not denying the right of people to communicate in this language. Although the Russian authorities justify the invasion by the fact that Russophobia allegedly flourished in Ukraine, in fact, the critical attitude was a consequence of such a brutal invasion, and was not its cause.

It is important that Ukraine maintains a mostly normal (positive or neutral) attitude towards Russian - speaking fellow citizens, but the long-term course is the development of the Ukrainian language as an important component and symbol of the Ukrainian civil nation. The paradigm shift in the perception of the Ukrainian language by age is notable. Back in the early 2000s (and in fact even later), the Ukrainian language was associated by many as the language of older people and people from rural areas (the language of "grandparents"). Now we see that the youngest Ukrainians are the ones who most insist on the unified state and official status of the Ukrainian language.

However, one must be prudent and understand that the process of development of the Ukrainian language and its spread in the previously predominantly Russian-speaking territories is long and gradual. The absolute majority of the population in all territories have a common foundation that accepts the gradual spread of the Ukrainian language. However, individual public figures (who often do not enjoy public trust, but at the same time their narratives are actively spread in the media) resort to damaging destructive statements that rely on the stigmatization and image of Russian-speaking fellow citizens. This destroys social harmony and consensus and can negatively affect defense capabilities. For all of us, the priority now should be to find everything that unites us. We should all look to a better future and make joint efforts to achieve it, and not drown in arguments about who behaved more correctly 5-10-20 years ago.  

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

What do you think should be the state policy regarding the Russian language in Ukraine? Russian language – … TO HALF OF THE RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE READ IN THE ORDER 1-2-3, TO HALF – IN THE ORDER 3-2-1