The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

During April 20-25, 2024, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, by order of the public organization Center for Strategic Communications "Forum", questions were added about trust in the UOC (MP) and what it should be policy on it. Bythemethodofcomputer-assistedtelephoneinterviews (CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting), 1,220 respondents living in all regions of Ukraine (except the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) were interviewed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived on the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the authorities of Ukraine, and the survey was not conducted with citizens who went abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.1) did not exceed 3.2% for indicators close to 50%, 2.7% for indicators close to 25%, 2.1% - for indicators close to 10%, 1.4% - for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. In particular, if in May 2022, among all the respondents we interviewed, 2.5-4% lived in the territories occupied after February 24 (and this corresponded to the percentage of those who live there, because the generation of telephone numbers was random), now due to the occupiers turning off the telephone connection, not a single respondent who currently lives in occupied settlements was included in the sample (along with this, out of a total of 1,220 respondents, 24 respondents lived in a settlement that is currently occupied until February 24, 2022). It is important to note that although the views of the respondents who lived in the occupation were somewhat different, the general trends were quite similar. That is, the impossibility of interviewing such respondents does not significantly affect the quality of the results. There are other factors that can affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions, which were cited by KIIS earlier.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

In December 2022 and then in May 2023, KIIS asked in its own surveys what the government's policy should be regarding the UOC (MP). In April 2024, we asked this question again to analyze the dynamics of public moods.

According to the results of the survey, 83% of Ukrainians believe that the state should intervene in the activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (MP) to one degree or another (in December 2022, 78%, in May 2023 – 85%). In particular, 63% believe that this Church should be completely banned in Ukraine (54% in December 2022, 66% in May 2023). Another 20% are now in favor of a somewhat "softer" approach, which does not involve a complete ban, but involves the establishment of state control and supervision (in December 2022 - 24%, in May 2023 - 19%).

At the same time, in the opinion of 12% of respondents, nothing should be done and should not be interfered in the affairs of the UOC (MP), but only certain possible cases of offenses should be investigated (the same was the case in December 2022, in May 2023 – 6%).

Graph 1. In your opinion, what should be the current policy of the Ukrainian authorities regarding the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (head - Onufrii)?

In the graph below, the data are shown in a regional dimension. In all regions of Ukraine, the majority of the population (from 76% in the East to 85% in the West and 86% in the Center) are in favor of a proactive state position regarding the activities of the UOC (MP).

At the same time, in the South and East, there are slightly fewer people who are in favor of a complete ban (55% and 46% against, respectively, 69% in the West and 68% in the Center).

Graph2. Policy regarding the UOC (MP) in the regional dimension

Respondents were also asked whether they trust the UOC (MP) or not. As can be seen in graph 3, 82% of Ukrainians do not trust the UOC (MP). 8% trust, and another 11% could not decide on their opinion.

Graph 3. To what extent do you trust or not trust the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, head - Onufrii?

In all regions, the vast majority (from 73% in the East to 88% in the West) do not trust the UOC (MP).

Graph 4. Trust in the UOC (MP) in the regional dimension

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

Our comments on the previous waves of the survey remain relevant and it can be argued that even now the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate continues its activities, due to which its perception among the population remains as the "fifth column of the Kremlin". Obviously, the Church is unable to convince Ukrainians that it is supposedly no longer dependent on the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate and stands on pro-Ukrainian positions.

At the same time, it is worth remembering and taking into account that practical security actions regarding representatives of the Church (and the Church itself in case of approval of the relevant Law) must be accompanied by enhanced communication, especially with the public of Western partners. You can already see that the Russian enemy is trying to discredit Ukraine abroad because of the alleged "persecution of Christians". This topic is particularly sensitive for our partners - the USA. As we can see, the Ukrainians themselves in Ukraine have an unambiguous perception of the Church and do not consider the current situation to be "persecution". However, the public and opinion leaders in the West do not have all the details of the religio-political situation in Ukraine and can easily "swallow" Russian narratives. Accordingly, Ukraine's communication direction should also be moderately active and reasoned for our partners.

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

To what extent do you trust or not trust the following institutions and organizations?

What do you think should be the current policy of the Ukrainian authorities regarding the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (head - Onufrii)?