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Perception of security agreements by Ukrainians
The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS
During May 16-22, 2024 and June 20-25, 2024, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted two separate all-Ukrainian surveys of public opinion "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, it added questions about Ukrainians' perception of security agreements. By the method of computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting), 1,067 respondents were interviewed in all regions of Ukraine (territory under the control of the Government of Ukraine) during May 16-22 and 1,007 respondents during June 20-25. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived on the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories that are temporarily not controlled by the authorities of Ukraine (at the same time, in each sample, about 2% are Ukrainians who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who went abroad after February 24, 2022. Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% - for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% - for indicators close to 5%. Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that can affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS. In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.
Despite the motley picture of challenges facing Ukraine in various spheres, the most fundamental issue for Ukrainians is ensuring long-term security. If before 2014 the vast majority of Ukrainians saw Ukraine as a neutral, non-aligned state, then after 2014 support for joining NATO increased significantly, and after 2022 the idea of joining NATO became a national dream. In November 2023 (survey for NDI), 89% of Ukrainians answered that they would like Ukraine to become a member of NATO. In the same survey, 78% of Ukrainians said that refusing to join NATO is unacceptable for them (in particular, for 56%, refusing to join NATO is categorically unacceptable)[1]. Even more, if Ukrainians are asked to decide what is more important to them - joining the EU or joining NATO - 54% choose NATO membership (compared to 24% who chose EU membership) (October 2023)[2]. At the same time, even membership in the EU is perceived through the lens of security opportunities. For 59% of Ukrainians, Ukraine's membership in the European Union is of the greatest importance for "ensuring long-term security" (and this answer was the most popular). At the same time, there is a pragmatic understanding of the obstacles on Ukraine's path to NATO. Were discussed since the beginning of the invasion, and from the end of 2023 were translated into the practical plane of Ukraine's conclusion of bilateral security agreements with our partners. In May 2022 and May 2023, KIIS asked whether it is acceptable to rely on security agreements instead of joining NATO, or whether only NATO membership can guarantee the security of Ukraine. If there was relative parity in May 2022 (39% insisted on NATO membership, and 42% agreed with security agreements), then in May 2023, 58% insisted on NATO membership, and 29% agreed with security agreements[3]. In May-June 2024, we decided to investigate this issue once again. However, it was clear that in a "face-to-face confrontation" NATO would "win" in security agreements. At the same time, it is obvious that the accession to NATO is postponed for the future, and Ukraine can currently rely only on such security agreements. Therefore, in May 2024 we asked the question to what extent security agreements are capable of helping to effectively confront the enemy, and in June 2024 we asked the question how useful these agreements are for the defense capability of Ukraine.
How useful are security agreements for strengthening Ukraine's defense capabilities
The vast majority of Ukrainians - 65% - believe that security agreements are useful for strengthening Ukraine's defense capabilities. At the same time, it is important to take into account that 18% of them consider it very useful, and the remaining 47% consider it rather useful (that is, the majority have a restrained-cautious attitude). At the same time, 27% of Ukrainians claim that these agreements either have no effect on defense capability or are generally useless.
Graph 1. This year, Ukraine has already signed several security agreements and is negotiating with other countries. In your opinion, how useful or not are these agreements for strengthening Ukraine's defense capabilities? (June 2024)
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In all regions of Ukraine, the majority of the population (from 59% in the East to 68% in the West) consider security agreements useful for strengthening defense capabilities. No more than a quarter of the population of each region has a skeptical attitude towards security agreements.
Graph 2. How useful are security agreements for strengthening Ukraine's defense capabilities in terms of the region of residence
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To what extent security agreements will help Ukraine effectively resist the aggressor
Usefulness is not the same as sufficiency, that is, certain types of aid from friendly countries can definitely be perceived as important elements of defense, but at the same time be considered insufficient, for example, to repel the enemy. As can be seen in the graph below, 13% of Ukrainians believe that the security agreements will allow to obtain everything necessary for the liberation of all territories and repelling Russian aggression in the future. Another 27% believe that these agreements will at least deter the enemy on the current front line and possibly liberate some territories. That is, in general, according to 40%, security agreements are capable of at least deterring the enemy. At the same time, 51% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine will receive insufficient support to effectively counter Russia.
Graph 3. This year, Ukraine has already signed several security agreements and is negotiating with other countries. And what is your impression about these agreements?
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In all regions of Ukraine, there is a rather pronounced presence of fears regarding security agreements, to what extent they will help effectively resist the aggressor.
Graph 4. To what extent will the security agreements help Ukraine effectively resist the aggressor in terms of the region of residence
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A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:
In the current situation, the impossibility of Ukraine's rapid membership in NATO is, unfortunately, an objective situation, and not through Ukraine's fault (and even more so not through the fault of Ukrainians). M. Bielieskov (chief consultant of the military policy department of the National Institute of Strategic Studies, senior analyst of the CO "Povernys zhyvym") speaks fairly about this issue, analyzing the agreement between Ukraine and the USA: "Unfortunately, Ukraine is in a situation where it accepts formats of interaction acceptable to our partners. And that is why the rather general wording of the agreement, which is not an alliance, is not ratified. It is not our fault and not the fault of those who are at Bankova here and now. Unfortunately, international relations are still more about calculating the risks and prices of certain steps, as well as about maximum freedom of maneuver, and not about charity, as we would like. Therefore, we must honestly say that the agreement with the USA (as well as other similar agreements) can both turn into a more detailed version of the Budapest Memorandum and into one of the instruments that can change the situation for the better. Question of filling". For our part, we draw attention to the importance of the subjective side - Ukrainians' perception of the agreements and their ability to ensure long-term security. Since the demand for security is fundamental, it is important that Ukrainians themselves believe that the parameters of Ukraine's agreements with its partners (current and future) really create conditions where one can feel at least relatively safe. Currently, there are considerable doubts among Ukrainians. Given the impossibility of NATO membership, Ukraine can only rely on security agreements. It is difficult to criticize Ukrainians for being cautious and doubtful. Ukrainians remember the infamous Budapest memorandum, the insufficiently timely and insufficient nomenclature of aid after a full-scale invasion, the dependence of Ukraine's aid on the internal politics of partner countries. However, even under such conditions, there are circumstances when confidence in security agreements will grow to a more acceptable level. And it primarily depends on our friends, how much they are ready to really adhere to the ambitious and powerful promises in the signed agreements. If Ukrainians see an uninterrupted flow of arms in sufficient quantity, will see that aid does not depend on the whims of domestic politics, and will eventually "feel" the consequences (for example, the cessation of systematic shelling of front-line cities) - then Ukrainians will be able to overcome their fears and worries about security agreements.
Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire
This year, Ukraine has already signed several security agreements and is negotiating with other countries. And what is your impression of these deals?
This year, Ukraine has already signed several security agreements and is negotiating with other countries. In your opinion, how useful or not are these agreements for strengthening Ukraine's defense capabilities?
5.7.2024
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