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Perception of Russia's safety margin and how long Ukrainians are willing to bear the burden of war

The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

 

From September 20 to October 3, 2024, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added questions about Russia's margin of safety and how long Ukrainians themselves are ready to endure the hardships of war. 989 respondents were interviewed By the method of computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting)989 respondents were interviewed in all regions of Ukraine (territory under the control of the Government of Ukraine). The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived on the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories that are temporarily not controlled by the authorities of Ukraine (at the same time, part of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who went abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% - for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% - for indicators close to 5%.

Under the conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that can affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moodts of the population.

 

 

 

Perception of Russia's margin of safety in the war against Ukraine

 

One of the enemy's important propaganda narratives is that it is futile to fight Russia because Russia has "virtually unlimited resources" such as money, people, weapons, etc. The calculation of Russian propaganda is to shake the faith of Ukrainians in the possibility of victory, as well as to sow doubts among our Western partners. That is why, in February 2023, for the first time, we asked the respondents which point of view they agree with to a greater extent - that Russia really has a significant reserve of resources, can exhaust Ukraine for a long time, and as a result, Ukraine will not be able to end the war on acceptable terms? Or that Russia is actually exhausting its resources, and Ukraine, together with the support of the world, will be able to end the war on acceptable terms in the foreseeable future? We also asked the same question again in October 2023 and in October 2024.

As you can see in the graph below, between February and October 2023, from 22% to 49%, more people believe that Russia still retains a significant stockpile of resources and can wage war against Ukraine for many more years. On the other hand, from 67% to 43%, the share of those who, on the contrary, believe that Russia is exhausting its resources and that the war may end on terms acceptable to Ukraine in the foreseeable future has decreased. Between October 2023 and October 2024, the situation almost did not change, although now we have reached a practically parity of opinion: 47% of Ukrainians believe that Russia has enough resources for a long war against Ukraine, and 46%, on the contrary, believe that Russia is running out of reserves their resources.

 

Graph 1. With which of these statements do you agree to a greater extent?

 

 


In all regions[1] both points of view are largely represented, although in the South and the East, however, there are slightly more people who believe that Russia still has a significant supply of resources than those who believe that it is depleting them (and in both regions, and especially in the East, perception has improved over the past year - there are fewer people who believe in the unlimited resources of the aggressor).

In the Center, we see a parity representation of opinions, and in the West, there are slightly more people who believe that Russia is still exhausting its resources (however, even in the West, 42% believe that Russia still has a significant reserve of resources).   

 

Graph 2. Dynamics of the perception of Russia's margin of safety in the regional dimension

 

 

 


As an example of the influence of the narrative about Russia's limitless resources, it is worth looking at the connection with the answers to the question whether Ukraine, in the case of proper support from the West, is able to succeed in the war [2].

Among those who believe in Russia's limitless resources, there are fewer who believe that success can be achieved with Western support - 71% versus 92% among those who believe that Russia is exhausting its resources.

 

Graph 3. And what is your opinion about Ukraine's ability to succeed in the war, provided that it has the proper support from the West?

 

 

 

 


How much longer will Ukrainians bear the burden of war

 

Regardless of the perception of Russia's safety margin, it is important to understand to what extent the Ukrainians themselves are ready to continue bearing the burden of the war. KIIS regularly asks the question "How much longer are you ready to endure the war?", and we can assess the dynamics of public sentiment.

From the beginning of the invasion until February 2024, the situation practically did not change: consistently around 71-73% answered that they were ready to endure the war for as long as necessary (and another 2-3% said 1 year). In the same period, 18-21% talked about a shorter own margin of safety (a few months to a year and a half).

Between February and October 2024, we record for the first time a decline in the share of those willing to endure as long as necessary. At the same time, the majority of Ukrainians - 63% - claim that they are ready to endure the war as long as necessary. At the same time, from 3% to 6% there were more people who talk about 1 year, i.e. 69% of Ukrainians talk about a relatively long period.

It is worth noting that the share of those who talk about a shorter period of several months to half a year has not increased - 19% now and 21% in February 2024 (this difference is within the margin of error). However, from 4% to 12%, there were more people who could not answer the question, which, obviously, reflects the increase in general uncertainty of the future in the eyes of Ukrainians.

 

Graph 4. How much longer are you willing to endure war?

 

 

The graph below shows the situation in terms of regions and changes compared to February 2024. As can be seen, although there is also an increase in uncertainty in the West and in the Center, in general, the population of these regions maintains high confidence in their capabilities (with minimal deterioration compared to February 2024)..

However, in the South and East, the dynamics are much more noticeable. In the South, from 71% to 57%, becamefewer people who talk about a conditionally long period (1 year - as long as it takes), in particular, from 68% to 50%, became fewer people who say about as long as necessary. At the same time, there is no significant increase in those who talk about a short period - 24% in February and 26% now. On the other hand, from 4% to 17%, became more undecided people.

In the East (which includes Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts) in February, 73% spoke of a relatively long period, and 70% of them said "as long as necessary." Now - 48%, and of them 38% are ready to endure as long as necessary. On the other hand, from 23% to 36%, the share of those who speak of a conditionally short period has increased, and from 5% to 16%, became more of those who are undecided.

 

Graph 5. How long are ready to endure war in the regional dimension

 

 


The connection between the assessment of Russia's strength and own willingness to endure war is traced. So, among those who believe that Russia is running out of resources, 77% are ready to endure as long as necessary (and in general 82% are ready to endure a conditionally long period).

At the same time, among those who believe in Russia's unlimited resources, 52% are ready to endure as long as necessary (and in general 59% are ready to endure a conditionally long period). Although even among them, 28% talk about a conditionally short period of several months to a year and a half.

 

Graph 6. How much longer are you ready to endure the war depending on the assessment of Russia's safety margin

 

 


This trend can be observed in all regions. In particular. In the South and East (where, as previously shown, we see the most noticeable negative dynamics), among those who believe that Russia is generally depleting resources, the vast majority are willing to endure a relatively long period (and most are willing to endure as long as necessary).

           

Graph 7. How long are ready to endure war in the regional dimension and depending on the assessment of Russia's safety margin

 

 


Finally, it is worth paying attention to how Ukrainian men and women of different ages are ready to endure war. As can be seen, the majority of both men and women, young Ukrainians, middle-aged Ukrainians, and older Ukrainians show a high willingness to endure as long as necessary.

 

Graph 8. How long are people willing to endure war by gender and age

 

 

 

 

 

 

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

 

The narrative about Russia's limitless resources really has a negative impact on the public moods of Ukrainians. According to the data presented in this press release, we already see a connection with our own readiness to bear the burden of war as long as it will be necessary, as well as with whether Ukraine, with Western support, is able to succeed in the war. In the following publications, we will also show that the belief in the unlimited resources of our enemy is connected, in particular, with a higher readiness for territorial concessions in order to end the war.

So far, the impact of such faith in Russia's limitless resources has not yet had critical destructive consequences, but we are already seeing the erosion of certain important moods (and especially alarming trends in the frontline regions). Of course, the enemy cannot be underestimated, and it is necessary to have a healthy and restrained perception of Russia's potential. However, one cannot allow oneself to suffocate in the myth of invincible Russia with its limitless resources.

We would like to emphasize separately that despite all the difficulties and objective reasons for an uncertain future, despite growing fatigue, the majority of Ukrainians are determined to fight as long as necessary.  

 

 

 

 

 


           

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

 

With which of these statements regarding the confrontation between Ukraine and Russia do you agree to a greater extent? RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER

Despite the loss, Russia still has a significant stock of resources - money, people, weapons, and equipment. No matter how much the world supports Ukraine now, it is not enough to end the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine and Russia will be able to wage war against Ukraine for many more years 1
Russia is depleting its reserves of resources - money, people, weapons, and equipment are becoming less and less. Together with the support of the world, Ukraine will be able to end the war on terms acceptable to Ukraine in the foreseeable future 2
DIFFICULT TO SAY (DO NOT READ) 3
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ) 4

 

How much longer are you ready to endure the war?

Several months 1
Half a year 2
1 year 3
As long as necessary 4
DIFFICULT TO SAY (DO NOT READ) 5
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ) 6

 

 



[1] The composition of the macroregions is as follows: Western macroregion – Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Khmelnytskyi, Chernivtsi oblasts; Central macroregion – Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Kyiv oblasts, Kyiv city, Southern macroregion – Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Odesa oblasts, Eastern macroregion – Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv oblasts.


4.11.2024
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