The press release was prepared by Anton Grushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

From September 20 to October 3, 2024, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added its own monitoring question about readiness for territorial concessions. Bythemethodoftelephoneinterviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) 2,004 respondents were interviewed in all regions of Ukraine (territory under the control of the Government of Ukraine) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting). The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived on the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories that are temporarily not controlled by the authorities of Ukraine (at the same time, part of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who went abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 2.9% for indicators close to 50%, 2.5% for indicators close to 25%, 1.7% - for indicators close to 10%, 1.3% - for indicators close to 5%.

Under the conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that can affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by the KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

Since May 2022, KIIS in its own surveys regularly asks questions about the population's readiness for territorial concessions in order to achieve peace and preserve independence as soon as possible. Before the current survey, the last time KIIS asked this question was in May 2024. Between May and the beginning of October 2024, a number of events took place that could have a significant impact on the thoughts and views of Ukrainians: the advance of Russian troops in Donbas (although slow and with heavy losses among the occupiers), the Kursk operation, the election campaign in the USA, not always a favorable position Western allies on certain important issues for Ukraine (for example, permission to use long-range weapons on the territory of Russia), etc.

As in our previous publication, we immediately pay attention to the following methodological aspects. Thus, the wording of the question reads "Which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree to a greater extent?", and the respondent was asked to choose one of these two statements (at the same time, the statements were read to different respondents in a different order to reduce the order effect ):

• "In order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence, Ukraine can give up some of its territories"
• "Under no circumstances should Ukraine give up any of its territories, even if because of this the war will last longer and there will be threats to the preservation of independence"

We emphasize separately that the first statement does not specify which territories can be the subject of concessions. Also, we are not talking about the official recognition of certain territories as belonging to Russia (for example, some people are ready to postpone the liberation of certain territories for the future at a more suitable time for this, but at the moment they did not recognize the official belonging to Russia). Also, in no case is the first statement the same as "peace on any terms" or even less readiness to surrender. This statement measures the extent to which Ukrainians in general are ready to discuss the possible parameters of peace in the context of the issue of territorial control. (However, at the same time, since the reality is more complex, the second part of the press release presents experimental data that better shed light on the attitude of Ukrainians to the parameters of peace.)

Graph 1 shows the respondents' answers. In the period from May 2022 to May 2023, the situation was relatively stable: about 8-10% of respondents were ready for territorial concessions, and the absolute majority - 82-87% - consistently opposed any concessions. After May 2023, there is a gradual increase in the share of those who are ready for territorial concessions. So, by the end of 2023, readiness to make concessions increased to 19%, in February 2024 – to 26%, in May 2024 – to 32%. Between May and the beginning of October 2024, the situation actually did not change - currently 32% are ready for territorial concessions.

The share of those who oppose no territorial concessions, respectively, decreased until May 2024 and reached 55%. As of the beginning of October 2024, despite all the difficult circumstances, the majority of Ukrainians - 58% - opposed any territorial concessions (the current indicator is within statistical error compared to May, i.e. formally there were no changes).

Graph 1. With which of these statements about possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree to a greater extent?

The graph below shows the data by region of residence of the respondents[1]. It is worth paying attention to the dynamics from May 2024. In fact, the situation has not changed in the West and in the Center (where the mood is almost identical to that of the whole of Ukraine - 59-60% are categorically against any concessions, and 31-32% are ready for certain concessions).

In the South of Ukraine, there were slightly more people who are categorically against any concessions (from 46% to 56%, mainly due to a smaller share of those who are undecided). At the same time, the share of those who are generally ready for certain concessions has not changed (36% in May and 33% now).

In the East, given the relatively small number of respondents, the difference is formally within the margin of error, although at the level of a trend, we can speak of an increase in the share of those who are generally ready to make certain concessions (from 33% to 40%). At the same time, 50% of respondents in the East are categorically against territorial concessions.

Graph 2. Readiness for territorial concessions in the regional dimension

Previously, KIIS published data from the same survey on how Ukrainians perceive Russia's safety margin (Russia has a conditionally "unlimited" supply of resources for terrorizing Ukraine or Russia is gradually depleting them) and how much they themselves are ready to endure war. As can be seen in the graph below, those who believe in Russia's "limitless" stock of resources are more ready to make territorial concessions - 48% versus 44%, who are still categorically against it. In contrast, among those who believe that Russia is still running out of resources, only 18% are ready for territorial concessions, and 72% are categorically against any concessions.

In the case of personal readiness to endure war, the longer the period mentioned by the respondents, the fewer among them are those who are ready for territorial concessions. So, if among those who are ready to endure the war for several months to a year and a half, 59% are ready for territorial concessions, then among those who are ready to endure 1 year - 43%, and among those who are ready to endure as long as necessary - 21 %. At the same time, the share of those who are categorically against any concessions is increasing from 34% to 69%.

Graph 3. Readiness for territorial concessions in terms of perception of Russia's safety margin and personal readiness to endure war

Other important dimensions that influence the readiness of territorial concessions are the internal consolidation of society and the feeling of support from Western partners. We previously published data on what, according to Ukrainians, the West's policy towards Ukraine is (does the West want a just peace for Ukraine or does the West pressure Ukraine for unfair concessions)[2], and regarding trust in the President[3].

The highest readiness to make concessions is among those who do not trust the President and believe that the West wants an unfair peace from Ukraine (56% are ready to make concessions, 38% are categorically against). If the respondent has "mixed" views (do not trust the President, but believe in support from the West, or vice versa), then the readiness to make concessions is already lower and more than half are categorically against concessions. At the same time, those who retain both trust in the President and the trust of the West are the least ready to make concessions. Among them, 69% are categorically against concessions (against 24% who are ready for territorial concessions).

Graph 4. Readiness for territorial concessions in terms of trust in President V. Zelenskyi and the perception of the West's policy towards Ukraine

In our monitoring question, we study the general readiness to make certain concessions, without specifying the territories that may be subject to painful compromise. In fact, for the absolute majority of Ukrainians, no piece of Ukrainian land can be legitimately recognized as part of Russia. For example, in the summer of 2024, KIIS conducted the research "Cognitive de-occupation of Crimea" at the request of the Representation of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the "Partnership for a Strong Ukraine" Foundation[4]. Among the important results - 94% of Ukrainians reject the statement that Crimea allegedly has an exclusively Russian past, and 90% believe that Crimea should be returned to Ukraine (and only 12% believe that Crimea has been lost forever). 

In June 2024, we investigated the question of possible concessions from the point of view of "package" agreements, and the results showed that, firstly, there is a differentiated attitude to different territories, and, secondly, the factor of security guarantees has a greater influence[5]. In the same survey (conducted in September-October 2024), we decided to approach this question a little differently (in order to see the broader picture, taking into account the previous results about "package" agreements). So, to begin with, we asked the question, "Please imagine the following requirement for achieving peace. Ukraine does not officially recognize this, but ..." and then the respondent was randomly offered such a territorial concession:

• "Russia maintains control over all currently occupied territories"
• "Russia establishes control over all territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts"
• "Russia maintains control over Crimea"

In the question, as you can see, there were no additional parameters of possible arrangements (such as certain security guarantees), that is, formally we were only asking about the territorial aspect. However, some of the respondents, perhaps in the context of the information consumed in the media, could understand it somewhat more broadly (for example, hope that such a compromise will be accompanied by certain positive consequences for Ukraine).

The answer scale is: "It is completely unacceptable", "It would be difficult, but it would be acceptable" or "It is easy to compromise on this item". The first two options indicate a general readigness to make a concession, although show a different degree of this readiness (and, accordingly, the importance of the concession for the respondent). Moreover, it is important that the second option ("it will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable") is a more socially acceptable form of expressing agreement with a certain difficult compromise.

So, first of all, we emphasize that for only 4-7% of Ukrainians, these territorial concessions are easy to accept. This should be interpreted as evidence of the illegitimacy of the occupation of any part of Ukraine for the absolute majority of the population.

At the same time, there is a part of Ukrainians for whom such concessions are difficult, but generally acceptable. Moreover, we see a differentiated attitude depending on the territory. On the one hand, in the case of all currently occupied territories, a total of 30% are ready for Russia to continue to de facto control them, but 64% are categorically against it. At the same time, on the other hand, in the case of Donbas and Crimea, a total of 46% are ready to accept such a concession. Categorically against - 50% in the case of Donbas and 51% in the case of Crimea.

Graph 5. Readiness to accept a territorial concession to end the war (without additional parameters such as security guarantees)

In the graph below, the data are shown in a regional dimension. In all regions, an absolute minority claims that a certain concession is easy for them. At the same time, we can talk about generally similar views in the West, in the Center and in the South (albeit with certain accents). In particular, in these regions, the majority is categorically against maintaining de facto Russian control over all occupied territories.

At the same time, the East stands out somewhat, where also the minority will easily agree to the mentioned concessions. However, in general, the readiness to make concessions is higher. In particular, the majority is ready, unenthusiastically, but to accept Russian de facto control over all currently occupied territories.

Graph 6. Readiness to accept a territorial concession to end the war in the regional dimension

The graph below is an illustration that in the case of complex questions, we cannot focus exclusively on one question, but must be aware of all the complexities. So, at the beginning of the press release, we provided the results of our monitoring question about the general readiness for territorial concessions. The graph below shows readiness for specific territorial concessions in terms of those who were "categorically against no concessions" and those who were generally ready to accept certain concessions.

As can be seen, for only 14% of those who are generally ready to make some concessions, this will be an easy decision. And although the majority is really ready to accept all the considered options, it is mostly a difficult decision for these respondents. At the same time, among those who are generally ready to make concessions, a third are against recognizing Russia's de facto control over all currently occupied territories (that is, they reject this option). For a quarter, de facto control over Donbas and Crimea will be unacceptable.

In turn, among those who are categorically against any concessions, 15% are ready to accept Russia's de facto control over all occupied territories, 27% - over Donbas, 31% - over Crimea.

Graph 7. Readiness to accept a territorial concession to end the war depending on the general readiness for territorial concessions

For respondents who were "categorically unacceptable" or who were "undecided" about their opinion regarding territorial concessions (for example, regarding Russia's de facto control over all currently occupied territories), an additional question was asked: "What if, at the same time, Ukraine in exchange for these territorial concessions received concessions from membership in NATO and really reliable security guarantees?". The scale was the same (from easily accepted to still categorically unacceptable concession).

The graph below summarizes the answers to both questions. So, in the case of de facto control of Russia over all occupied territories, in addition to 30% of those who are ready to accept it even without security guarantees, another 21% are ready to accept such a concession in exchange for NATO membership. Categorically against, even under the condition of membership in NATO - 42%.

In the case of both Donbass and Crimea, 19% of those who are ready to do so in exchange for reliable security guarantees are added to the 46% of those who are already ready to accept de facto control of Russia. Categorically against even with NATO membership - 30%.

Graph 8. Readiness to accept territorial concessions to end the war on the condition of NATO membership / security guarantees

Below in the graph, the data are shown in the regional dimension. Almost everywhere, more than half of respondents are ready to accept (albeit unenthusiastically) some concession if Ukraine is granted NATO membership. Only in the West, in the case of de facto recognition of Russia's control over all occupied territories, the same number are ready to accept such a concession in exchange for NATO and categorically against it.

Graph 9. Readiness to accept a territorial concession to end the war on the condition of obtaining NATO membership / security guarantees in the regional dimension

A. Grushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

Currently, Ukraine is in a very difficult situation: in addition to the advance of the Russian occupiers (albeit slowly and with heavy losses) in the Donbas, the situation in the international arena is turbulent and uncertain, especially after the elections in the USA.

Taking into account the uncertainty of the development of the situation, especially in relations with the Western allies, it is important that the military-political leadership of Ukraine has the support of the public in difficult (and currently such, which, obviously, it is impossible to tell the public in detail) diplomatic maneuvers and decisions. And we really see that Ukrainians, on the one hand, categorically reject the formula "peace on any conditions". "Any" peace is not needed and will not be approved by Ukrainians. On the other hand, Ukrainians retain flexibility and space for maneuver to adopt possibly difficult, but best in this situation, decisions for the future of the country. We see that the occupation of any part of the territory is illegitimate in the eyes of Ukrainians, but security guarantees are now largely a priority. That is, Ukrainians are neither putting pressure on the authorities to achieve "any kind of peace" nor creating categorically defined unrealistic frameworks. The military-political leadership has space for action and we should support it and hope for a better development of events.

As sociologists and representatives of KIIS, we realize that only the top military-political leadership of Ukraine has all the information about the situation in the country and in international relations with partners. We are sorry to see how even respected members of the public (journalists, public activists, volunteers, experts, etc.), without having all the information, use their reputation and people's trust and populistly speculate on difficult issues of "how to properly conduct military operations", "how to properly organize Defense Forces", "how to properly conduct international diplomacy", etc. Although it may be difficult for some to admit, a significant part of our public figures have very narrowly specialized expertise and cannot be experts on many other issues.

We must all now show unity and maintain mutual trust. Not all issues are subject to public discussion. The example of the Kursk operation shows that many processes cannot be the subject of public discussions, because then there will be no efficiency. This applies both to the planning and conduct of military operations, and to sensitive issues of international politics. Therefore, instead of critical comments and emotional outrage on social media, we should maintain unity and work for Victory.

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

With which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree to a greater extent? RANDOMIZATION OF THE ORDER

Imagine, please, the following requirement for achieving peace. Ukraine does not officially recognize this, but Russia …

SPLIT-SAMPLE (ONLY 1 OPTION TO THE RESPONDENT):

• maintains control over all currently occupied territories
• establishes control over all territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
• maintains control over Crimea

How would you feel about it? Use the scale "It is easy to compromise on this item", "It would be difficult, but it would be acceptable" or "It is completely unacceptable"

IF 3-5 IN THE PREVIOUS And if at the same time Ukraine received NATO membership and really reliable security guarantees in exchange for these territorial concessions? IF NECESSARY, INDICATE WHICH OPTION OF CONCESSIONS IS IN QUESTION

.