The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

From May 2 to 12, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added a question about trust in ten Ukrainian politicians. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,010 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022року.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

Under the conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

In the first half of May 2025, KIIS conducted a survey on trust in individual Ukrainian politicians. In total, we asked people to rate their trust (or distrust) in ten Ukrainian politicians. In the case of eight of them (O. Arestovych, Yu. Boiko, V. Zelenskyy, V. Klychko, P. Poroshenko, S. Prytula, D. Razumkov, Yu. Tymoshenko), we previously published the results of the surveys[1] and therefore it was also interesting to understand how citizens' attitudes towards them have changed. At the same time, this time we also added two more politicians: O. Honcharenko (given his high media activity and resonant statements and actions) and Ye. Muraiev (a representative of one of the segments of "abroad").

There are many influential public and political figures in Ukraine, the attitude towards which it is advisable to track in surveys. Unfortunately, we are limited in our own resources, so we have limited our list to ten names. Also, our focus is on politicians (or those who were involved in relevant activities at least until 2022), so, for example, the list does not include such well-known figures as V. Zaluzhnyi (who has not announced his political ambitions at this time), O. Syrskyi, K. Budanov and others.

 Also, before moving on to the actual results, we would like to point out some methodological points for the correct interpretation of the results. Thus, respondents were asked the question “To what extent do you trust or distrust the following Ukrainian public figures? If you do not know him or her, say so.” Respondents were offered the answers “Completely do not trust”, “rather do not trust”, “rather trust” and “completely trust”. The option “hard to say” was not offered, but respondents could ask to mark it on their own initiative.

For such questions, a typical approach (both in Ukraine and around the world) is to “combine” the answers “rather” and “completely” during publications (for example, to list together the share of those who rather or completely trust a certain politician). This is how the results will be presented further in the press release. At the same time, readers can also familiarize themselves with the detailed distributions (for each answer option) in the Annex.

We have previously published the results of the same survey on trust in President V. Zelenskyy[2]. Therefore, it is worth immediately moving on to considering trust in other politicians on the list.

Apart from V. Zelenskyy, the only figure on the list who has a positive balance of trust-distrust is S. Prytula. He is trusted by 50%, distrusted by 38% (balance of trust-distrust – +12%). V. Klychko has quite high trust indicators (albeit with a negative balance), trusted by 43%, distrusted by 47% (balance – -4%).

Next in terms of trust indicators are O. Honcharenko (27% trust, 41% do not trust, balance -14%; however, in his case 25% do not know who he is), D. Razumkov (27% trust, 32% do not trust, balance -5%; in his case many also do not know who he is – 34%), P. Poroshenko (25% trust, 70% do not trust, balance -45%). Yu. Tymoshenko is trusted by 14%, distrusted by 80% (balance – -66%).

The least amount of Ukrainians trusts O. Arestovych (7% trust, 79% do not trust, the balance is -72%), Yu. Boiko (7% trust, 72% do not trust, the balance is -65%), Ye. Muraiev (6% trust, 47% do not trust, balance -41%; however, in his case, 43% do not know who he is).

Graph 1. To what extent do you trust or not trust the following Ukrainian public figures? If you don't know him or her, say so.

It is also worth noting that 91% of respondents trust at least one politician from the list, on average they trust 3 figures.

The graph below shows how trust in eight politicians has changed compared to February 2024. As in the previous case, the dynamics of trust in V. Zelenskyy have been examined in more detail in our previous publications, so let's look at other politicians.

The share of those who trust S. Prytula has decreased from 61% to 50%, and the balance has decreased from +28% to +12%. In the case of V. Klychko, the indicators have almost not changed - the share of those who trust is now 43% against 45% in February 2024, and the balance - respectively -4% and -6%.

In the case of D. Razumkov, the increase in the share of those who do not know him is noticeable - from 27% to 34%. At the same time, the number of those who trust him has decreased from 35% to 27%, and the balance has generally deteriorated from +2% to -5%. The share of those who trust P. Poroshenko has decreased from 31% to 25%, and the balance has decreased from -37% to -45%. In the case of Yu. Tymoshenko, the indicators have almost not changed - now 14% trust her against 17% in February 2024, and the balance is, respectively, -65% and -66%.

Also, compared to February 2024, there were more people who did not know O. Arestovych - an increase from 4% to 10%. Due to this, there were slightly fewer people who trust and those who do not trust, and the balance is the same (-72%). In the case of Yu. Boiko, the indicators also changed minimally. In February 2024, 10% trusted him, now - 7%. His balance indicators are, respectively, -63% in February 2024 and -65% in May 2025.

Graph 2. Dynamics of trust between February 2024 and May 2025 

Earlier in the press release, we noted that on average, respondents trusted three out of ten proposed politicians, which means that a significant part of Ukrainians trust several people at the same time. Many people have a false “black and white” perception that trusting one politician excludes trusting a certain other politician-public enemy. However, this is not so, and it is useful to understand what the intersection of such fields of trust is.

The table below shows how those who trust a certain politician feel about other politicians. It is noticeable that V. Zelenskyy is trusted by the majority of those who trust other politicians from the list. At the same time, in many other cases, a significant overlap in trust can also be seen.

It is worth paying attention to, as an example, perhaps one of the most irreconcilable (and one of the most harmful for the country) confrontations along the line of V. Zelenskyy-P. Poroshenko. Thus, among those who trust P. Poroshenko, 73% trust V. Zelenskyy. At the same time, among those who trust V. Zelenskyy, a significant share also trust P. Poroshenko – 25%. In fact, among all adult Ukrainians in the territory controlled by the Government, 19% simultaneously trust both V. Zelenskyy and P. Poroshenko.

A similar situation can be seen in the context of the confrontation between the central government and the leadership of Kyiv in the person of V. Klychko. Among those who trust V. Klychko, 82% trust V. Zelenskyy. And among those who trust V. Zelenskyy, 47% trust V. Klychko. In general, among all respondents, 35% simultaneously trust both the President and the Mayor of Kyiv.

As can be seen in the table, the situation is similar for other pairs of politicians.

Table 1. Do those who trust a certain figure from the list trust other politicians

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

As of May 2025, 71% of Ukrainians oppose elections even in the event of a truce with security guarantees[3]. At the same time, the above-mentioned levels of trust (mostly not very high and/or with negative dynamics, and in the case of V. Zelenskyy largely due to the effect of rallying around the flag) show that there is still a demand in society for a new generation of leaders. Since the Defense Forces and volunteers enjoy the highest trust in Ukraine[4], it is expected that it is from these categories of the population that Ukrainians seek to see those who will lead Ukraine through reconstruction and reforms to a better future in the European family.

Another important result is that there is significantly less mutual polarization and hostility among the public than in the statements of competing political teams (especially on social media). The data in this press release shows that, for example, 19% trust both P. Poroshenko and V. Zelenskyy. In one of our previous surveys, it was noticeable that despite the fact that the majority of Ukrainians do not trust P. Poroshenko and at the same time the majority trust V. Zelenskyy, 59% saw a political basis for sanctions against him[5]. That is, high trust in the President does not transform into unwavering support for all decisions. And also, distrust of the ex-President does not immediately lead to agreement with all accusations against him. At the same time, the often harsh rhetoric of P. Poroshenko's team against V. Zelenskyy contradicts the fact that the majority of those who have a favorable attitude towards him also trust the current President.

If not from a moral point of view (no discord during an existential war), then at least from a pragmatic/technological point of view (maintaining the loyalty of citizens who may become disillusioned in the event of harsh mutual accusations) both teams should take this into account when resorting to certain actions or statements.

We understand that the logic of parliamentary elections means that only 5% of the votes is enough to have your own faction, while getting, for example, 20% may be enough to become the leader of the race and claim the post of Prime Minister (even if you are not trusted by the majority of the population). This encourages many to use confrontational rhetoric and promote polarization (as a tool for mobilizing in the elections). However, it also destroys the country from within, makes it weaker in the face of a Russian invasion, and can lead to catastrophic consequences. Belief in a better future for Ukraine keeps hope and fire in the hearts of Ukrainians to continue the struggle. Therefore, responsible politicians, in our opinion, should follow a technologically more complex, but correct path - the formation of unifying platforms, the unity of our diverse society (both horizontally and vertically) and positive motivation with the success that we can truly achieve through joint efforts.

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

Now we would like to know your attitude towards individual Ukrainian public figures. To what extent do you trust or distrust the following Ukrainian public figures? If you do not know him or her, say so. RANDOMIZATION OF READING

Ukraine as a whole

West[6]

Center

South

East