The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

From May 15 to June 3, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative,  added a question about the level of optimistic / pessimistic moods regarding the future of Ukraine and the unity of Ukrainians. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,011 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

KIIS continues to investigate how optimistic/pessimistic Ukrainians are. In particular, over the past few years, KIIS has regularly asked questions about whether Ukrainians are moving towards unity/split, as well as how Ukrainians see the future of Ukraine in 10 years – as a prosperous EU member state or, conversely, as a ruined country with a significant outflow of population.

The last time KIIS asked these questions was in December 2024, and in general, we expected to repeat them every year. At the same time, taking into account the dynamics of the first half of 2025 (especially in the context of new relations with the USA), we decided to find out in our survey in May-June 2025 what Ukrainians think now.

Graph 1 below shows data on how Ukrainians feel about unity (or division) in society. Compared to December 2024, the number of those who believe that Ukrainians are overcoming contradictions and are on the path to a united nation has increased from 53% to 61%. This was mainly due to a decrease in the share of those who had undecided views (from 14% in December 2024 to 7% now).

At the same time, a third of the population (33% now and exactly the same number in December 2024) believe that internal contradictions are deepening and Ukrainians are heading towards a split.

Graph 1. And how do you assess unity among Ukrainians and overcoming contradictions?

* In 2020, due to a different socio-political context, the formulations were similar in content, but somewhat different: "Ukraine as a country is being stitched together, is on the path of unification" and "Ukraine as a country is falling apart, is heading towards split.".

Graph 2 below shows how Ukrainians see Ukraine in 10 years. Since October 2022, we have seen a steady decline in the share of those who share an optimistic view of Ukraine’s future. However, as recently as December 2024, the majority still believed that Ukraine would be a prosperous EU member state in 10 years.

However, between December 2024 and May-June 2025, there were fundamental changes in public moods, and now only 43% are optimistic about the country's future (decrease from 57%). On the other hand, the number of those who believe that in 10 years Ukraine will be a destroyed country with a significant outflow of population has increased from 28% to 47%. For the first time, we record that the share of pessimists exceeded the share of optimists.

Graph 2. How do you see the future of Ukraine in 10 years?

It should be noted separately that in December 2024, the answers to the two questions were correlated – those who saw more unity in society were also more optimistic about the future of the country. In May-June 2025, there is no correlation. Thus, among those who believe that society is moving towards unity, 43% are optimists and 47% are pessimists. Among those who see a movement towards split, the indicators are almost identical – 44% are optimists and 48% are pessimists.

The table shows the answers broken down by region of residence of the respondents[1]. In all regions there is a tendency for the share of those who see a movement towards unity to grow. And at the same time, in all regions there have become more pessimists in the context of the perception of the future of Ukraine.

Moreover, the differences between the regions are quite insignificant (i.e., the levels of optimism / pessimism are quite similar in all regions).

Table 1. Do Ukrainians move towards unity and how they see Ukraine in 10 years in terms of region of residence

As in December 2024, those who trust the President better assess unity in society.

However, regarding the assessment of the country's future in 10 years, the connection took place in December 2024, but has already become much weaker (and reversed in direction). Thus, among those who trust the President, 41% are optimistic about the country's future, and among those who do not trust the President - 48%.

Moreover, compared to December 2024, the biggest changes occurred in the segment of those who trust the President. Among those who do not trust the President, the indicators in May-June 2025 are almost the same as they were in December 2024. And among those who trusted the President in December 2024, 71% were optimistic about the future of the country. And now the indicator among them has dropped to 41%.

Table 2. Are Ukrainians moving towards unity and how they see Ukraine in 10 years in terms of whether they trust/distrust President V. Zelenskyy

It can be assumed that the indicators of optimism / pessimism are related to trust in Western partners. In the case of unity / split, there is a connection with the perception of Europe's policy towards Ukraine. Thus, of those who feel continued support from Europe, 76% see a movement towards unity. On the other hand, among those who believe that Europe is tired and support is weakening, only 32% (and the majority believe that the country is heading towards split). At the same time, there is no such connection with the USA - regardless of the perception of USA policy, the majority see a movement towards unity.

At the same time, the assessment of Ukraine's future is almost unrelated to whether Ukrainians feel support from Europe/the USA or not. For example, among those who feel consistent support from Europe, 48% are optimistic about the future and 44% are pessimistic. And among those who believe that Europe no longer strongly supports Ukraine, the indicators are almost identical - 45% of optimists and 46% of pessimists, respectively.

Table 3. Are Ukrainians moving towards unity and how do they see Ukraine in 10 years in terms of perception of European/USA policy regarding Ukraine

In December 2024, we also asked whether we can expect a fair peace for Ukraine from President D. Trump. Among those who thought so, 73% were optimistic about the future of the country. Among those who, on the contrary, expected an unfair peace, 43%. In May-June 2025, we did not ask this question, but we asked whether it was good or bad for Ukraine that D. Trump was the President of the United States. And among those who think it was good, the share of optimists was 41%. Among those who think it was bad, almost the same indicator (43%).

It can be assumed that in December 2024, many people remained optimistic about D. Trump, but the first half of 2025 could have largely dispelled their hopes.

In the table below, we propose to look at Ukrainian optimists and pessimists from a different perspective. So, we propose to see how they differ from each other in matters of war and peace, namely – how much they are ready to tolerate wars and how acceptable are different options for territorial concessions. That is, in this case, we take as 100%, for example, those who optimistically assess the future of the country in 10 years, and compare them with those who assess the future pessimistically.

So, if to talk about the assessment of the movement towards unity/split, then those who see unity demonstrate a significantly higher readiness to continue the resistance. For example, among them, 72% are ready to endure the war as long as necessary (versus 40% among those who see the movement towards split), and 83% are against the official recognition of any Ukrainian territories as part of Russia (among those who see the movement towards split – 46%).

However, in the case of optimists/pessimists regarding Ukraine's future in 10 years, the differences are mostly imperceptible. That is, both those who see Ukraine as a prosperous EU member state and those who see Ukraine as a ruined country demonstrate a largely similar (and high) indicator of readiness to continue resistance and equally reject unacceptable territorial demands.

            Table 4. How many are ready to endure war and are readiness to territorial concessions among those who believe that the country is moving towards democracy/authoritarianism

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

The weakening of faith in the country's happy future is certainly a worrying trend, since to a large extent the current war and the losses associated with it are perceived as an "investment" in the fact that Ukraine and Ukrainians will finally be able to live normally. A "golden era" for post-war Ukraine is an important part of the justice that Ukrainians so long for after all this loss and destruction. The less Ukrainians believe that Ukraine is really on the path to becoming a prosperous EU member state, the weaker our resilience and ability to mobilize resources to resist the enemy will be.

At the same time, we see that Ukrainians retain the will to continue resisting Russia and are not going to capitulate, regardless of whether they are optimistic or pessimistic about the country's future. However, it is difficult to say whether the growth of pessimism about the country's future will not at some point transform into a higher readiness to capitulate. Therefore, it is important to monitor and counteract these moods (all the more so since we can expect that Russia will try to take advantage of them).  

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

How do you see the future of Ukraine in 10 years? RANDOMIZATION OF THE ORDER

And how do you assess unity among Ukrainians and overcoming contradictions? RANDOMIZATION OF THE ORDER