The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskiy, executive director of KIIS

From September 19 to October 5, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added a monitoring question about the perception the policy of Europe and the USA regarding Ukraine. By the method oftelephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,008 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of a sample of 1008 respondents (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) does not exceed 4.1%. In order to avoid the effect of the order of questions, we asked half of the respondents questions about Europe, and half of the respondents about the USA. Thus, 487 respondents answered the question about European politics, and 521 respondents answered the question about USA politics, which gives an error (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) of no more than 5.8%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow for a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

KIIS continues to monitor Ukrainians' perceptions of the policy of Europe and the USA regarding Ukraine. During September 19-October 5, 2025, we repeatedly asked whether, in the opinion of Ukrainians, Europe/the USA remain reliable allies who want a fair peace for Ukraine, or, on the contrary, they are getting tired of Ukraine, their support is weak, and they are pressuring Ukraine to conclude an unfair peace.

Before moving on to the results, it is worth paying attention to the data collection period of the last two waves (i.e., when the interviews were conducted). Thus, the penultimate wave was conducted between July 23 and August 4, 2025, i.e., it covered the strengthening of pro-Ukrainian signals from D. Trump in July, but the survey was completed before S. Witkoff's visit to Moscow in August and, accordingly, before the information about the organization of the meeting between D. Trump and V. Putin in Alaska.

The last (current) wave was conducted during September 19-October 5, 2025 and covered the period when D. Trump, for example, mentioned the possibility of a Ukrainian victory. However, this wave did not cover the period of stronger statements about, for example, the realism of discussing the provision of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine. And it did not cover, of course, information about a possible meeting between D. Trump and V. Putin in Budapest.

So, as can be seen in Graph 1 below, the majority of Ukrainians – 58% – believe that Europe continues to seriously assist Ukraine and wants the war to end on fair terms. Believe that Europe is tired and is pushing for an unfair peace – 36%. At the same time, if during February-August 2025 the public perception of Europe was quite stable, then now we are recording a downward trend for the first time. So, there have been fewer people who see Europe as a reliable ally – from 63% in early August to 58% in early October. At the same time, there have been more people who believe that Europe’s support is weakening and that it is pressuring Ukraine to make concessions to Russia, from 27% to 36%.

In terms of perception of USA policy, the situation has been very dynamic this year. Thus, in March of this year, we recorded the lowest rate of positive perception of USA policy – only 24% considered the USA a reliable ally of Ukraine. By May, the situation had improved slightly, although not very significantly. By the beginning of August (apparently, against the background of positive statements for Ukraine in July), the share of those who considered the USA a reliable ally had increased to 42% and we at least saw parity with those who critically assessed USA policy (there were 38%). At the same time, in early August, every fifth person (19%) was unable to answer the question (which, most likely, reflected the variability of statements on the part of the American side).

And finally in early October, we see that although the share of optimists who favorably assess USA policy has decreased slightly (from 42% in early August to 38%), the share of those who believe that the USA is tired and is pressuring Ukraine to approve an unfair peace has increased from 38% to 52%. Moreover, this increase in the share of critically minded citizens occurred primarily due to a decrease in those whose views were undecided at the beginning of August.

At the same time, for the correct perception of the USA by Ukrainians, we must recall that according to KIIS data in May 2025[1] 63% of Ukrainians had a good attitude towards this country as a whole, and 90% had a good attitude towards ordinary Americans. And according to the social distance index (the subject of a later publication by KIIS), the attitude towards Americans now (as of early October 2025) remains quite normal and no worse than the indicators a year ago (as of early October 2024). That is, the “swings” in the perception of the USA government’s policy towards Ukraine do not lead to an increase in anti-American moods.

Graph 1. And with which statement about Europe/USA support for Ukraine do you agree to a greater extent?

In this survey, we also asked questions about Ukrainians' readiness for territorial losses to end the war[2]. The table below shows how those who have different perceptions of European/USA policy towards Ukraine feel about territorial losses. Since few respondents answered the question, the data is indicative for understanding general trends.

So, as can be seen in Table 1 below, those who believe that Europe/the USA are getting tired and putting pressure on Ukraine are more ready to accept territorial losses, even the most severe ones. At the same time, even among those who are critical of Europe/the USA policy, the majority reject the most severe demands (such as the official recognition of the occupied territories as part of Russia or the transfer of territories currently controlled by Ukraine to Russia).

Moreover, a greater influence is observed in the case of Europe, i.e. there is a tendency that the perception of Europe as an (un)reliable ally is more important for the readiness to accept territorial losses. Although such an influence also occurs in the case of the USA, i.e. the perception of USA policy is also important for Ukrainian citizens in the context of forming views on war and peace.

 Table 1. Readiness for territorial concessions depending on the perception of European and USA policy regarding Ukraine

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

From the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainians had romanticized views of fighting the Russian invasion together with the West. Thus, in September 2022, 80% of Ukrainians considered Ukraine's successes on the battlefield the result of joint efforts with Western countries[3]. In February 2023, 81% of Ukrainians claimed that cooperation between Ukraine and the West to repel Russian aggression is a “win-win” situation, where both Ukraine itself and the West benefit[4]. And although we now see a more pragmatic approach to relations with the West, Ukrainians still recognize the importance of Western support and Ukrainians want to see strategic and partnership relations (which, in particular, is confirmed by the consistently high support for Ukraine's membership in the EU and NATO).

At the same time, the Russian enemy immediately identified an information vulnerability for Ukraine and is constantly investing resources in imposing on Ukrainians the idea that Western support is weakening and that the West is ready to abandon Ukraine. As shown in this press release, the weakening of faith in Western support is indeed associated with higher pessimism and a readiness to accept difficult demands to end the war. That is, the spread of such a narrative seriously harms Ukraine's information security.

One can debate the (in)sufficiency of the amount of support (and it is difficult to deny that the amounts were not always sufficient and timely, but it is also impossible to deny that they were and are significant), but Ukraine objectively retains a significant number of reliable allies. In a changing media environment (especially in the context of the not always consistent public position of the USA), Ukrainians need to see and remember that we are not alone.

At the same time, the recent decline in confidence in Europe is particularly worrying, especially since the perception of Europe plays a strong role in shaping public opinion on issues of war and peace. The narrative of Europe fatigue can have very negative consequences, so it requires the attention of both Ukrainian actors and our European friends. Strong signals from European allies, supported by actual actions, and adequate communication in Ukrainian society are important for maintaining the stability of public opinion and society.

Appendix 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

HALF OF RESPONDENTS ABOUT EUROPE, HALF ABOUT THE USA

And with which statement about Europe's support for Ukraine do you agree to a greater extent? RANDOMIZATION OF THE ORDER OF STATEMENTS

And with which statement about USA support for Ukraine do you agree to a greater extent? RANDOMIZATION OF THE ORDER OF STATEMENTS