The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi,executive director of KIIS

From September 2 to 14, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added questions which concern attitude towards Russia and Russians. By the method of telephone interviews(computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,023 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of a sample of 1023 respondents (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) does not exceed 4.1%. Most of the questions considered in this press release were asked to all respondents. At the same time, an experiment was implemented in the question about possible peace plans and we found out the opinion of respondents about one of two randomly selected peace plans (to avoid the effect of the order of answers). Each peace plan was evaluated by about 500 respondents, which gives an error (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) of no more than 5.8%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

One of the KIIS monitoring questions reads as follows: “How do you generally feel about Russia now?” Respondents could choose one of the options: “very good”, “mostly good”, “mostly bad”, “very bad” (or at their own insistence “hard to say”). The graph below shows the dynamics of Ukrainians’ responses during 2008-2025.

As can be seen, currently, 91% of Ukrainians have a bad attitude towards Russia, while 4% have a good attitude towards it. In 2024, these indicators were 93% and 3%, respectively. The difference compared to the current indicators is within the statistical error, that is, there were no changes over the year. In fact, the same trend that we observe after the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022 persists - a consistently negative attitude towards Russia (and, as will be shown below, towards Russians as well).

It is important to emphasize that the deterioration in attitude toward Russia followed Russia’s own aggressive actions, not preceded them. Russian authorities and propaganda claim that their aggressive actions are a response to growing anti-Russian moods (although even this cannot justify military actions in any case). However, our data shows that Ukrainians maintained a good attitude toward Russia, and only Russia’s brutal actions forced Ukrainians to reconsider their attitude.

Graph 1. Dynamics of attitudes towards Russia, 2008-2024

Below in the graph we compare how felt about Russia residents of different regions[1] in February 2022 (on the eve of the invasion), in October 2024 (a year ago) and how they are treated now (in September 2025).

As can be seen, the absolute majority of the population in all regions – from 92% in the West to 80% in the East – have a bad attitude towards Russia. The share of those who have a good attitude varies from only 3-4% in the West, Center and South to 9% in the East. Compared to 2024, at the trend level, can be seen some improvement towards Russia in the East (from 3% to 9%). However, it should be taken into account that the sample of respondents in the East is small and this difference is within the margin of error.

Graph 2. Attitude towards Russia in the regional dimension

We also asked the question, "How do you generally feel about Russians – residents of Russia?” Currently only 8% of Ukrainians have a good attitude towards Russians -residents of Russia, while 85%, on the contrary, have a bad attitude towards them. Almost identical indicators were in 2024, so the situation with the attitude towards Russians - residents of Russia has not changed over the past year.

Graph 3. Dynamics of attitude towards Russians - residents of Russia

The graph below compares the changes between November 2021 and September 2025. As of September 2025, the absolute majority of Ukrainians in all regions – from 91% in the West to 73% in the East – have a bad attitude towards Russians - residents of Russia. The share of those who continue to treat them well does not exceed 14% (in the East).

Graph 4. Attitude towards Russians - residents of Russia in the regional dimension

In our other survey in September-October 2025, we studied attitudes towards Russians using the Bogardus scale (more detailed results on interethnic relations will be published by KIIS later). Thus, for a certain group (such as Russians -residents of Russia), respondents must answer how close a relationship they are ready to allow with representatives of this group. This is called social distance. The minimum social distance is 1 (agree to allow as a family member), the maximum is 7 (would not allow to enter Ukraine). You can calculate an index that will vary from 1 to 7, where 7 will correspond to the maximum distance to this group.

To understand the context: in 2013 we asked about the general attitude towards Russians, and then the index value was 2.7 (which indicated a high openness of Ukrainians towards Russians). The attitude was better only towards Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (2.0) and towards Russian-speaking Ukrainians (2.3). That is, Russians were very close and followed immediately after Ukrainians.

As of September 2025, the index value for Russians – residents of Russia is 6.5. Moreover, the situation is almost similar in all regions – 6.7 in the West, 6.5 in the Center, 6.3 in the South, 6.2 in the East. In fact, 82% among all respondents (83% in the West, 84% in the Center, 76% in the South, and 78% in the East) answered that Russians - residents of Russia should not be allowed into Ukraine at all. In 2024, the indicators were almost identical, meaning that Ukrainians have a very critical attitude towards Russians - residents of Russia, and in all regions – in particular, in the East.

Graph 5. Social distance from Russians - residents of Russia (from 1 to 7, where 7 is the maximum distance)

In September-October 2024, KIIS conducted an experiment that showed that the attitude towards Russian-speaking ethnic Russians – residents of Ukraine is cooler (or, rather, they are subject to stricter requirements to “prove” their identity). However, at the same time, if they are patriots of Ukraine, then most Ukrainians still consider them to belong to the Ukrainian nation[2]. That is, provided they identify themselves and act for the good of Ukraine, Russian-speaking Russians are a completely legitimate part of the Ukrainian nation.

Therefore, when Ukrainians express their critical opinion about Russians – residents of Russia, it is more likely that they are talking about a “political” definition of Russians, not an ethnic one. So, we learned how Ukrainians in Ukraine relate to Ukrainians – residents of Russia. As can be seen in the graph below, although The attitude towards Ukrainians in Russia is slightly better (than towards Russians), but also clearly negative – the index value is 5.6 (and 49% of respondents answered that Ukrainians in Russia should not be allowed into Ukraine at all). That is, for Ukrainians in Ukraine, even ethnic Ukrainians in Russia are enemies, since, most likely, they are perceived as part of the “Russian world”, which is a broader political concept than the narrower definition of “ethnic Russians”.

Graph 6. Social distance from Russians – residents of Russia and Ukrainians - residents of Russia (from 1 to 7, where 7 is the maximum distance)

And finally, the table below shows how respondents feel about Russia and Russians, depending on the language of communication, as well as their readiness to accept the Russian "peace plan" (i.e., in fact, their readiness to capitulate).

As can be seen, among Russian-speaking Ukrainians, only 12% have a good attitude towards Russia and only 22% have a good attitude towards Russians. On the other hand, 76% have a bad attitude towards Russia and 69% have a bad attitude towards Russians. Therefore, it is wrong to use the language of people's communication as an attempt to justify the occupation of territories or the transfer to Russia of territories currently controlled by Russia. We see that Russian-speaking Ukrainians are critical of Russia and Russians and do not want to be part of Russia.

In the case of attitude towards the Russian “peace plan”, among those who are ready to accept it, only 12% have a good attitude towards Russia and only 23% have a good attitude towards Russians. According to the results of a KIIS survey in September 2025, 17% of Ukrainians were ready to accept the Russian “peace plan”, that is, they were ready to surrender[3]. Thus, of these 17%, only 5% have a good attitude or have an uncertain attitude towards at least ordinary Russians. At the same time, 12% of the 17% have a bad attitude towards them. Therefore, it can be assumed that most of those who are ready for actual surrender do so not for reasons of love for Russia, but, for example, due to psychological stress, etc..

Table 1. Attitude towards Russia and Russians depending on the language of communication and readiness to accept the Russian “peace plan”

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

Among Ukrainians, regardless of region or language of communication, there is a consolidated – unequivocally critical – position towards both Russia as a whole and ordinary Russians. Ukrainians are united in their awareness of the existential threat posed by Russians.

Therefore, we call on Ukrainian subjects – politicians in power and opposition, public figures, journalists, ordinary citizens – to use the unifying potential of a perceived common threat to strengthen an inclusive Ukrainian nation. “Enough of ruins and disagreements,” enough of sowing discord and quarreling over linguistic practices, stereotypical perceptions of different regions, or political preferences. Both the Ukrainian-speaking resident of the West and the Russian-speaking resident of the East – we are all Ukrainians. As our polls show, there is much more that unites us than divides us, and on the main sensitive issues there are completely consensual policies that satisfy the absolute majority of the population.

At the same time, we have a call to the world, and especially our partners in the West, to stop equating the use of the Russian language in Ukraine with the presence of a Russian identity. Russian-speaking Ukrainians are patriots of Ukraine, identify themselves as part of the Ukrainian nation, and do not want to live in Russia. Therefore, using the fact of using the Russian language in certain territories to impose territorial losses is an absolutely wrong policy.

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

How do you generally feel about Russia now? 

And how do you generally feel about Russians – residents of Russia? 

Now I will read you the names of some national groups. For each group, say whether you agree to admit its representatives. Choose all that apply.

Russians - residents of Russia

Ukrainians - residents of Russia