The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi,executive director of KIIS

 

From November 26 to December 13, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added questions related to war and peace, trust in Western partners, and the internal situation. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 547 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 5.6% for indicators close to 50%, 4.8% for indicators close to 25%, 3.4% for indicators close to 10%, 2.5% for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

KIIS plans to survey about 500 more respondents and ask the same questions, so we will publish the revised results later. At the same time, we can assure you that the results presented in this press release accurately reflect the public moods of Ukrainians.

 

Main results:

• 72% of Ukrainians are ready to approve a peace plan that, among other things, would include freezing the situation behind the current front line along with security guarantees for Ukraine (and without officially recognizing the occupied territories as part of Russia);
• At the same time, 75% (the same as in September) reject a plan that would, among other things, include the withdrawal of troops from Donbas, restrictions on the Ukrainian army, and together with this, would not contain specific security guarantees;
• Only 9% of Ukrainians expect the war to end by the beginning of 2026 and only another 14% expect it to end at least in the first half of 2026;
• 63% of Ukrainians are ready to endure war as long as necessary (in September it was 62%);
• 49% trust the EU, 23% do not trust it (almost unchanged compared to December 2024);
• At the same time, from December 2024 to December 2025, trust in the USA decreased from 41% to 21%, and in NATO - from 43% to 34%;
• 61% of Ukrainians trust President V. Zelenskyy, 32% do not trust him (in early October, 60% trusted him, 35% did not trust him);
• Only 9% of Ukrainians want elections to be held as soon as possible, even before the end of hostilities.

 

 

 

 

In September 2025, KIIS researched the perception of conditional peace plans from Russia and from Europe and Ukraine[1]. We have now re-asked these questions to understand how Ukrainians' attitudes towards these peace plans have changed compared to September 2025.

Given that the current negotiations are mostly closed, the available information is fragmentary, and the situation itself is very dynamic, we have not been able to formulate a peace plan that would reliably reflect the current agreements. At the same time, we note that the “Russian” peace plan in our survey includes the most sensitive components that are currently being discussed and that individual actors would like to see in a peace agreement: for example, the withdrawal of troops from Donbas, restrictions on the Ukrainian Defense Forces, unspecified security guarantees, etc. That is, our conditional “Russian” plan is actually close to the expectations/insistencies of some actors (not only on the Russian side).

It is worth recalling important methodological aspects. In the framework of a regular survey (especially a telephone survey), we cannot discuss the plans in detail with the respondents in full, since each plan includes many components. Therefore, we prepared two shortened versions with, in our opinion, particularly important (from the point of view of public perception) elements. One of the two plan options was randomly selected and read to the respondent[2]. At the same time, we did not say that this plan is from Europe with Ukraine / from Russia. That is, we only read out the conditions and asked to answer how acceptable this plan is in general. Below is what we read out to the respondents.

Conditional plan of Europe and Ukraine:

• Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees from Europe and the USA, which include a steady supply of weapons and money to Ukraine in sufficient quantities, as well as the closure of Ukrainian skies from Russian attacks
• The current front line is frozen, Russia retains control over the occupied territories, but Ukraine and the world do not officially recognize this
• Ukraine is moving towards joining the EU
• Sanctions against Russia remain until a stable peace is established and the threat of a second attack by Russia disappears

Conditional plan of Russia:

• The USA and Europe lift all sanctions against Russia
• The Russian language receives official status
• Ukraine must significantly reduce its army and limit its armaments
• Ukraine permanently abandons NATO membership, and the West can no longer supply weapons to Ukraine
• Russia has the right to determine what security guarantees will be for Ukraine, and will be one of the guarantors of Ukraine’s security
• Ukraine withdraws troops from the part of Donetsk oblast it currently controls, i.e. from Kramatorsk, Sloviansk and other cities
• Ukraine officially recognizes Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as part of Russia and renounces them forever
• Russia retains control over the occupied parts of Kherson region and Zaporizhzhia

 

Graph 1 shows data on the readiness to accept these plans. So, the Russian plan remains categorically unacceptable – 75% of Ukrainians consider it completely unacceptable (the same number was in September 2025). Only 17% of Ukrainians are ready for the Russian version of peace (the same number was before).

At the same time 72% of Ukrainians (although mostly without enthusiasm) are ready to approve the Europe and Ukraine plan. Only 14% categorically reject it. In September 2025, 74% were ready to support this plan, the difference is within the margin of error compared to the current indicator. At the same time, the number of those who "would easily agree to this plan" increased from 18% to 31%.

 

Graph 1. There are different options for ending the war. Now I will read you one option, and you tell me how you would react to it. Use the scale “I easily agree with this option”, “it will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable” or “this option is completely unacceptable”.

 

 

 

Only 9% of Ukrainians expect the war to end by early 2026 (down from 18% in September) and only 14% expect it to end at least in the first half of 2026 (down from 15% in September). That is, only a quarter of Ukrainians expect it to end in the relatively near future.

Instead, 11% say about the second half of 2026 (was 12%), 32% say about 2027 and later (was the same number). Every third respondent (33%, an increase from 23% compared to September)) answered "don't know".

 

 

Graph 2. In your opinion, when might the war end?

 

 

At the same time the majority of Ukrainians (63%) continue to say that they are ready to endure the war as long as necessary (in September it was 62%). Another 1% said they were ready to endure for about a year.

15% of respondents say a shorter period (six months or several months) (in September it was 21%, but at the same time, the number of those who could not answer the question increased from 13% to 21%).

 

Graph 3. How much longer are you ready to endure war?

 

 

 

The graph below shows the dynamics of trust in the EU, the USA and NATO. We would like to separately note a methodological specific that must be taken into account when interpreting the results: we read out to respondents all the answer options, including the option “hard to say for sure”.

So, 49% trust the EU, 23% do not trust it (in December 2024 it was 46% and 19%, i.e. almost unchanged). The remaining 27% answered “hard to say for sure.” Overall, it can be seen that the EU is more likely to enjoy the trust of Ukrainians.

At the same time, the indicators of trust in the USA and NATO are significantly lower, which also demonstrate a significant downward trend over the year. Thus, the USA is trusted by 21% (down from 41% in December 2024), and distrusted by 48% (up from 24% in December 2024). The remaining 32% could not decide on their opinion. (At the same time, let's recall our results for May 2025: if to ask about ordinary Americans, then 90% of Ukrainians have a good attitude towards them[3])

In the case of NATO, 34% trust the organization (down from 43% in December 2024), while 41% do not trust it (up from 25%). The remaining 25% could not decide.

 

Graph 4. Please tell me how much you trust those I will name – do you completely trust, rather trust, hard to say for sure whether you trust or not, rather do not trust or completely do not trust?

 

 

  

The Russian enemy also continues the information war against Ukrainians, and this can be seen in particular in the situation of the lack of electricity due to Russian shelling. We can see the spread of narratives that shift the focus and responsibility from the Russians themselves to, for example, Ukraine itself (in the form of criticism of the Ukrainian authorities) or to Western partners. Therefore, we asked a question about what is the main reason for the lack of electricity, and offered three answer options (the respondent had to choose only one answer).

So, the majority of Ukrainians – 57% – say that the main reason is Russian shelling, from which it is impossible to fully defend. 

At the same time, 29% place the responsibility primarily on the Ukrainian authorities, which, in their opinion, were not adequately prepared. Another 8% believe that the main reason is insufficient support from Western partners.

 

Graph5. In your opinion, the occasional lack of electricity in many cities and villages is primarily a consequence of …?

 

 

 

61% of Ukrainians trust V. Zelensky, 32% do not. The balance of trust-distrust is +29%. At the beginning of October, trust indicators were almost identical.

At the same time, the indicators of trust in the President are dynamic. Among the respondents we surveyed in November (November 26-30), 49% trusted Zelenskyy, and among the respondents surveyed in December (December 1-13) – 63% (and in the week of December 8-13 – 65%).

 

Graph 6. How much do you trust or do not trust Volodymyr Zelenskyy?

 

* The option “hard to say” was not read to respondents. It was only marked if the respondent requested it.

 

Only 9% of Ukrainians believe that elections should be held before the ceasefire (in September – 11%).

In the event of a ceasefire and security guarantees, 25% support holding elections (there is a tendency for the indicator to increase, in September it was 22%).

At the same time, the majority – 57% (in September – 63%) – continue to insist that elections are possible only after a final peace agreement and a complete end to the war.

 

Graph 7. Imagine that a ceasefire really takes place and Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees: more weapons, peacekeepers from a European country, etc. Should Ukraine then hold national elections after that?

 

             

The majority of Ukrainians – 59% (in September – 56%) – continue to believe that there are indeed attempts to fight corruption in Ukraine and that there are positive developments. At the same time, hold the opinion that Ukraine is hopelessly corrupt – 33% (in September it was 40%).

 

Graph 8. The media regularly reported on corruption investigations, detentions, arrests, etc. For you personally, this is more of an indication that …

 

 

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

 

In issues of war and peace, we see a fairly stable situation in terms of public opinion – the majority of Ukrainians are open to negotiations and a diplomatic end to the war and are even ready for difficult compromises (more than 70% are ready to approve the Ukrainian-European plan, which already includes many complex (and certainly unfair) concessions). However, at the same time, the majority rejects a plan that would be perceived as capitulation and would include such unacceptable things as, for example, the withdrawal of troops from Donbas in a package with unspecified security guarantees. And as we see, the majority of Ukrainians are consistently ready to endure the war as long as necessary.

In the context of security guarantees, it is important to emphasize that only 21% of Ukrainians trust the USA. Given the rather low level of distrust, Ukrainians reasonably demand specific security guarantees that would actually prevent a second Russian invasion. If security guarantees are not unambiguous and binding (in particular, with specific, convincing, strong steps that the USA and other partners will definitely take in the event of a new invasion), Ukrainians will not trust them, and this will affect the general readiness to approve the corresponding peace plan.

The level of trust in Zelenskyy after the corruption scandal most likely decreased by about 10 percentage points, but after the release of Andrii Yermak and increased pressure from the USA, it returned to the previous level and is 61%. Among internal issues, the absolute majority of Ukrainians do not request holding national elections before the end of hostilities. Trust in V. Zelenskyy remains high and in the eyes of Ukrainians he retains legitimacy as President. Therefore, the insistence on elections in Ukraine is critically perceived by the public and is regarded as an attempt to weaken the country.

 

 

 

           

Appendix 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

 

 

SPLIT-SAMPLE: RESPONDENT IS READ EITHER PLAN A OR PLAN B

 

А: There are different options for ending the war. Now I will read you one option, and you tell me how you would react to it. Use the scale “I easily agree with this option”, “this will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable” or “this option is completely unacceptable”. POINTS ARE READ IN A DIFFERENT ORDER

 

• Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees from Europe and the US, which include a steady supply of weapons and money to Ukraine in sufficient quantities, as well as the closure of Ukrainian skies from Russian attacks
• The current front line is frozen, Russia retains control over the occupied territories, but Ukraine and the world do not officially recognize this
• Ukraine is moving towards joining the EU
• Sanctions against Russia remain until a stable peace is established and the threat of a second attack by Russia disappears

 

1	I easily agree to this option
2	This will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable
3	This option is completely unacceptable
4	HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)
5	REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)

 

B: There are different options for ending the war. Now I will read you one option, and you tell me how you would react to it. Use the scale “I easily agree with this option”, “this will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable” or “this option is completely unacceptable”. READ IN ORDER AS BELOW. READ ALL 8 POINTS

 

• The USA and Europe lift all sanctions against Russia
• The Russian language receives official status

 

• Ukraine must significantly reduce its army and limit its armaments
• Ukraine permanently abandons NATO membership, and the West can no longer supply weapons to Ukraine
• Russia has the right to determine what security guarantees will be for Ukraine, and will be one of the guarantor countries of Ukraine's security

 

• Ukraine withdraws troops from the part of Donetsk oblast it currently controls, i.e. from Kramatorsk, Sloviansk and other cities
• Ukraine officially recognizes Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as part of Russia and renounces them forever
• Russia retains control over the occupied parts of Kherson region and Zaporizhzhia

 

1	I easily agree to this option
2	This will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable
3	This option is completely unacceptable
4	HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)
5	REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)

 

In your opinion, when might the war end? READ

1	By the end of this year 2025 or early 2026
2	In the first half of next year 2026
3	In the second half of next year 2026
4	In 2027 or even later
5	HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)
6	REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)

 

How much longer are you ready to endure war? READ

1	Several months
2	Six months
3	1 year
4	As long as necessary
5	HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)
6	REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)

 

How much do you trust or do not trust Volodymyr Zelenskyy? READ

Completely do not trust	1
Rather do not trust	2
Rather trust	3
Completely trust	4
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)	5
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)	6

 

Imagine that a ceasefire actually takes place and Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees. Should Ukraine then hold national elections after that? READ

1	Yes, it should
2	No, elections should be held after a final peace agreement and a complete end to the war
3	I believe that elections should be held now, even before the ceasefire
4	HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)
5	REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)

 

In your opinion, the occasional lack of electricity in many cities and villages is primarily a consequence of … READ. RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER

… Russian attacks, from which it is impossible to fully defend	1
… ineffective actions of the Ukrainian authorities, which failed to prepare properly	2
… insufficient support from Western partners, which did not provide sufficient means for defense	3
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)	4
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)	5

 

The media regularly reported on corruption investigations, detentions, arrests, etc. For you personally, this is more of an indication that … READ. RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER

There are indeed attempts to fight corruption in Ukraine, there are positive developments	1
Ukraine is hopelessly corrupt, there are no positive changes	2
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)	3
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)	4

 

Please tell me how much you trust those I will name – do you completely trust, rather trust, hard to say for sure whether you trust or not, rather do not trust or completely do not trust?

(RANDOMIZATION)	Completely trust	Rather trust	Hard to say	Rather do not trust	Completely do not trust
1. European Union (EU)	1	2	3	4	5
2. USA	1	2	3	4	5
3. NATO	1	2	3	4	5