The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi,executive director of KIIS

 

From November 26 to December 29, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added questions related to war and peace. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,001 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

 

KIIS previously published preliminary results for most of the questions considered in this press release (based on 547 interviews conducted between November 26 and December 13, 2025)[1]. This press release presents the final results for 1001 interviews. They do not differ significantly from the previous ones, but we recommend using the final data as more accurate and up-to-date. In addition, this press release also contains information that was not in the previous press release.

 

Main results:

• 69% of Ukrainians are ready to approve a peace plan that, among other things, would include freezing the situation behind the current front line along with security guarantees for Ukraine (and without officially recognizing the occupied territories as part of Russia);;
• At the same time, 74% (the same as in September) reject a plan that would, among other things, include the withdrawal of troops from Donbas, restrictions on the Ukrainian army, and together with this, would not contain specific security guarantees;
• Only 10% of Ukrainians expect the war to end by the beginning of 2026 and only another 16% expect it to end at least in the first half of 2026;
• 62% of Ukrainians are ready to endure war as long as necessary (in September there were the same number).

 

 

 

Since May 2022, KIIS has been regularly asking questions in its own surveys about the population’s readiness to make territorial concessions in order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence. The original wording (which we prepared in May 2022) reads as follows: “Which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree with to a greater extent?”, and the respondent was asked to choose one of two such statements (the statements were read to different respondents in different orders to reduce the order effect):

• “In order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence, Ukraine may give up some of its territories”
• “Under no circumstances should Ukraine give up any of its territories, even if this makes the war last longer and threatens the preservation of independence”

We separately emphasize that the first statement does not specify which territories may be the subject of concessions, and also what “territorial concessions” are in question. Another factor is that our formulation provides a more socially acceptable form of accepting losses, since in exchange “the war ends” and “Ukraine retains its independence”. Our experiment in February 2025 showed that Ukrainians strongly react to “preserving sovereignty” and consider it one of the fundamental points for any peace deal. In particular, some respondents could, for example, understand “preserving independence” as receiving security guarantees. That is, their interpretation may be broader than the question directly implies.

It is especially important to emphasize that there are several interpretations of “territorial concessions”, so this time, in addition to the original monitoring question, we formulated three alternative formulations, where we more clearly specified what we mean by “territorial concessions”. The respondent was asked a randomly selected 1 of 4 questions. This issue will be considered in more detail in the next paragraph (before graph 2), and first we propose to consider what changed the answers of Ukrainians to our typical monitoring question (where we do not specify the definition of “territorial concessions”).  

Graph 1 shows the respondents’ answers. Compared toearly October 2025, the situation has not changed. Thus, 53% are firmly against any territorial concessions (in early October 2025 it was 54%). At the same time, 33% are generally ready for some territorial losses (previously it was 38%). At the same time, the number of those who could not decide on an opinion increased from 8% to 14%.

 

Graph 1. Which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree with to a greater extent?

 

 

 

Now it is worth considering how specifying “territorial losses” affects the results. In the other three versions of our question, the wording was as follows.

 

v  Version “Official recognition of occupation” – Ukraine officially recognizes certain territories as part of Russia and no longer claims them:

• «In order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence, Ukraine could officially recognize certain territories as part of Russia and give them up forever»
• «Under no circumstances should Ukraine officially recognize certain territories as part of Russia and give them up forever, even if this means the war will last longer and there will be threats to the preservation of independence»

 

v  Version “Transfer of unoccupied territories to Russia” – Ukraine transfers control of territories that it currently controls, such as the cities of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, etc.:

• «In order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence, Ukraine could transfer territories currently controlled by Ukraine, such as the cities of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, etc., under Russian control»
• «Under no circumstances should Ukraine transfer territories currently controlled by Ukraine, such as the cities of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, etc., under Russian control, even if this means the war will last longer and there will be threats to the preservation of independence»

 

v  Version “De facto recognition of occupation without de jure” – Ukraine de facto recognizes Russia’s control over certain territories, but does not recognize it officially:

• «In order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence, Ukraine agrees that Russia retains control over the occupied territories, but Ukraine and the world do not officially recognize this»
• «Under no circumstances Ukraine should agree and allow Russia to maintain even unofficial control over the occupied territories, even if this means the war will last longer and there will be threats to the preservation of independence»

 

 

Therefore, if we are asking about the official recognition of certain territories as part of Russia, then the majority (58%) will be against. Ready to accept – 25% (Note that we are talking about “separate territories”, not all occupied territories; depending on the territories, there may be significant differentiation). Compared to the beginning of October 2025, the share of those who are ready for such losses has not changed (it was 24%). However, there have been fewer those who categorically reject the option (from 67% to 58%), but due to the increase in uncertainty (from 9% to 17%), there have been more those who could not decide on their opinion).

Also, the absolute majority – 66% – reject the transfer of territories controlled by Ukraine under Russian control. Ready to accept – only 18%. At the beginning of October 2025, there were slightly more of those who rejected this option, but as in the previous case, due to an increase in the share of those who were undecided.

In the case of the option of freezing the front line without officially recognizing any occupied territories as part of Russia, 50% categorically reject this option, and 39% are ready for it. In early October 2025, 56% rejected this option, and 35% were ready to support it, that is, the readiness to approve such an approach has increased (although in May-June 2025 it was higher than now).

 

Graph 2. Which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree with to a greater extent?

 

 

 

 

In September 2025, KIIS researched the perception of conditional peace plans from Russia and from Europe and Ukraine[2]. We have now re-asked these questions to understand how Ukrainians' attitudes towards these peace plans have changed compared to September 2025.

Given that the current negotiations are mostly closed, the available information is fragmentary, and the situation itself is very dynamic, we have not been able to formulate a peace plan that would reliably reflect the current agreements. At the same time, we note that the “Russian” peace plan in our survey includes the most sensitive components that are currently being discussed and that individual actors would like to see in a peace agreement: for example, the withdrawal of troops from Donbas, restrictions on the Ukrainian Defense Forces, unspecified security guarantees, etc. That is, our conditional “Russian” plan is actually close to the expectations/insistencies of some actors (not only on the Russian side).

It is worth recalling important methodological aspects. In the framework of a regular survey (especially a telephone survey), we cannot discuss the plans in detail with the respondents in full, since each plan includes many components. Therefore, we prepared two shortened versions with, in our opinion, particularly important (from the point of view of public perception) elements. One of the two plan options was randomly selected and read to the respondent[3]. At the same time, we did not say that this plan is from Europe with Ukraine / from Russia. That is, we only read out the conditions and asked to answer how acceptable this plan is in general. Below is what we read out to the respondents.

Conditional plan of Europe and Ukraine:

• Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees from Europe and the USA, which include a steady supply of weapons and money to Ukraine in sufficient quantities, as well as the closure of Ukrainian skies from Russian attacks
• The current front line is frozen, Russia retains control over the occupied territories, but Ukraine and the world do not officially recognize this
• Ukraine is moving towards joining the EU
• Sanctions against Russia remain until a stable peace is established and the threat of a second attack by Russia disappears

Conditional plan of Russia:

• The USA and Europe lift all sanctions against Russia
• The Russian language receives official status
• Ukraine must significantly reduce its army and limit its armaments
• Ukraine permanently abandons NATO membership, and the West can no longer supply weapons to Ukraine
• Russia has the right to determine what security guarantees will be for Ukraine, and will be one of the guarantors of Ukraine’s security
• Ukraine withdraws troops from the part of Donetsk oblast it currently controls, i.e. from Kramatorsk, Sloviansk and other cities
• Ukraine officially recognizes Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as part of Russia and renounces them forever
• Russia retains control over the occupied parts of Kherson region and Zaporizhzhia

 

Graph 3 shows data on the readiness to accept these plans. So, the Russian plan remains categorically unacceptable – 74% of Ukrainians consider it completely unacceptable (the same number was in September 2025). Only 17% of Ukrainians are ready for the Russian version of peace (the same number was before).

At the same time 69% of Ukrainians (although mostly without enthusiasm) are ready to approve the Europe and Ukraine plan. Only 16% categorically reject it. In September 2025, 74% were ready to support this plan, that is, now there are slightly fewer of them (but due to the shift to "hard to say", rather than categorical opponents). At the same time, the number of those who "would easily agree to this plan" increased from 18% to 30%.

In the regional dimension, 71-78% in all regions reject Russia's plan. In contrast, 67-69% in all regions are ready to approve the plan of Europe and Ukraine.

 

Graph 3. There are different options for ending the war. Now I will read you one option, and you tell me how you would react to it. Use the scale “I easily agree with this option”, “it will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable” or “this option is completely unacceptable”.

 

 

 

 

Only 10% of Ukrainians expect the war to end by early 2026 (18% in September) and only 16% expect it to end at least in the first half of 2026 (15% in September). That is, only a quarter of Ukrainians expect it to end in the relatively near future.

Instead, 12% say about the second half of 2026 (was 29%), 32% say about 2027 and later (was the same number). Every third respondent (33%, an increase from 23% compared to September) answered "don't know"..

 

 

Graph 4. In your opinion, when might the war end?

 

 

 

At the same time the majority of Ukrainians (62%) continue to say that they are ready to endure the war as long as necessary (in September it was the same number). Another 3% said they were ready to endure for about a year.

14% of respondents say a shorter period (six months or several months) (in September it was 21%, but at the same time, the number of those who could not answer the question increased from 13% to 21%).

 

Graph 5. How much longer are you ready to endure war?

 

 

 

 

 

The Russian enemy also continues the information war against Ukrainians, and this can be seen in particular in the situation of the lack of electricity due to Russian shelling. We can see the spread of narratives that shift the focus and responsibility from the Russians themselves to, for example, Ukraine itself (in the form of criticism of the Ukrainian authorities) or to Western partners. Therefore, we asked a question about what is the main reason for the lack of electricity, and offered three answer options (the respondent had to choose only one answer).

So, the majority of Ukrainians – 54% – say that the main reason is Russian shelling, from which it is impossible to fully defend. 

At the same time, 31% place the responsibility primarily on the Ukrainian authorities, which, in their opinion, were not adequately prepared. Another 7% believe that the main reason is insufficient support from Western partners.

 

Graph 6. In your opinion, the occasional lack of electricity in many cities and villages is primarily a consequence of …?

 

           

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

 

Public opinion on the issues of war and peace has remained virtually unchanged over the past few months. It is worth emphasizing a few key points once again. First, despite the announcements of the next “decisive” days or weeks and the “historic” approach to peace, Ukrainians mostly do not share such optimism and are determined that the war will continue for a long time.

Secondly, Ukrainians really sincerely want peace and are open to negotiations and even difficult compromises. It may not be obvious to foreign media representatives and experts, but even freezing the current front line means that millions of Ukrainians will be forced to live in the harsh realities of occupation, and millions of IDPs and refugees will not have the opportunity to return home. This is already a huge, very difficult compromise for Ukrainians. Thirdly, agreement on such a compromise can only be made if truly convincing security guarantees are provided. As we see in this press release, Ukrainians will not support freezing the front line if there are no security guarantees. At the same time, if they are provided, Ukrainians may agree.

Fourth, hard “red lines” remain: not to officially recognize the occupied territories as part of Russia, not to withdraw from territories currently controlled by Ukraine, not to impose significant restrictions on the Ukrainian Defense Forces, not to agree to restrictions on sovereignty. Fifth, Ukrainians retain the willpower and resilience to continue resistance. We see that the majority is consistently ready to endure the war for as long as necessary for its acceptable conclusion. We are not talking about complete victory, and in fact, the majority of Ukrainians soberly assess the situation. But peace cannot be capitulation, and Ukrainians are ready to continue resistance.

 

 

 

           

Appendix 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

 

DIVIDE THE SAMPLE INTO 4 GROUPS. EACH GROUP IS ASKED ONE QUESTION VERSION

 

A.Which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree with to a greater extent? RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER

1	In order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence, Ukraine may give up some of its territories
2	Under no circumstances should Ukraine give up any of its territories, even if this makes the war last longer and threatens the preservation of independence
3	HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ OUT)
4	REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ OUT)

 

B.Which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree with to a greater extent? RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER

1	In order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence, Ukraine could officially recognize certain territories as part of Russia and give them up forever
2	Under no circumstances should Ukraine officially recognize certain territories as part of Russia and give them up forever, even if this means the war will last longer and there will be threats to the preservation of independence
3	HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ OUT)
4	REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ OUT)

 

C.Which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree with to a greater extent? RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER

1	In order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence, Ukraine could transfer territories currently controlled by Ukraine, such as the cities of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, etc., under Russian control
2	Under no circumstances should Ukraine transfer territories currently controlled by Ukraine, such as the cities of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, etc., under Russian control, even if this means the war will last longer and there will be threats to the preservation of independence
3	HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ OUT)
4	REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ OUT)

 

D.Which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree with to a greater extent? RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER

1	In order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence, Ukraine agrees that Russia retains control over the occupied territories, but Ukraine and the world do not officially recognize this
2	Under no circumstances Ukraine should agree and allow Russia to maintain even unofficial control over the occupied territories, even if this means the war will last longer and there will be threats to the preservation of independence
3	HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ OUT)
4	REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ OUT)

 

% in the column	West[4]	Center	South	East
Original question (without specifying “territorial concessions”)
Territorial losses can be accepted	33	30	30	37
Categorically against territorial losses	53	63	51	43
Hard to say	13	7	15	19
Refusal	1	0	4	0
Official recognition of occupation
Territorial losses can be accepted	25	26	26	25
Categorically against territorial losses	58	59	63	48
Hard to say	17	14	11	27
Refusal	0	1	0	0
Transfer of unoccupied territories to Russia
Territorial losses can be accepted	18	20	12	16
Categorically against territorial losses	66	64	66	75
Hard to say	15	16	22	7
Refusal	1	0	0	2
De facto recognition of occupation without de jure
Territorial losses can be accepted	39	49	37	41
Categorically against territorial losses	50	43	48	53
Hard to say	12	8	16	6
Refusal	0	0	0	0

 

HALF OF RESPONDENTS WAS READ OPTION A, HALF - OPTION B

 

OPTION А: here are different options for ending the war. Now I will read you one option, and you tell me how you would react to it. Use the scale “I easily agree with this option”, “this will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable” or “this option is completely unacceptable”. POINTS ARE READ IN A DIFFERENT ORDER

 

• Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees from Europe and the US, which include a steady supply of weapons and money to Ukraine in sufficient quantities, as well as the closure of Ukrainian skies from Russian attacks
• The current front line is frozen, Russia retains control over the occupied territories, but Ukraine and the world do not officially recognize this
• Ukraine is moving towards joining the EU
• Sanctions against Russia remain until a stable peace is established and the threat of a second attack by Russia disappears

 

 

 

 

 

OPTION B: here are different options for ending the war. Now I will read you one option, and you tell me how you would react to it. Use the scale “I easily agree with this option”, “this will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable” or “this option is completely unacceptable”. READ IN ORDER AS BELOW. READ ALL 8 POINTS

 

• The USA and Europe lift all sanctions against Russia
• The Russian language receives official status

 

• Ukraine must significantly reduce its army and limit its armaments
• Ukraine permanently abandons NATO membership, and the West can no longer supply weapons to Ukraine
• Russia has the right to determine what security guarantees will be for Ukraine, and will be one of the guarantor countries of Ukraine's security

 

• Ukraine withdraws troops from the part of Donetsk oblast it currently controls, i.e. from Kramatorsk, Sloviansk and other cities
• Ukraine officially recognizes Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as part of Russia and renounces them forever
• Russia retains control over the occupied parts of Kherson region and Zaporizhzhia

 

 

In your opinion, the occasional lack of electricity in many cities and villages is primarily a consequence of … READ. RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER

 

 

In your opinion, when might the war end?

 

How much longer are you ready to endure war?