The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi,executive director of KIIS

From November 26 to December 29, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added questions related to trust in President V. Zelenskyy, holding of national elections, perception of the fight against corruption in Ukraine, and the country's movement towards democracy. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,001 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

KIIS previously published preliminary results for most of the questions considered in this press release (based on 547 interviews conducted between November 26 and December 13, 2025)[1]. This press release presents the final results for 1001 interviews. They do not differ significantly from the previous ones, but we recommend using the final data as more accurate and up-to-date. In addition, this press release also contains information that was not in the previous press release.

59% of Ukrainians trust V. Zelenskyy, 35% do not. The balance of trust-distrust is +24%. At the beginning of October, the trust indicators were almost identical, that is, overall, according to the results of December, the level of trust in the President remained unchanged compared to the situation a few months ago (in particular, before the appearance of information about corruption in the energy sector).

At the same time, indicators of trust in the President are very dynamic and context-dependent (especially, which agenda dominates public discussions – internal issues, such as public administration, corruption, etc., or external issues, such as relations with partners and peace negotiations). Among the respondents we surveyed in November (November 26-30), 49% trusted V. Zelenskyy, and among the respondents surveyed in the first half of December (December 1-13) – 63%. At the same time, among the respondents surveyed in the second half of December (December 14-29), 55% expressed trust in V. Zelenskyy. Therefore, in general, we can see that the President lost about 10 percentage points of trust after the publication of information about corruption in the energy sector, but further, against the background of the international situation (peace negotiations), we see another round of “ralliance around the flag” and increased trust in the President. However, by the end of December, the strength of such "cohesion" had somewhat weakened and there was rather a tendency towards a slight but decreasing trust. In any case, at the end of 2025, the level of trust in the President is higher than at the end of 2024 (although during 2025, the peak of support was in early May).

We can expect that in the future (even right now, taking into account, for example, personnel changes) the indicator of trust in the President will remain dynamic.

Another important aspect of trust in the President is that among the 59% of those who trust him, 26% “completely” trust him, and 33% “rather” trust him. A KIIS survey in September-October 2025 showed one of the fundamental differences between these categories. Thus, those who “completely” trust V. Zelenskyy would like to see him as President after the war. And those who “rather” trust him mostly want to see someone new as the leader of Ukraine (and “new” means someone from the new generation of leaders, not someone from the current opposition)[2].

It should also be noted that among the 35% of those who do not trust the President, 23% “completely”do not trust him, and 12% “rather” do not trust him  (and those segments also have different views on certain issues).

Graph 1. How much do you trust or distrust Volodymyr Zelenskyy?

* The option “hard to say” was not read to respondents. It was marked only if the respondent requested it

Only 10% of Ukrainians believe that elections should be held before the ceasefire (in September – 11%).

In the event of a ceasefire and security guarantees, 23% support holding elections (there is a tendency for the indicator to increase - for example, during the year from March to December the indicator increased from 9% to 23%).

At the same time, the majority – 59% (in September – 63%) – continue to insist that elections are possible only after a final peace agreement and a complete end to the war.

Graph 2. Imagine that a ceasefire really takes place and Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees: more weapons, peacekeepers from a European country, etc. Should Ukraine then hold national elections after that?

The graph below shows support for holding elections in terms of trust in the President. Thus, among those who trust V. Zelenskyy, the vast majority support holding elections only after a final peace agreement (and only 3-4% believe that elections should be held right now, even before the end of hostilities)..

Among those who do not trust the President, there is a differentiation of views. Those who “rather” do not trust the President are also mostly (61%) postponing the issue of elections until after the final peace agreement, and only 11% want elections before the end of hostilities (and another 22% consider it advisable to hold them after a ceasefire with security guarantees).

And only among those who “completely” do not trust V. Zelenskyy, the demand for elections in the near future is quite significant. Thus, among them, 28% insist on elections in the near future even before the end of the war, and 34% – after a truce with security guarantees (34% say about elections after a final peace agreement).

Graph 3. Attitude towards holding elections depending on trust in President V. Zelenskyy

The graph below shows attitude towards elections broken down by whether the country is moving towards democracy or authoritarianism (see more detailed results below). So, among those who believe that Ukraine is moving towards authoritarianism, the demand for elections is indeed higher, but half (46%) also postpone elections until after a final peace agreement, and only 22% insist on elections as soon as possible, even before the war ends.

Graph 4. Attitude towards holding elections depending on perceptions of whether a country is moving toward democracy or authoritarianism

KIIS regularly monitors the issue of how Ukrainians perceive the fight against corruption in Ukraine. We have already noted that those who consider Ukraine “hopelessly corrupt” are, in particular, more ready for Ukraine to capitulate[3]. That is, strengthening such a narrative (and not the narrative that Ukraine is a country that is trying to fight corruption and that there is progress in this area) can undermine security and defense capabilities.

The last time we asked this question was in September-October 2025, that is, before the publication of information about corruption in the energy sector. Considering the scale of the situation (77% had heard about the “Mindich tapes”, and among those who had heard, 71% considered the investigation objective, and 59% considered V. Zelenskyy responsible for the actions of T. Mindich[4]), one could expect a worsening of the situation with the perception of the fight against corruption (i.e. that there will be more people who consider Ukraine “hopelessly corrupt”).

However, as can be seen in the graph below, public moods on this issue has remained virtually unchanged The majority of Ukrainians – 57% (in September-early October – 56%) – continue to believe that there are indeed attempts to fight corruption in Ukraine and that there are positive developments. At the same time, hold the opinion that Ukraine is hopelessly corrupt – 35% (previously it was 40%).

Graph 5. The media regularly reported on corruption investigations, detentions, arrests, etc. For you personally, this is more of an indication that …

In May-June 2025, we asked whether Ukraine was moving towards democracy or, conversely, towards authoritarianism. Now, in December 2025, we repeated the question (given that the second half of 2025 was full of a large number of internal events).

As can be seen in the graph, over the past six months, the number of those who could not decide on their opinion has increased from 9% to 24%. As a result, there have been fewer people who say that Ukraine is moving towards democracy (from 50% to 42%), and fewer people who say that it is moving towards authoritarianism (from 41% to 34%).

That is, in any case, the advantage of those who see a movement towards democracy remains (as before), although the share of those who see a movement towards authoritarianism remains significant. At the same time, let us recall that in May-June we also asked questions about what exactly Ukrainians see as manifestations of authoritarianism. To a large extent, the answers were about dissatisfaction with the actions of the authorities (and not about, in fact, the development of an authoritarian system)[5]. And as was shown in the press release earlier, for example, the issue of the lack of elections mostly does not bother those who see a movement towards authoritarianism.

Graph 6. In your opinion, Ukraine is moving more quickly in its development …

The graph below shows the data in terms of trust in the President. The higher the trust, the more people see a movement towards democracy (and vice versa).

Graph 7. Ukraine is moving towards democracy/authoritarianism depending on trust in President V. Zelenskyy

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

Despite the fact that 2025 was full of events that were not always optimistic for the authorities, the majority of Ukrainians continue to trust V. Zelenskyy and he remains the legitimate head of state. Moreover, at the end of 2025, the trust indicators are even slightly higher than they were at the end of 2024.

At the same time, the dynamics of trust during 2025 shows that the power of the "rallying around the flag effect" is becoming shorter and negative internal events are increasingly able to "interrupt" the President's activities in the international arena in the minds of citizens. Moreover, trust in the President is not absolute, since out of 59% of those who trust, only 26% "completely" trust. A significant segment of those who “rather” trust (and, by the way, those who “rather” do not trust) is very sensitive to situations in internal politics, and therefore, depending on decisions in the near future, we may see fluctuations both in the direction of increasing trust and in the direction of decreasing trust.

At the time of preparing the press release, personnel changes are being actively discussed in the media, in particular, special attention is paid to rumors about possible changes of authoritative leaders in the security agencies, who enjoy high trust among the population. Public comments of concern from other authoritative leaders in the defense sector, as well as from the public and media sectors, only increase the attention (and worries!) of ordinary Ukrainians to these possible "rotations".

We would like to remind you that the greatest decline in trust in V. Zelenskyy occurred during the resignation of V. Zaluzhnyi (on the eve of the resignation, 77% trusted V. Zelenskyy, at the time of the resignation – 64%, and in the first days after the resignation the indicator was even closer to 60%). Therefore, in the event of such a resignation now (even if it is a “rotation”, but with a hint of demotion) without proper communication, this could have a significant impact on trust in the President. As we noted a little earlier, although the President enjoys trust, he does not enjoy absolute trust. Therefore, such decisions cannot be legitimized simply by “a decision of the President who considers it necessary.” The public will need proper convincing justification. In addition, it should be taken into account that the resignation of an authoritative person can easily be used in media attacks and further erosion of the trust of the head of state (this can be used by both Russian enemies and internal Ukrainian opposition-minded entities).

Ukrainian society is mature enough for difficult conversations. If the authorities see a need for certain personnel changes that are not obvious to the public, then it is necessary to conduct a constructive dialogue and properly communicate these decisions. Perhaps there really are objective circumstances that the public is not aware of. Then they should be discussed calmly. Ultimately, we are all interested in Ukraine only becoming stronger as a result of personnel changes.

Appendix 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

Imagine that a ceasefire actually takes place and Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees. Should Ukraine then hold national elections after that? ЗАЧИТАТИ

Наскільки Ви довіряєте чи не довіряєте Володимиру Зеленському? ЗАЧИТАТИ

The media regularly reported on corruption investigations, detentions, arrests, etc. For you personally, this is more of an indication that … READ. RANDOMIZATION OF THE ORDER

In your opinion, Ukraine is moving more quickly in its development...? READ. RANDOMIZATION OF THE ORDER