The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi,executive director of KIIS

From November 26 to December 29, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added a question on how Ukrainians see the future of Ukraine. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,001 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

KIIS continues to research how optimistic/pessimistic Ukrainians are. In particular, over the past few years, KIIS has regularly asked how Ukrainians see the future of Ukraine in 10 years – as a prosperous EU member state or, conversely, as a ruined country with a significant population outflow.

As can be seen in the graph below, from October 2022 to May 2025, there was a steady trend of decreasing optimism in Ukrainian society, and in May 2025, we first recorded a predominance of pessimistic moods. Thus, in May 2025, 47% believed that in 10 years Ukraine would be a country with a destroyed economy and a large outflow of population - compared to 43% who believed that in 10 years Ukraine would be a prosperous member of the EU.

However, then, in the second half of 2025, we observe a recovery of optimistic sentiments – the share of optimists first increased to 56% in early October and then to 64% in December. In contrast, from 47% in May to 21% in December, fewer people believed that in 10 years Ukraine would be a destroyed country with a significant population outflow. Optimism indicators at the end of 2025 even slightly exceeded those at the end of 2024, although they remain lower than they were in 2022-2023.

Graph 1. How do you see the future of Ukraine in 10 years?

The table below shows the level of optimism depending on the answers to other questions and among certain socio-demographic categories. As can be seen, the level of optimism is higher among those who trust the President (74% vs. 47% who do not trust), among those who see progress in the fight against corruption (75% vs. 46% who consider Ukraine “hopelessly corrupt”), and among those who believe that Europe remains a reliable ally (73% vs. 53% who believe that Europe is pressuring Ukraine for an unfair peace).

In the case of different socio-demographic categories, the situation is quite similar and regardless of region of residence, gender, age, military service and level of wealth, the majority believe that in 10 years Ukraine will be a prosperous EU member state.

We will separately note the data by age, namely among Ukrainian youth under 30 (since this is important in the context of emigration moods and demographic prospects). Thus, among respondents aged 18-29, 64% answered that Ukraine will be a prosperous country in 10 years.

Table 1. How people see Ukraine in 10 years, depending on answers to other questions and in terms of socio-demographic categories

In this survey, we also asked questions about attitude towards the Russian peace plan and how much longer are ready to endure war[2]. The table below shows how those who are optimistic/pessimistic about the future of Ukraine answered these questions.

As can be seen, those who are pessimistic about the country's future are more likely to approve of the Russian peace plan, and there are also fewer of them who are ready to endure the war for as long as necessary. Thus, among them, a total of 27% can accept the Russian peace plan - against 14% among those who optimistically assess the future of Ukraine (at the same time, we emphasize that among pessimists, the vast majority reject the Russian peace plan). And also, if among optimists 68% are ready to endure the war as long as necessary, then among pessimists - 51% (which, although a lower indicator, also shows that among pessimists a significant part retains a margin of safety to continue resisting the enemy).

 Table 3. Readiness to make territorial concessions depending on optimistic/pessimistic assessments of unity and the future

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

The narrative about “Ukraine’s bleak and joyless future” demoralizes people and reinforces the idea that there is no point in resisting the enemy. And although currently among pessimists opinions prevail in favor of continuing to resist the Russian enemy, we still see a greater tendency to go for “any peace”. Therefore, the spread of such a narrative deals a serious blow to Ukraine’s security. The Russian enemy understands this and is investing a lot of resources to convince Ukrainians of the futility of their country.

Therefore, all of us who care about the fate of Ukraine should say that although our path is thorny (and often in the format of "two steps forward, one step back"), we are moving towards a better future. Better times lie ahead for us and our children, but for this we must now make all the necessary efforts to survive this extremely difficult period.

The dynamics during 2025 deserve special attention. If to analyze the results of public moods from 2022 to mid-2025, we may get the impression of an inexorable and irreversible process of demoralization (since in each subsequent survey since October 2022 we have seen only a decrease in optimism indicators). However, in the second half of 2025 the trend was reversed and we observed a significant increase in optimism.

The question remains open about the factors that contributed to the increase in the level of optimism in the second half of 2025. One possible explanation: after the election of Donald Trump as USA President in late 2024, there was cautious optimism among Ukrainians that the end of the war was approaching. However, from February 2025 onwards, what experts aptly described as a “hard landing” occurred, as the statements and actions of the USA President turned out to be shocking for many Ukrainians. Perhaps in the first half of 2025 there was a “hard landing”, and with it an adaptation to new realities. After such an adaptation, Ukrainians could begin to react more calmly to the new reality. In addition, if before the beginning of 2025 it was difficult for many to imagine how Ukraine would be able to resist Russia without significant support from the USA, then 2025 showed that even under USA restrictions, Ukraine, together with its European allies, is able to continue effective resistance. 

In any case, it is important that even if we see a negative trend (which, moreover, may be stable over a relatively long period), it should be perceived not as a sign of the country's doom, but as a call to action - we must analyze the reasons and take action to correct the situation (because "crying has not given freedom to anyone yet, but he who is a fighter gains the world").  

Appendix 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

How do you see the future of Ukraine in 10 years? RANDOMIZATION OF THE ORDER