The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi,executive director of KIIS

From November 26 to December 29, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added a question about trust in public institutions. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,001 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

One of the most important, marker indicators of the state of society and public opinion is the level of trust in individual institutions. Previously, we published the results of a survey on trust in V. Zelenskyy[1], and in this publication we want to show trust in other institutions as well. At the same time, in this publication the results on trust in the President (and, in particular, in the dynamics compared to December 2024) are calculated according to other questions. So, in our previous publication (mentioned earlier) we asked about trust in V. Zelenskyy and did not offer “hard to say” among the answer options (although if the respondent himself insisted, this answer was noted).

This publication presents the results of trust in institutions based on a question that we have been asking for many years at the end of the year. For example, KIIS asks the question “Now I will name some more social institutions. Please tell me how much you trust those I will name – do you completely trust, rather trust, hard to say for sure whether you trust or not, rather do not trust  or completely do not trust?” That is, the respondent immediately heard and knew that he could choose the option “hard to say” among the possible options. And we asked about trust in the President of Ukraine (and not “V. Zelenskyy”).

Graph 1 shows the dynamics of trust in state authorities: the President, the Verkhovna Rada, the Government. Graph 2 shows trust in law enforcement and security institutions: the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the National Police, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, prosecutors and courts. Finally, graph 3 shows trust in civil society institutions: the Church, Ukrainian media and volunteers. In each graph, we compare the current results with the results at the end of 2024 to assess the dynamics over the past year (except for NABU, since we asked about NABU for the first time). At the same time, the results in dynamics for 2021-2025 can be found in the Appendix. The Appendix also provides data on trust in institutions in the regional dimension.

So, if in December 2024, according to this wording of the question, 45% trusted the President, then in December 2025 – 57%. At the same time, the indicator of distrust has almost not changed – 31% in 2024 and 33% in 2025. The balance of trust-distrust over the year increased from +10% to +24%. The growth in trust occurred due to a decrease in the share of those who had an undecided attitude - from 24% to 10%. Our previous publication showed that during 2025 there was a significant dynamics in trust in the President. Most likely, the decrease in the share of those who had an undecided attitude and the predominant transition to trust is associated with the effect of rallying around the flag. That is, in the conditions of the challenges of 2025, many Ukrainians who had an undecided attitude began to say that they trust the President in order to demonstrate unity in defending the interests of Ukraine.

However, as before, most Ukrainians do not trust other government bodies – the Parliament and the Government – and no significant changes have occurred over the year. In the case of the Verkhovna Rada, 12% trust it and 70% do not trust it (in December 2024 – 13% and 68%). The balance of trust-distrust is -58% (in December 2024 - -55%). At the same time, more than half of Ukrainians can name at least one faction whose activities they approve of, i.e. high distrust of the parliament does not mean distrust of all parliamentarians[2].

Trust in the Government is slightly higher, but also low: now 23% trust it (in December 2024 – 20%), 56% do not trust it (in December 2024 – 53%). The balance of trust has not changed over the past year and is the same -33%. However, in the context of trust in the parliament and the Government, we note that despite the low trust, the majority of Ukrainians are against holding elections now .

Graph 1. Trust in government bodies

n the case of the Defense Forces of Ukraine, support remains consistently very high – 94% trust and only 2% do not trust (a year ago the indicators were 92% and 2%, respectively). Trust-distrust balance – +92%.

Another important security institution – the SBU – also maintains a fairly high level of trust (despite a slight decrease compared to last year). Thus, 51% of Ukrainians trust the SBU, 26% do not trust it (in December 2024 the indicators were 54% to 21%). The balance of trust-distrust is +25% (last year it was +33%).

Trust in the National Police has decreased somewhat. So, 35% trust the police, 46% do not trust them. In December 2024, 37% trusted and 38% did not trust them. Accordingly, the balance of trust-distrust decreased from -1% to -11%.

This year, for the first time, we added NABU to this question and we observe quite high trust – 50% versus 31% who do not trust it. Therefore, the balance of trust-distrust is positive and amounts to +19%.

At the same timeTrust in courts and prosecutors remains critically low. Only 15% of Ukrainians trust the courts and only 12% trust prosecutors. 62% and 64% do not trust them, respectively. Compared to last year, the situation has not changed significantly.

Graph 2. Trust in law enforcement agencies

And finally, trust in institutions among civil society. Trust in volunteers remains high in Ukraine – 79% trust them and only 7% do not trust (in December 2024 the indicators were 81% and 5% respectively).

Trust in Ukrainian media remains quite low, although the situation has improved slightly over the past year. So, now 34% trust Ukrainian media, 42% do not trust (the remaining 25% have an undecided attitude). In December 2024, 27% trusted them, 42% did not trust. Therefore, if last year the balance of trust-distrust was -15%, now it is -8%. However, as can be seen, the level of distrust has remained at the same level, and trust has increased due to a decrease in the share of those who had an undecided attitude.

The Church used to be the leading institution in terms of trust, but in recent years it has significantly lost trust. Over the past year, the situation with trust in the Church has improved slightly - now 44% trust the Church and 28% do not trust. In 2024, the ratio was 40% to 26%.

Graph 3. Trust in civil society institutions

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

In Ukrainian society, a consensus has persisted for a long time, which, on the one hand, implies criticism of the authorities. We see that the majority of Ukrainians are consistently dissatisfied with the actions of both the Verkhovna Rada and the Government. At the same time, on the other hand, this consensus also implies that there is currently no possibility of renewing power through elections. In the same survey, only 10% of respondents insisted on elections in the near future, even before the end of hostilities (and a significant part of these respondents view elections not from a patriotic perspective of strengthening the country, but as a way to end the war through Ukraine's surrender).

That is, Ukrainians may be dissatisfied with their government (and often, if not in most cases, quite rightly so), but they are aware of the risks and dangers that hastily organized elections entail. For Ukrainians, the priority is obvious - ensuring acceptable conditions for peace, and then solving other important problems (including the renewal of government).

Trust in institutions also demonstrates an important, consistent trend – very high trust in the Defense Forces and volunteers. Accordingly, many Ukrainians want to see military personnel and volunteers among the country's new generation of leaders. And this, in turn, creates another problem for holding "quick" elections: both military personnel and volunteers - as responsible people who make efforts for the country's defense capability - will not be able to participate in the elections now. Their non-participation in the elections will undermine the legitimacy of the result in the eyes of the Ukrainian public. Therefore, many Ukrainians support postponing the elections, so that they are both properly organized and so that all worthy candidates can really take part in them.

Appendix 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

FORMULATION OF THE QUESTION:

Now I will name some more social institutions. Please tell me how much you trust the ones I will name – do you trust completely, rather trust, hard to say for sure whether you trust or not, rather do not trust or completely do not trust?

DYNAMICS OF TRUST IN 2021-2025:

TRUST IN TERMS OF REGIONS: