The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi,executive director of KIIS

 

During January 9-14, 2026, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey, which, among other things, included questions related to war and peace. By the method oftelephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 601 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 5.3% for indicators close to 50%, 4.6% for indicators close to 25%, 3.2% for indicators close to 10%, 2.4% for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

 

Main results:

• 69% believe that Russia wants to destroy the Ukrainian nation or commit genocide first. Overall, 83% believe that Russia's goals are broader than just control over all of Donbas;
• 77% believe that although Russia is advancing on the front, it is slowly and with heavy losses, and Ukraine is able to continue its resistance (consider Ukraine's resistance hopeless – 12%);
• 69% do not believe that the current negotiations will lead to a lasting peace (the main explanation is due to Russia's own reluctance to make peace and its desire to continue the war against Ukraine). Only 26% believe;
• 54% categorically reject the proposal to transfer all of Donbas under Russian control in exchange for security guarantees from the USA and Europe. 39% are ready to agree (but with the requirement of substantial security guarantees);
• 55% support holding a referendum on the peace agreement, 32% oppose;
• 57% expect that even in the event of a “freeze” behind the current front line and with security guarantees, Russia will still try to attack again (only 11% believe that it will not attack again);
• 59% believe that in the event of a second attack, Europe will provide all the necessary support. In the case of the USA, confidence is lower – 39% believe that the USA will help;
• 60% have a negative attitude towards the possibility of voting online in elections (and when discussed in the context of possible falsifications, the negative attitude increases to 71%).

 

 

           

The vast majority of Ukrainians – 69% – continue to perceive the war as an existential threat and believe that Russia either wants to commit physical genocide or destroy the Ukrainian nation and statehood (in February 2025, was almost the same number – 66%).

Another 11% believe that Russia wants to seize most of Ukraine's territories and establish a puppet government (previously was 14%). Believe that Russia wants to "limit itself" to only 5 regions in full (i.e. including Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson region, which are currently controlled by Ukraine) – 3%. That is, a total of 83% of respondents believe that Russia's current goal goes beyond Donbas (and is mostly about the complete conquest/destruction of Ukraine).

Only 2% are inclined to believe that Russia currently seeks only to occupy the entire Donbas, without control over Zaporizhzhia and Kherson region (i.e., what is supposedly the subject of negotiations). And only 1% believe that Russia will "limit itself" only to the currently occupied territories.

At the same time, there are 2% of respondents (the same number as before) who believe that Russia simply wants to "denazify" and "demilitarize" Ukraine without encroaching on its sovereignty.

 

Graph 1. In your opinion, what goal does Russia currently set for itself in the war against Ukraine?

 

* New option, was not in the February 2025 survey.

           

To assess the situation at the front, respondents were asked to choose one of the statements with a more optimistic or more pessimistic interpretation.

The absolute majority of respondents – 77% – share the view that although Russia is advancing, it is slowly and with heavy losses, and Ukraine is able to continue effective resistance. Share a more pessimistic view, according to which Russia has made significant advances and victories, and Ukraine's resistance is hopeless – 12%. Another 11% could not decide on their opinion.

 

Graph 2. With which opinion about the situation at the front do you agree to a greater extent?

 

 

 

           

The vast majority of respondents – 69% – do not believe that the current negotiations will lead to lasting peace in Ukraine. 26% believe in the success of the negotiations. Another 5% could not decide on their opinion.

 

Graph 3.Do you believe or not that the current negotiations will lead to lasting peace in Ukraine?

 

Respondents who answered they did not believe that negotiations would lead to peace (or were undecided) were asked an additional question – we asked them to answer in an open-ended manner why they think so.

Most of these respondents (52%) explain their lack of faith in the success of the negotiations by saying that Russia does not want real peace, that Russia plans to continue the war, etc. For example, direct speech from several respondents:

“Russia’s goal is to destroy Ukraine, they won’t calm down.”

“Putin doesn’t need it. Until Russia collapses, there will be war. Even if they come to an agreement, peace will be temporary.”

“As long as the Russians have resources left, they will move forward.”

“Because agreements with Russia, as the classic said, are not worth the paper they are written on.”

“Because verbal arguments do not force Russia to act.”

 

Graph 4. And why exactly do you not believe or doubt?

Open question, top answers, % among those who do not believe or doubt that negotiations will lead to a sustainable peace

 

Other answers were mentioned less often, but they are also worth paying attention to. So, the explanations follow:

• Negotiations/war have been going on for a long time, there have been various negotiations and – without result (14%). For example, "because it drags on for a long time, it's a big political game, people are given hope, and then people see that there is no hope, there is not even a dialogue with Russia, and negotiations are between us and our allies, it's a vicious circle, it won't lead us to peace." Or "negotiations are for the process, not for the result";
• The Ukrainian authorities are not doing enough for this (10%). For example, "the war could have ended a long time ago, but it is not in the President of Ukraine's interest to end it" or "our government is doing everything to prevent us from believing in it";
• Do not believe in promises/support from the West to maintain peace (10%). For example, "Donald Trump is not interested in the nature of the conflict, he doesn't give a damn about Ukraine" or "Europe doesn't really want to change its good life and help us to the end, they have their own interests and they are getting tired of helping us".

 

 

 

           

            The majority of Ukrainians – 54% – consider it categorically unacceptable to transfer the entire Donbas to Russia in exchange for security guarantees. At the same time, 39% are ready for such a concession (although most of them admit that this is a difficult condition). Another 5% could not decide on their opinion.

 

Graph 5. Now I will read a possible condition for achieving peace, and you tell me how acceptable it is to you. Use the scale “I easily agree with this condition”, “This will be a difficult condition, but generally acceptable”, “This condition is absolutely unacceptable”.

Ukraine withdraws its troops from the territories of Donbas that it currently controls, i.e. from Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, etc., and these territories pass under Russian control. In return, the USA and Europe give Ukraine security guarantees

 

Respondents for whom such a condition is categorically unacceptable (or who hesitated to answer) were asked an additional open-ended question as to why they thought so.

So, there are three roughly equally common explanations for why Ukrainians reject such a condition (% among those who believe that such a condition is categorically unacceptable or who found it difficult to answer):

• Russia will still not stop and will try to continue fighting against Ukraine (35%). For example, "Russia will not stop there, Putin is determined to destroy Ukraine as a state" or "if we give up Donbas, then other oblasts of Ukraine will follow";
• Ukraine cannot simply give up its territories and the people who live there, Ukraine has a Constitution and territorial integrity (33%). For example, "we should not trade lands and we should not give them away, this is also written in the Constitution" or "because these are Ukrainian territories, we should not give them away, Ukrainians live there";
• Do not believe in the reality of security guarantees from the West (25%). For example, "the Budapest Memorandum was signed once and no one fulfilled it" or "the USA and Europe will not fulfill these guarantees, they will only promise - and that's it".

 

Graph 6. Why exactly do you consider this proposal categorically unacceptable or do you have doubts?

Open question, top answers, % among those who believe that such a condition is categorically unacceptable or who found it difficult to answer

 

 

 

And respondents who are generally ready to accept the transfer of Donbas to Russian control in exchange for security guarantees were asked an open question about what guarantees they would trust.

Respondents most often talked about the deployment of Western troops in Ukraine (24%, with some talking about deployment right near the front line, i.e. about a serious contingent), about legal obligations and real protection mechanisms in the event of a repeat attack (21%), providing Ukraine with all necessary weapons (18%, some spoke, for example, about long-range missiles, etc.).At the same time, among the top answers was also that respondents do not believe in the effectiveness of security guarantees (11%). That is, these respondents are ready to withdraw troops from Donbas, but do not expect real security guarantees.

It is important to note that those who are ready to withdraw from Donbas still mostly expect practical and convincing security guarantees. That is, if the proposed security guarantees turn out to be weak and do not provide for a serious response to Russian aggression, then support for the withdrawal of troops from Donbas will be even lower.

 

Graph 7. And what security guarantees from the USA and Europe would you consider sufficient to trust them?

Open question, top answers, % among those who can agree to such a condition

 

The table below shows how respondents answered the question about the possibility of agreeing to the transfer of Donbas to Russian control in exchange for security guarantees from the USA and Europe, depending on the answers to other questions. Thus, the highest readiness to agree to this offer is demonstrated by:

• Those who are more pessimistic about the situation on the front – among them 53% are ready to agree versus 38%, among those who are more optimistic about the situation on the battlefield (at the same time, even among conditional pessimists, almost half categorically reject the withdrawal of troops from Donbas even in exchange for security guarantees);
• Those who believe in the success of the negotiations – 46% versus 38% among those who do not believe in the current negotiations;
• Those who support holding a referendum on the peace agreement – 48% versus 28% who oppose holding such an expression of will;
• Those who do not expect Russia to attack again – 71% among them agree with such a proposal, versus 52% among those who estimate the probability of another Russian attack as 50/50, and only 29% among those who expect Russia to attack again;
• Those who do not trust President V. Zelenskyy – 48% versus 36% who trust;
• Younger respondents – if among 18-29 year olds 54% are ready to approve such a proposal, then the indicator drops to 28% among 60+ year olds.

 

There are not enough in the sample for statistically reliable calculations of those currently serving in the military or who are veterans. However, to understand the general trends, we note that among the 23 respondents in military service, 16 respondents categorically reject such a proposal. And among the 21 respondents who are demobilized/veterans, 15 respondents categorically reject.

 

 

Table 1. Readiness to support the transfer of all of Donbas under Russian control in exchange for security guarantees in the context of answers to other questions

 

 

 

           

There is no unambiguous opinion among Ukrainians regarding the referendum on the peace agreement. On the one hand, 55% support holding a referendum, that is, about half. On the other hand, about half are either against it (32%) or have doubts (14%).

 

Graph 8. Do you support or oppose holding a referendum on the peace agreement?

 

 

 

           

The majority of Ukrainians – 57% – expect that even if the war is “frozen” along the current front line and security guarantees are received, Russia will try to attack again. Another 26% estimate the probability as 50/50 (which also reflects quite significant fears of a repeat attack).

Only 11% of Ukrainians believe that Russia will not attack again.

 

Graph 9. Imagine a ceasefire being declared along the current front line and the US and Europe providing security guarantees to Ukraine. In your opinion, would Russia then try to attack Ukraine again or not?

 

 

If Russia attacks under such conditions, 59% expect that Europe will still provide all the necessary support to repel the attack (believe that it will not provide – 31%).

There are significant doubts about the USA and only 39% expect the USA to provide all necessary support. Believe that the US will not provide support – 40%, and another 20% could not decide on their opinion.

 

Graph 10. And if Russia does attack Ukraine again, do you think Europe will provide the necessary support to repel the attack?” / “What about the USA?, %

 

 

 

           

Most respondents (64%) believe that the idea of holding presidential elections 2-3 months after the ceasefire is a necessary concession to demonstrate Ukraine's readiness to hold the voting.

Believe that this is an attempt by V. Zelenskyy to stay in power in this way – 18% (and another 18% are undecided).

 

Graph 11. Volodymyr Zelenskyy mentioned the possibility of holding presidential elections 2-3 months after the ceasefire. In your opinion, is this primarily …?

 

 

           

KIIS has asked questions about online voting several times, offering to choose between two statements (option A below)[1]. These statements reflected the realities of the period before the full-scale invasion, although the context of the discussion is somewhat different now. Therefore, to continue the dynamics, we asked half of the respondents the same question (option A), and the other half – in a different wording, where we simply asked whether they had a positive / negative attitude towards online voting (option B).

As can be seen, if to just ask (without additional information), 60% are negative about the idea of online voting and only 35% are positive.

If to give additional explanations, then 71% choose the option with a critical attitude towards online voting, as it creates risks of falsifications. And instead, only 21% choose the option that this is a step forward in the technologies of democracy. Moreover, in 2023, when asked a similar question, 69% answered that they had a negative attitude due to the risk of falsifications (versus 29% who had a positive attitude). That is, no significant changes have occurred over the past few years.

Thus, in any case, online voting is perceived unfavorably by the population, and in the event of a discussion of possible falsifications, the attitude deteriorates even further.

 

Graph 12. What is your attitude towards the idea of introducing the possibility of voting in elections via the Internet?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

 

The survey results show that, firstly, Ukrainians, despite all the difficulties, remain resilient and optimistic in the war. The absolute majority believe that Ukraine has the strength to continue effective resistance (and only a minority consider Ukrainian resistance hopeless).

Second, in the context of peace talks, we continue to record that Ukrainians do not believe in their success in the near future. In December 2025, we asked about when the war would end, and only a minority (26%) expected an end in the first half of 2026, demonstrating low expectations for the many iterations of negotiations[2]. Third, the reason for the skeptical mood of Ukrainians is primarily a deep distrust of Russia and a sense of existential threat from it. If the majority believes that Russia wants to destroy the Ukrainian nation (or even commit genocide), this significantly narrows the space of solutions that may be acceptable to Ukrainians. Therefore, the cornerstone for Ukrainians is the configuration of security guarantees and the role of the West in providing them, especially since Ukrainians expect that Russia will still try to attack again.

And here, fourthly, we are faced with a rather critical perception of Western partners, especially the USA. If in the case of Europe, more than half at least believe in providing support in the event of a repeated attack, then in the case of the USA, only a minority believe that they will come to the rescue in the event of a repeated attack by Russia. This opinion - that Europe and the USA will not fulfill the guarantees - was quite often heard during the survey (along with the mention of the non-fulfillment of the Budapest Memorandum). This can be called a crisis of confidence among Ukrainians in Western partners, but it is better to consider it modern Ukrainian pragmatism (generously watered with the blood of hundreds of thousands of people), which rightly expects specific mechanisms to repel future Russian aggression.

And, fifthly, it is worth dwelling separately on the discussion of transferring Donbas under Russian control in exchange for security guarantees from Europe and the USA (although it seems that the talks are about a “free economic zone”, but the statements of Russian representatives are unambiguous – they want to establish their control). As we can see, most Ukrainians categorically reject this proposal. Moreover, those who are ready to agree to it expect quite significant security guarantees. Therefore, if the level of security guarantees is lower than expected, then the approval of such a proposal will be even lower. In any case, without receiving truly reliable security commitments and mechanisms for repelling Russian aggression, Ukrainians will continue to categorically reject any options regarding Donbas.

 

 

 

           

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

 

In your opinion, what goal does Russia currently set for itself in the war against Ukraine? READ

Denazify and demilitarize Ukraine without encroaching on sovereignty	1
Retain control over the current occupied territories and make no claims to others	2
Seize control over all of Donbas, but do not seek to establish control over Kherson and Zaporizhzhia	3
Seize control over all of Donbas, all of Zaporizhzhia and all of Kherson region and make no claims to others	4
Seize all or most of the territories of Ukraine and establish a pro-Russian government	5
Seize all or most of the territories of Ukraine, destroy statehood and the Ukrainian nation	6
Commit physical genocide of Ukrainians	7
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)	8
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)	9

 

With which opinion about the situation at the front do you agree to a greater extent? READ. ADD “OR” BETWEEN STATEMENTS. RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER

Although Russia is advancing, it is slowly and with heavy losses. Ukraine is more likely to be able to continue effective resistance	1
Russia has significant advances and victories. Ukraine's resistance is more likely to be hopeless and doomed	2
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)	3
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)	4

 

Do you believe or not that the current negotiations will lead to lasting peace in Ukraine? READ. ADD “OR” BETWEEN STATEMENTS. RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER

Rather believe	1
Rather NOT believe	2
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)	3
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)	4

 

 [IF IN THE PREVIOUS 2 OR 3] And why exactly do you not believe or doubt? WRITE DOWN EVERYTHING THE RESPONDENT SAYS

 

_____________________________________________________________________________________

 

Now I will read a possible condition for achieving peace, and you tell me how acceptable it is to you. Use the scale “I easily agree with this condition”, “This will be a difficult condition, but generally acceptable”, “This condition is absolutely unacceptable”.

 

[IF 1-2 (CAN SUPPORT)] And what security guarantees from the USA and Europe would you consider sufficient to trust them? WRITE DOWN EVERYTHING THE RESPONDENT SAYS

 

_____________________________________________________________________________________

 

 [IF 3-4 (AGAINST OR HARD TO SAY)] Why exactly do you consider this proposal categorically unacceptable or do you have doubts? WRITE DOWN EVERYTHING THE RESPONDENT SAYS

 

_____________________________________________________________________________________

 

Do you support or oppose holding a referendum on the peace agreement? READ. ADD “OR” BETWEEN STATEMENTS. RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER

Rather support	1
Rather oppose	2
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)	3
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)	4

 

Imagine a ceasefire being declared along the current front line and the USA and Europe providing security guarantees to Ukraine..

 

In your opinion, would Russia then try to attack Ukraine again or not? READ. TO HALF READ IN ORDER 1-3, TO HALF – 3-1

Rather will try to attack	1
50/50	2
Rather will not attack	3
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)	4
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)	5

 

And if Russia does attack Ukraine again, do you think Europe will provide the necessary support to repel the attack? READ. ADD “OR” BETWEEN STATEMENTS. RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER

Rather will provide the necessary support	1
Rather will NOT provide the necessary support	2
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)	3
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)	4

 

And what about the USA? READ. ADD “OR” BETWEEN STATEMENTS. RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER

Rather will provide the necessary support	1
Rather will NOT provide the necessary support	2
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)	3
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)	4

 

Now we have a few questions about possible elections.

 

What is your attitude towards the idea of introducing the possibility of voting in elections via the Internet? ADD “OR” BETWEEN STATEMENTS. RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER. SPLIT-SAMPLE (RANDOM SCALE A OR B)

Scale А

Positive, because it is modern and a step forward in the technologies of democracy	1
Negative, because it creates risks of falsification	2
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)	3
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)	4

 

Scale B

Positive	1
Negative	2
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)	3
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)	4

 

Volodymyr Zelenskyy mentioned the possibility of holding presidential elections 2-3 months after the ceasefire. In your opinion, is this primarily … ADD “OR” BETWEEN STATEMENTS. RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER

A necessary concession to demonstrate Ukraine's readiness to hold elections	1
Volodymyr Zelenskyy's attempt to stay in power in this way	2
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)	3
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)	4