The press release was prepared by the President of KIIS, Volodymyr Paniotto,
and the Executive Director, Anton Grushetskyi

From September 19 to October 5, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey “Omnibus”, to which, on its own initiative, added a question about attitude towards certain categories of the population of Ukraine. By the method of telephone interview (computer-assisted telephone interview, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,008 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

Cohesion, unity is one of the important characteristics of society. For Ukraine, which is forced to fight a powerful enemy, it is a question of the country’s survival as an independent state. Sociological studies show that, in general, the cohesion of Ukrainian society has increased significantly, differentiation by region, language, and ethnic origin has significantly decreased. But the war in Ukraine has caused not only physical destruction, but also social differentiation in society. As a result of the war, new categories of people have emerged who find themselves in different situations: those who are fighting; those who have become disabled; those who have remained in place; those who have been forced to leave their homes and move to another settlement within Ukraine (internally displaced persons, IDPs); those who have gone abroad (refugees); and those who have found themselves in occupied territory. However, sometimes, instead of uniting and supporting each other, new forms of distrust and condemnation arise.

KIIS conducted research on this topic in March 2023 and repeated it in September 2024 and September-October 2025 to analyze the social consequences of the war in Ukraine and understand how these consequences affect the integration and cohesion of Ukrainian society (and KIIS plans to continue to research this issue annually).

We usually provide specific methodological information (for example, detailed wording of questions, etc.) in the appendices, but in this case preliminary explanations are necessary. Since 1994, KIIS has been conducting a study of the attitude of the population of Ukraine towards certain ethnic and social groups[1]. This study is conducted using the scale of the American sociologist Emory Bogardus (adapted by N. Panina). For each ethnic group from the list, respondents must answer how close a relationship they are willing to allow with representatives of each group. This is called social distance. The minimum social distance is 1 (agree to allow as a family member), the maximum is 7 (would not allow to enter Ukraine). Often, the level of social distance is interpreted as the level of prejudice towards a particular group.

Now I will read you the names of some social and national groups. For each group, say whether you agree to allow its representatives ... . Choose all that apply.

The full distribution of answers to these questions is given in Table D1 in the appendix. Below, Table 1 shows the distribution of answers, which combines the percentage of people who are ready to allow refugees, IDPs and representatives of other groups as family members, friends, neighbors or work colleagues (score 1-4). If we use the terminology of Ye. Golovakha and N. Panina, this attitude can be called tolerant[2]. The attitude towards a particular category of the population, which consists in the fact that a person would not like to see representatives of this category in his circle but does not object to these people being citizens of Ukraine (score 5), can be called social isolation by analogy with the terminology of Ye. Golovakha and N. Panina. And disagreement with the fact that people of this social category live in Ukraine can be called xenophobia. If they do not object to these people coming as guests (score 6) – this is a lower level of xenophobia, and if they do not even perceive them as guests (score 7 – would not let them into Ukraine at all) – this is the highest level of xenophobia.

Table 1. To what social distance are Ukrainian residents ready to allow representatives of several social categories, %, October 2025

Each of the categories will be analyzed separately in following parts.

As can be seen from Table 1, in October 2025, the attitude towards refugees currently abroad remains generally tolerant. 47% of respondents are ready to allow them into their immediate social circle (as family members, friends, neighbours or colleagues), another 43% agree that they should live in Ukraine. Thus, in total, 89% of the population allows refugees into Ukrainian society, and only 11% have a xenophobic attitude (would not allow them into Ukraine or would only allow them as guests).

The average social distance towards refugees is 3.6, which almost completely corresponds to the average level of social distance towards ethnic groups, which KIIS records in many years of research. This indicates a consistently high level of solidarity with Ukrainian citizens who were forced to leave the country due to the war. In general, these data are consistent with the data of the study we conducted in September 2022[3]. We studied attitudes towards refugees in Europe using direct questions about attitudes towards them (“As you know, many Ukrainians left Ukraine due to the Russian invasion and became refugees. Some Ukrainians who remained are understanding of the refugees and do not condemn them for leaving and not returning. Other people, on the contrary, are upset by this choice and condemn them for leaving and not returning. And what is your general attitude towards Ukrainian refugees in Europe?”). We studied attitudes towards refugees in general and towards individual categories of refugees. Overall, 90% of Ukrainians are understanding of refugees and do not judge them. Although some categories, in particular young men, are treated worse.

Compared to previous years, there have been no significant changes in attitudes towards refugees: negative attitudes remain marginal, and the dominant position is one of acceptance and understanding.

To better understand the results of this study, we also present the results of a survey using the Bogardus scale, which we conducted in October 2025 for two groups – with minimal social distance (Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, average distance 2.4) and with maximum social distance (Russians living in Russia, average distance 6.5).

Table 2. To what social distance are residents of Ukraine ready to allow between Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians and Russians living in Russia, %. October2025 року

As we can see, even for Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, the social distance is not equal to 1, 27% of the population would not like to see them among their closest circle and 3% have a xenophobic attitude towards them. Therefore, 11% of the negative attitude towards refugees does not cause particular concern. Almost 90% of the population is ready to allow refugees into their closest circle, the situation with the attitude towards refugees is satisfactory.

Ukrainians treat IDPs out of the groups we studied this time better than other groups. The social distance index is 3.1, which is significantly lower than the average for ethnic groups. Almost 58% are ready to let them into their circle, another 40% agree that they should live in Ukraine (98% in total). Thus, 98% of the population agrees to let IDPs into their environment, and only 2% have a xenophobic attitude towards them. Therefore, the situation with IDPs looks quite favourable.

Additionally, we would like to note that in September-October 2024, KIIS conducted a survey for the Council of Europe Office and, in particular, separately among IDPs[4]. Thus, 68% of IDPs feel a positive attitude towards themselves from the community, 27% – neutral. And only 4% feel a negative attitude towards themselves.

The difference with the results of September 2024 is insignificant, the situation regarding IDPs has not changed in a year and a half.

Separately, we note that among residents living in the same settlement as before 2022, the indicator is also 3.1, that is, it is quite favourable and indicates a positive attitude towards IDPs.

The attitude towards this category is worse. The social distance index is 3.9, close to average, 41% are ready to let them into their environment, the same number (41%) agree that they should live in Ukraine (total – 82%). 18% have a xenophobic attitude towards them. The difference with the results of 2024 is insignificant, the situation regarding those forced to live under occupation has not changed over the past year.

In September 2022, we asked about those who remained in the occupied territory in a slightly different way[5], with respondents having to choose which of two answer options was closer to their point of view: (1) “Most residents who still live in the territories occupied after February 24 continue to live there because they really support the Russians or they simply don’t care about Ukraine” or (2) “Most residents who still live in the territories occupied after February 24 are victims of circumstances, and they would like Ukraine to regain control over these territories.” The first answer was chosen by 12%, while the majority (72%) believed that the occupied were victims of circumstances and were waiting for the return of Ukrainian power, while the rest did not know how to answer. Finally, in December 2022, in a similar survey, 83% expressed sympathy for the occupied Ukrainians, and 6% expressed condemnation. However, in another study conducted by KIIS for the NGO “Opora” in August 2022, a significant part of the respondents demanded criminal liability for certain categories of occupied citizens of Ukraine[6]. In July-August 2024, KIIS conducted a survey for the Mission of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine, the results of which show a fairly normal attitude towards residents under occupation, but with a demand for punishment of certain categories[7].

The state should have clearer and more understandable communication with those who remained in the occupied territory, so that it is clear what activities fall under the law on collaboration. In general, the situation with the attitude towards citizens in the occupied territories so far looks more or less satisfactory but requires constant monitoring and attention. This is also one of the factors that affect Ukraine’s chances of returning and successfully reintegrating the occupied territories and Ukrainian citizens.

The social distance index is 3.7, which corresponds to the average, 47% are ready to allow them into their circle, another 35% agree that they should live in Ukraine. That is, 82% of the population are ready to allow Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine into their circle. 18% have a xenophobic attitude towards them.

The difference with the results of September 2024 is insignificant, the situation regarding Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine has not changed in a year and a half.

It should be noted separately that among respondents who mainly speak in Ukrainian at home, 40% are ready to accept Russian-speaking citizens into their close circle (and in general 76% see them as residents of Ukraine). The index value is 4.1. For comparison, among respondents who mainly speak in Russian at home, 74% are ready to accept a Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainian into their close circle (and in general 97% see them as residents of Ukraine). The index value is 2.4.

Thus, there is a certain coolness towards Russian-speaking citizens, but in general the situation is normal. However, there is still a need to monitor the situation, since external enemies and certain internal subjects do not abandon attempts to create a split between Ukrainian and Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine.

This group has the worst attitude among those we studied this time. The social distance index is 4.3, quite high, 38% are ready to let them into their circle, and 30% agree that they should live in Ukraine (68% in total). 32% have a xenophobic attitude towards them. There is a certain positive dynamic here compared to 2023, but then the situation stabilized and is exactly the same as it was in 2024. We conducted a certain methodological experiment and asked questions about Russians-residents of Ukraine, the level of negative attitude was even higher (see Appendix 2).

Of course, the attitude towards Russian citizens of Ukraine is much better than towards Russian citizens of Russia, who would not be allowed into Ukraine even as guests by 82%, but still this situation is worrying and may negatively affect the unity of our society. Perhaps this is because in the past Ukrainians-ethnic Russians supported pro-Russian parties more than ethnic Ukrainians. But now the situation has changed, regional, linguistic and ethnic differentiation on most important issues has disappeared or significantly decreased. It is possible that many respondents have not yet realized these changes. Now many people of Russian nationality call themselves Ukrainians in the survey, because they have just such a civic identification. In addition, according to our research, 78% of those ethnic Russian-speaking Russians who continue to call themselves Russians, primarily consider themselves citizens of Ukraine[8].

Also in September 2024, KIIS conducted a special experiment asking whether certain people were considered to belong to the Ukrainian nation. Thus, 56% of respondents said that a Russian-speaking ethnic Russian resident of the East, who considers Ukraine to be his homeland and condemns Russian aggression, belongs to the Ukrainian nation. Only 7% rejected belonging to the Ukrainian nation (the rest mostly answered 50/50)[9]. That is, in general, Ukrainians see ethnic Russians as part of the Ukrainian nation, but there is some caution and expectation that ethnic Russians should “make more efforts” to prove their belonging to the Ukrainian nation.

V. Paniotto, comments on the survey results:

KIIS continues to study the attitude of the population towards new categories of people who found themselves in various situations because of the war. Negative attitudes towards certain social groups can have a significant impact on our society, reducing its cohesion, resistance potential, and the ability to rebuild the country after the war. The negative attitude towards our refugees in Europe, which is quite widespread on social networks, reduces the percentage of those who will return to Ukraine after the war. The same applies to those who found themselves in the occupied territories. And this is no less than 8 million people in total. The attitude towards internally displaced persons affects the ability to adapt to a new place and economic processes. The attitude towards other groups is also important.

Fortunately, so far, the attitude of the population towards most of the groups we study is satisfactory. The best attitude towards IDPs, more or less normal attitude towards refugees and the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine, a little worse, but generally normal attitude towards citizens in the occupied territories. At the same time, the situation may change, greater aggressiveness in social networks and individual high-profile cases may worsen the situation, so neither the authorities nor civil society should calm down.

The situation with the attitude towards Ukrainians-ethnic Russians is relatively the worst. The negative attitude towards Russians-citizens of Russia is a natural defence mechanism, an adequate and necessary reaction of any normal person to the support of the majority of the Russian population for the insidious and harsh war against our country. But, unfortunately, these feelings, as our research shows, were partially transferred by Ukrainians to citizens of Ukraine who are Russians by nationality. This is an understandable, but not rational and unfair reaction to the actions of a real enemy. Ukrainians who are ethnic Russians, according to research data, currently do not fundamentally differ from ethnic Ukrainians on key issues (attitude towards Russia, towards the independence of Ukraine, towards the EU, towards NATO) and also defend Ukraine in the ranks of the Defence Forces, as well as through volunteer and other activities. Citizens of Ukraine are Ukrainians regardless of their ethnic origin, only such an approach allows us to preserve the unity of Ukraine. We must clearly distinguish real enemies from compatriots, brothers and sisters who fight alongside us. I hope that the authorities, public organizations, media, and opinion leaders will fight this negative trend and contribute to the integration of our society.

Annex 1.

Table D1. To what social distance are Ukrainian residents of several social categories ready to allow, %, October 2025

Annex 2. 

An experiment to study the wording of a question about attitudes towards ethnic Russians who are residents of Ukraine.

When using the Bogardus scale in this study, we asked about ethnic Russians living in Ukraine twice in different contexts and wordings. In the study described above, we asked about attitudes towards citizens of Ukraine who are Russians by nationality, in the list of groups mentioned above (refugees, IDPs, Ukrainians under occupation, and Russian-speaking Ukrainians).

In the second block of questions, the Bogardus scale sounded the same: “Now I will read you the names of some social and national groups. For each group, say whether you agree to allow its representatives … . Choose all that apply.”

But then there was a list of 13 ethnic and linguistic-ethnic groups, among which there were groups of both residents of Ukraine and residents of other countries (Ukrainians-residents of Ukraine, Ukrainians-residents of Russia, Canadians, Jews, Germans, etc.). That is, we asked not about citizens of Ukraine who are Russians, but about Russians-residents of Ukraine. The results of the comparison are in Table D2.

Table D2. Comparison of responses on the social distance scale with attitudes towards “citizens of Ukraine of Russian nationality” and “Russians living in Ukraine”, %, October 2025

We see that the result significantly depends on the wording and, perhaps, the context, the level of xenophobic attitude in the first case is 32%, and in the second 43%, those who would not let into Ukraine in the first case 21%, and in the second 29%.

The first wording begins with the belonging of the group being assessed to Ukraine and emphasizes that these are citizens of Ukraine, and only then do we talk about their nationality. And in the second case, the first word is “Russians”, which is an irritant for the population of Ukraine, and only then do we say that these are residents of Ukraine. And theoretically there remains the possibility that they are residents, but not citizens of Ukraine (although statistically this group is close to zero).