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Press releases and reports
Dynamics of attitude to the status of the Russian language in Ukraine during 1997-2026
The press release was prepared by Anton Grushetskyi,executive director of KIIS
From May 7 to June 3, 2026, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added a question about the Russian language. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,000 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022. Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%. Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS. In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.
Since the 1990s, KIIS has regularly asked various questions about state policy regarding the Russian language in Ukraine. For example, one of our monitoring questions concerns the advisability of studying the Russian language in schools. We last asked this question in 2025 and in a separate publication analyzed how public moods on this issue changed during 1998-2025[1]. And although quite a few Ukrainians still considered it possible to study Russian in schools in 2025, thanks to long-term dynamics, we see how the situation after 2022 is different from the period before 2022 (and even more so compared to the 1990s). Our other research in 2025 was devoted to the assessment (using an experimental design) of three possible language policy options. In this case, our interest was to find out which direction of language policy would not only receive the approval of the formal majority of the population, but would also be consensual for all regional and language groups. According to the results obtained, the absolute majority of residents of all regions (83-90% depending on the region) and language groups (83-88% depending on the predominant language of communication at home) approve of the option of strategic (“gentle”) Ukrainization (Ukrainian as the only state and official language and as the main one in the sphere of education, but with the possibility of using Russian at the everyday level without stigmatization and restrictions)[2]. Other options, while they might have received formal approval from the majority of the population as a whole, would have received polarizing evaluations among regional and linguistic groups (i.e., would have potentially led to conflicts). In this press release, we examine the dynamics of perceptions of the status of the Russian language using the formulation we have been using since 1997. This allows us to understand not only current moods, but also to assess the evolution that Ukrainian public opinion has undergone over almost 30 years. To ensure a correct analysis of the dynamics, we used identical formulation (although we are aware that the socio-historical context has changed significantly since the 1990s and some elements of the question could be adapted). We asked respondents to answer the question “What do you think should be the state policy regarding the Russian language in Ukraine? Russian language – …” and choose one of three options:
Since 2024, we have additionally asked respondents who chose option #2 the question “Do you support or do you not support making the Russian language official in your oblast?” It is important to emphasize that we asked about the Russian language in the sphere of official communication (and did not ask about everyday household use). Also in this press release, we present the dynamics of Ukrainians' perception of whether there is systematic persecution/restrictions for Russian-speaking citizens in the country. We asked this question earlier in 2022 and 2023, so we can assess how Ukrainians' views have changed over 4 years of full-scale war.
Status of the Russian language in Ukraine
So, The majority of Ukrainians – 65% – believe that the Russian language should be eliminated from official communication throughout Ukraine. Only 5% of Ukrainians would like Russian to become the second state language in Ukraine. At the same time, quite a few Ukrainians (22%) believe that the Russian language could become official in certain regions where the majority of the population wants it. However, the majority of such respondents do not want the Russian language to become official in their region. Thus, of these 22%, 12% do not want the Russian language to be official in their region, 8% would like it (and another 2% could not decide on their opinion). Thus, a total of 77% are either in favor of removing the Russian language from the official sphere throughout the territory, or at least in their region. Only 13% would like Russian to be the official language in their region or even the state language throughout Ukraine.
Table 1. What do you think the state policy regarding the Russian language in Ukraine should be? Russian language – ...?
Are there systematic oppressions/persecutions of Russian-speaking citizens in Ukraine
The graph below shows data on whether Ukrainians believe that Russian-speaking citizens in the country are systematically oppressed/persecuted. As can be seen, since 2022, the number of those who believe that Russian-speaking residents are persecuted in Ukraine has increased from 5% to 17%. At the same time, the absolute majority – 78% – continues to claim that there are no problems with the use of the Russian language. At the same time, we should additionally comment that in this question we did not ask about personal objective experience of oppressions or persecutions. We asked respondents about their subjective perception of the situation, which, of course, may also be based on personal real experience. However, as we see in many of our surveys, respondents’ opinions are often (if not predominantly) formed on the basis of information from the media they consume. Therefore, at least in part, the increase in the share of those who observe systematic oppressions and restrictions may reflect respondents’ receipt of distorted/manipulative information, which is intended to convince them that Russian-speaking citizens in Ukraine are being persecuted.. It is noteworthy that among those who feel there are oppressions and persecutions, 55% want the Russian language to be removed from official communication throughout the territory or at least in their region. And only a third of these respondents (30%) talk about official status in their region or the status of a second state language in Ukraine.
Graph 1. And with which of these statements regarding the language issue in Ukraine do you agree to a greater extent?
Results in terms of region of residence and language spoken at home
To get a complete picture, it is necessary to understand how respondents who live in different regions and speak different languages answered these questions. The table below shows the corresponding results. We separately note how many such respondents are in the sample, since currently only 14% claim that they speak Russian mainly or always at home. In contrast, 23% claim that they speak both languages, and 62% answered that they mainly or always use Ukrainian. It is worth noting that Although among those who speak Russian primarily at home, 34% feel pressure and persecution, the majority – 59% – claim that there are no problems. And among those who communicate in both languages (i.e. Russian as well) – 76% claim that there are no problems. Also among Russian-speaking citizens, 43% believe that the Russian language should be removed from official communication, or at least they do not want it in their region. At the same time, 39% of Russian-speaking citizens would like to see it official in their region or even state language. Similar indicators among bilingual citizens – 70% and 18%. In the regional dimension, 39% in the East speak of oppressions and persecutions, although the majority of the population of the region – 56% – expressed the opinion that there are no problems. At the same time, 81% in the South, and 77% in the Lower Dnieper region, answered that there is no oppressions or persecutions (experience problems – 16% and 19%, respectively). Regarding state policy, in the East 48% support the removal of the Russian language from the official sphere in general or in their region, and 28% would like to see official status (at theirs’ or in all of Ukraine) (the remaining 24% have undecided views). In the South 58% support removal from the official sphere in the entire country or in their region, and 31% support official status. In the Lower Dnieper region, 74% and 17%, respectively. Thus, although the attitude towards Russian-speaking citizens is indeed perceived somewhat more sharply by those who mainly communicate in Russian, even among them (and among the general population of the South and East) the majority do not believe that there is systematic oppressions and persecutions on the basis of language in Ukraine. Moreover, those who already communicate in both Ukrainian and Russian to the same extent (i.e. in whose lives the Russian language is significantly present) perceive the situation much calmer and speak much less about any problems. In the case of the status of the Russian language, although there is somewhat more concern in the South and East, in general public opinion is inclined to believe that Ukrainian should be the only state and official language. At the same time, we will recall the results of our experiment in 2025 (which we mentioned at the beginning), which should reflect a tolerant attitude towards the use of the Russian language at the everyday level.
Table 2. Status of the Russian language in Ukraine and persecutions of Russian-speaking residents in terms of region of residence and main language of communication at home
A. Grushetskyi, comments on the survey results:
In Ukraine, even before 2014, awareness of the importance of the Ukrainian language and the strengthening of its status were growing evolutionary, and Russian aggression only accelerated and intensified these processes. Moreover, in Ukraine, even despite the occupation of Crimea and the outbreak of the war in Donbas by Russia in 2014, Ukrainians continued to be quite tolerant of the Russian language (and, by the way, of ordinary Russian residents of Russia). And if before the full-scale invasion, many Ukrainians were ready to consider compromise options, where the Ukrainian language would be guaranteed an important symbolic state role, and the Russian language could be present in certain regions and in education, then the Russian aggression of 2022, for obvious reasons, made such scenarios impossible. For our foreign readers (in Europe, North America and other regions), it is of fundamental importance for us to emphasize that the Russians’ justification of their aggression against Ukraine by the alleged persecution of the Russian language in Ukraine is an absolute lie. And it was a lie before 2014, on the eve of 2022, and now (in 2026). As in the case of “desire for NATO membership,” Russia is manipulatively reversing cause and effect. Before 2014, that is, before Russia occupied Crimea and started the war in Donbas, the majority of Ukrainians in all regions were against NATO membership (only 15-20% supported it) and this issue was not even part of the demands of the Revolution of Dignity of 2013-2014. It was Russian aggression that contributed to the fact that Ukrainians had a desire to join NATO. The situation is similar with regard to the Russian language - the emotional reaction of some Ukrainians to the Russian language is now exclusively a consequence of aggression and there was no talk of anything like this before. And even in conditions of full-scale war and constant atrocities by Russians, for 88% of Ukrainian-speaking citizens it is quite acceptable that the Russian language can be used safely in everyday life. Unfortunately, Russia has effectively misled many, even educated people in the West, who continue to say that “Ukraine’s desire to join NATO provoked the war” or that “the oppressions of the Russian language provoked the war.” These are simply lies used by Russia to justify its imperialist ambitions, and for some reason many people in the West also find such claims a convenient way to shift the blame onto Ukraine. For our Ukrainian readers, we want to emphasize that social unity in the face of the existential challenge of the Russian invasion has been one of the pillars of our effective resistance for over 4 years. It is not surprising that the Russian enemy is looking for every crack that could be turned into a split. We must recognize such attempts and not succumb to them. We must maintain this unity and in the case of complex issues (of which we will have many more!) we must resort to calm civilized dialogue to find consensus. In the case of the language issue, we observe how, to a large extent spontaneously, from the “grassroots” horizontal level of communication of ordinary people (which is perfectly described by the English word grassroots), a consensus option is being developed. Yes, the Ukrainian language is a very important symbol and it should be the only state and official one. Yes, it should receive increased support from the state and in the long term its role should only expand and strengthen. Yes, the Ukrainian language should be the main one in education. And at the same time, at the everyday level there should be no place for stigmatization and persecution on the basis of language, in particular for using the Russian language. We should not be complacent about the fact that the majority of the Russian-speaking population does not feel pressure and persecution, but work to minimize the percentage of those who do feel such pressure. The role of the state in this case (and of all those who consider themselves statesmen) is constructive decisions that direct the development of the situation in such a consensual spirit. Finally, we would like to note that KIIS has been researching social distance towards various linguistic and ethnic groups since the 1990s. As of 2025, Russian-speaking Ukrainians are in second place in terms of closeness (after, in fact, Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians) with indicators that indicate a completely tolerant attitude[4]. So, the situation is not ideal, that is, there is a slightly more cautious attitude than there should be in conditions of complete harmony, but this is quite expected in the whirlpool of emotions during a brutal war. It is important that all of us – the authorities, the opposition, journalists, experts, and ordinary citizens – orient ourselves towards dialogue and consensus, and not towards emotional accusations (in particular, to score political points). We have had enough of Russia's attempts to divide us. We must be wiser and maintain unity.
Appendix 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire
And with which of these statements regarding the language issue in Ukraine do you agree to a greater extent? READ. ORDER RANDOMIZATION
What do you think the state policy regarding the Russian language in Ukraine should be? The Russian language – … HALF OF THE RESPONDENTS READ IN ORDER 1-3, HALF – IN ORDER 3-1
[IF SELECTED 2] Do you support or do you not support making the Russian language official in your oblast[IF NOW LIVE IN KYIV – in the city of Kyiv itself]?
[1] Attitude towards teaching Russian in Ukrainian-language schools // https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1513&page=5 [2] Attitude towards individual language policy options in Ukraine // https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1555&page=1 [3] Склад макрорегіонів такий: Захід – Волинська, Рівненська. Львівська, Івано-Франківська, Тернопільська, Закарпатська, Хмельницька, Чернівецька області; м. Київ – лише м. Київ (без області); Центр / Північ – Вінницька, Житомирська, Київська, Кіровоградська, Полтавська, Сумська, Черкаська, Чернігівська області; Південь – Миколаївська, Одеська, Херсонська області; Нижнє Подніпров’я – Дніпропетровська, Запорізька області; Схід – Донецька і Харківська області (формально до складу макрорегіону також включена Луганська область, але через майже повну окупації ніхто з респондентів зараз там не проживає, хоча є респонденти, які до 2022 року проживали в цій області). [4] Interethnic prejudice in Ukraine: September-October 2025 // https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1603&page=1
15.6.2026
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