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Expediency of the President's intervention in the activities of the Government and Parliament and the expediency of rebooting power after the war

The press release was prepared by Anton Grushetskyi,executive director of KIIS

 

From May 7 to June 3, 2026, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added questions related to domestic policy issues and attitudes towards the government. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,000 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

 


This press release examines two issues related to domestic politics and attitudes towards government. We have previously published results on trust in individual public figures, including government representatives[1]. So, 61% trust the President of Ukraine, 34% do not. That is, the majority of Ukrainians trust him.

At the same time, an important related question is whether it is possible to justify the President's interference in the activities of other authorities (Government, Parliament), for example, if the goal is to strengthen defense? That is, does high trust in the President legitimize hypothetical violations of the constitutional separation of powers, even with a noble goal?

In addition, in another survey in April of this year, we already showed that high trust in the President does not mean that people want to see him in this position after the war[2]. In May 2023, when expectations were more optimistic, we asked a general question about the expediency of resetting the central government after the war to rebuild the country. Now, three years later, we have re-asked the same question to track the dynamics of the request for a renewal of central government.

  

Expediency of the President's intervention in the activities of the Government and Parliament to strengthen defense

 

In July 2022, KIIS conducted a comprehensive survey for “OPORA”, which, among other things, concerned issues of democracy in Ukraine and the rights and freedoms of citizens in the face of a full-scale war. One of the questions we asked our respondents was whether it was justified for the President to interfere in the activities of the Government and the Verkhovna Rada to strengthen defense[3]. Thus, we can see how citizens' views on this issue have changed over almost 4 years of full-scale war.

So, in July 2022, 79% believed that the President could intervene and ignore the constitutional separation of powers. 16% opposed this. However, now, in May 2026, the share of those who consider interference in the activities of the parliament and the government justified has decreased to 52%. On the other hand, the share of those who believe that the President should adhere to the constitutional division of powers has increased to 38%.

 


Graph 1. Which point of view about the interaction between the President, the Government and the Parliament is closer to you?

 

 


The graph below shows the data in terms of trust in the President. As can be seen, only among those who completely trust the President the absolute majority (81%) consider it justified to interfere in the activities of the Government and Parliament. Among those who rather trust, 55% consider it justified.

At the same time, even among those who rather or completely do not trust the President, quite a few still consider such intervention advisable.

 

Graph 2. Expediency of the President's intervention in the activities of the Government and Parliament in terms of trust in the President

 

 

             


Expediency of rebooting central government after the war

 

Respondents were also asked the question “In your opinion, after the end of the war, in order to restore the country, it is necessary or not to reset and replace the central government – the President, the Government, the Verkhovna Rada? Choose all that apply.” Respondents could choose “Yes, replace the President”, “Yes, replace the Government”, “Yes, replace the Verkhovna Rada”, “Yes, everyone needs to be replaced” or “No, no one needs to be replaced”. For convenience, the graph below shows the total answers for each body of government and the answers “everyone needs to be replaced”. For example, 63% chose the option “everyone needs to be replaced”. Separately, the Verkhovna Rada – 20%. Therefore, the graph indicates that in total 83% would like to replace the Verkhovna Rada. The Appendix contains the full distribution of answers.

Before moving on to the results, let us emphasize that we were talking about the period after the war. KIIS surveys consistently show that the majority of Ukrainians are against holding elections until the war is over[4].

So, if three years ago 73% expected a reset of the central government at least at one level, now the indicator has increased to 88%. In the case of the Parliament, the number of those who expect a reset after the war has increased from 69% to 83%. In the case of the Government, the increase has been from 47% to 74%, and in the case of the President, from 23% to 67%.

 

Graph 3. In your opinion, after the end of the war, is it necessary or not to reboot and replace the central government – the President, the Government, the Verkhovna Rada – to restore the country? Choose all that apply.


The graph below shows the data on the expediency of a post-war reboot at the level of the President in terms of trust in the President. Thus, only among those who completely trust him, a minority (“only” 33%) expect a reboot at this level after the war (and the majority, accordingly, are against it).

Already among those who rather trust, the majority (68%) expect a reboot at this level after the war. And among those who do not trust (and rather, and completely) - almost everyone expects changes.

It should be noted that these results are fully correlated with the results of our other question in April – how Ukrainians see the future of V. Zelenskyy after the war. So, then among those who completely trusted, 70% would like him to remain President after the war, among those who rather trusted – only 28%, among those who did not trust – 1-2%[5].

 

Graph 4. Expediency of the reboot of central government at the level of the President after the war in terms of trust in the President

% think it's worth a reboot

 

 

 

A. Grushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

 

We have observed the same trends persisting recently. On the one hand, the majority of Ukrainians continue to trust President V. Zelenskyy. He remains the legitimate head of state and Ukrainians are against holding elections until the war is over. Although narratives about his “illegitimacy” due to the lack of elections are shared by a certain part of the population (which is why threats in the field of information security persist), this is only a minority.

On the other hand, a significant part of those who trust him are conventionally “state-oriented” Ukrainians, for whom it is important to rally around the institution of the President in the conditions of an existential war with Russia. That is, they believe that there is reason to criticize the President (and react more sensitively to, for example, hypothetical violations of the division of powers), but avoid an uncompromising fight against him, since the priority is to survive the war. But these same people, after the war, in peacetime, want to see someone from the new generation of leaders as President.

It is important to clarify that this does not apply exclusively to the President - it is a much broader request for the renewal of the elites and the desire to see someone new in the parliament, the Government, and other government bodies. Moreover, “someone new” is not the current parliamentary opposition, Ukrainians have accumulated criticism and claims against it as well. At the same time, the population sees heroes on the front, sees effective volunteer and public organizations, sees individual representatives of local authorities who are able to overcome challenges, sees individual officials of the central government who were able to establish the necessary processes. And it is with these people that Ukrainians want to move towards their dreamed-of future after the war in peacetime.

Thus, the President enjoys the trust and support of Ukrainians in matters of national defense, and for the majority he should remain in office until the end of the war. However, this trust and support is not unconditional, but rather restrained. However, over many years, both claims and simply psychological fatigue have accumulated, so high trust indicators should not reassure the country's leadership. At the same time, the country's leadership should understand that Ukrainians primarily want the war to end on acceptable terms, Ukrainians have the will to continue resistance and bear the burden of problems. Ordinary Ukrainians are open to constructive cooperation with the authorities, and if the authorities sincerely communicate and offer truly effective solutions that strengthen our defense, then they can rely on the support of the people.


           

Appendix 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

 

Which point of view about the interaction between the President, the Government and the Parliament is closer to you? READ. RANDOMIZATION OF THE ORDER OF STATEMENTS

% in the column Ukraine as a whole West[6] Center South East
The President should be able to intervene in the activities of the Parliament and the Government in time of war in order to strengthen the country's defense, regardless of the division of powers between them 52 56 49 55 42
Even in time of war, the division of powers between the various branches of government should be preserved and the President should not interfere in the activities of the Parliament and the Government 38 34 41 35 42
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ) 10 9 9 9 17
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ) 1 1 1 1 0

 

In your opinion, after the end of the war, is it necessary or not to reboot and replace the central government – the President, the Government, the Verkhovna Rada – to restore the country? Choose all that apply. READ

% in the column Ukraine as a whole West Center South East
Yes, replace the President 4 4 4 2 7
Yes, replace the Government 12 8 12 16 4
Yes, replace the Verkhovna Rada 20 17 19 24 21
Yes, everyone needs to be replaced* 63 65 64 57 62
No, no one needs to be replaced 5 6 5 3 5
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ) 6 5 5 9 7
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ) 1 0 0 2 0

If this option was selected, then the other individual answers (the President separately, the Government separately, the Verkhovna Rada separately) were not marked for the respondent. Also, if the respondent indicated that he or she would like to reboot both the President, the Government, and the Verkhovna Rada, then only the option “everyone needs to be replaced” was marked. Thus, for each respondent, either one or two bodies of government that he or she would like to reboot were marked, or “everyone needs to be replaced” (or “hard to say” or “refusal”) were marked.  



[1] Trust in President V. Zelenskyy and other public figures: results of a survey conducted on May 7-June 3, 2026 // https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1616&page=1

[2] Dynamics of trust in President V. Zelenskyy: results of a survey conducted on April 20-27, 2026 // https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1610&page=2

[3] Democracy, civil rights and freedoms, and media consumption in the conditions of war: Results of a KIIS survey for OPORA // https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1132

[4] Trust in President V. Zelenskyy and attitude towards the conduct of the elections: results of a survey conducted on March 1-8, 2026 // https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1595&page=1

[5] Dynamics of trust in President V. Zelenskyy: results of a survey conducted on April 20-27, 2026 // https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1610&page=2

[6] The composition of the macroregions is as follows: West – Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Khmelnytskyi, Chernivtsi oblasts; Center – Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Chernihiv oblasts, Kyiv city; South – Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia oblasts, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson oblasts; East – Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts (formally, the macroregion also includes Luhansk oblast, but due to almost complete occupation, none of the respondents currently live there, although there are respondents who lived in this oblast until 2022).


17.6.2026
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