The press release was prepared by Anton Grushetskyi,executive director of KIIS

During June 17-23, 2026, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey, to which, on its own initiative, added a question about how historical disputes between Ukraine and Poland should be resolved. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,005 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

In June 2026, a significant crisis occurred in Polish-Ukrainian relations, formally related to different views on common historical events and what role these different interpretations should play in interstate relations and in the domestic politics of individual states. After the beginning of the aggravation in early June 2026, KIIS decided to ask in its survey in the middle of the month what approach to resolving historical disputes between Ukraine and Poland Ukrainians support (and in the end, part of our survey took place before the decision of the President of Poland to take away the Order of the White Eagle from the President of Ukraine, part - after this decision).

Previously, in September-October 2023, KIIS conducted an all-Ukrainian survey commissioned by the Ilko Kucheriv Foundation “Democratic Initiatives” and the Center for the Study of the Liberation Movement, where the question “Should Ukraine or not coordinate its policy of identifying and honoring heroes of the past with neighboring European states?” was answered “no” by the majority of respondents (55%) (“yes” by 37%). At the same time, the majority (60%) answered “no” to the question “Should neighboring European states coordinate their policy with Ukraine regarding their heroes of the past?” (“yes” by 32%)[1]. That is, most Ukrainians took a rather wise position that Ukraine should not interfere in the historical politics of its neighbors, and that at the same time other neighbors should not interfere in Ukraine's own historical politics. And now we have asked a somewhat different, but relevant, question about the Ukrainian-Polish historical disputes in particular.

The central question for this publication is the question we asked about approaches to resolving historical disputes between Ukraine and Poland. At the same time, for a complete picture, we suggest looking further at our long-term results of monitoring attitudes towards Poles and how Ukrainians assess the activities of the OUN-UPA during World War II. KIIS asked these questions in previous surveys, but they are relevant to better understand public moods in Ukraine.

During the survey, respondents were asked the question “Poland and Ukraine have disputes over history. Which approach do you support the most?” We offered four answers to choose from. Two of these answers are confrontational, meaning they do not involve consensus and mean that one of the nations must give in:

• "Ukraine must fulfill all Polish demands and generally adhere to the Polish view of mutual history" – that is, the actual subordination of Ukrainian historical policy to Polish demands and Ukraine's loss of subjectivity in matters of its own history;
• "Poland should change its position and start adhering to the Ukrainian view of mutual history" – in this case, on the contrary, it is expected that Poland will be deprived of subjectivity in historical matters;

The next two options are constructive and reflect a romantic view or a purely pragmatic view:

• "Both countries should strive to create a common view of mutual history through mutual compromises and through joint commissions of historians, not politicians" – romantic expectation that through depoliticization and the work of professional historians, a consensus and a common view of events can be developed;
• "Each country can have its own view of history and should not interfere with how another country sees it" – a pragmatic approach that reflects a fair understanding that every nation can have its heroes and that other nations should not interfere in these matters.

Graph 1 below shows the results of the survey. As can be seen, only 5% of Ukrainians share a confrontational approach to resolving historical disputes: only 1% expect Ukraine to submit to Poland on these issues, and at the same time only 4% of Ukrainians expect Poland to submit to Ukraine.

Instead 90% of Ukrainians seek constructive interaction with Poland. The majority (57%) share the pragmatic view that each nation can have its own heroes and other nations should not interfere. Another 33% expect that through joint commissions of historians, not politicians, a consensus view can be reached.

Graph1. There are disputes over history in Poland and Ukraine. Which approach do you support most?

The table below shows the data in terms of region and age of respondents. As can be seen, the situation is quite similar in all regions and in all regions the majority of Ukrainians share a pragmatic position (and a significant number – a romantic conciliatory one). And only a small minority in all regions chose confrontational answers.

Table 1. Approach to resolving historical disputes between Poland and Ukraine in terms of socio-demographic categories

Since 1994, KIIS has been conducting a research of the attitude of the Ukrainian population towards certain ethnic and social groups. This research is conducted using the scale of the American sociologist Emory Bogardus (adapted by N. Panina). For each ethnic group from the list, respondents must answer how close a relationship they are ready to allow with representatives of each group. This is called social distance. The minimum social distance is 1 (agree to allow as a family member), the maximum is 7 (would not allow to enter Ukraine). Often, the level of social distance is interpreted as the level of prejudice towards a particular group.

If respondents are ready to accept representatives of the group as family members, friends, neighbors or work colleagues (score 1-4), then, using the terminology of Ye. Holovakha and N. Panina, this attitude can be called tolerant[3]. The attitude towards a particular category of the population, which consists in the fact that a person would not like to see representatives of this category in his environment, but does not object to these people being citizens of Ukraine (score 5), can be called social isolation by analogy with the terminology of Ye. Holovakha and N. Panina. And disagreement with the fact that people of this social category live in Ukraine can be called xenophobia. If they do not object to these people coming as guests (score 6) - this is a lower level of xenophobia, and if they do not perceive them even as guests (score 7 - would not let them into Ukraine at all) - this is the highest level of xenophobia.

We last conducted our survey in September-October 2025 (and we plan the next one in September-October this year)[4]. And we always asked questions about social distance from Poles. The graph below shows the results for Poles - the average score (recall that the closer to 1, the better the attitude). For a better understanding of the results, we note that the minimum social distance is for Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians - the average distance is 2.4 (i.e. not even 1, but 2.4). The maximum social distance is for Russians - residents of Russia - the average distance is 6.5.

So, for almost the entire period from 1994 to 2025, the indicator of attitude towards Poles varied between 4 points or slightly higher, which reflects a fairly tolerant attitude. As of 2025, the indicator is 4.1 points.

At the same time, it is important to pay attention to the dynamics since 2021. If in 2021 the indicator was 3.7 points, then in 2022 (after the invasion) it decreased to 3.0 points, in 2023 (in September) it decreased to 2.9. In fact, in September 2023, Poles came in second place in terms of closeness to Ukrainians (after, in fact, Ukrainians themselves). These were historically the best indicators for the entire observation period. That is, Ukrainians saw enormous help from Poland and were truly sincerely grateful.

And the deterioration of the indicator to 4.0 in 2024 and to 4.1 in 2025 is a consequence of such actions as the blockade of the border from the Polish side, which began at the end of 2023. That is, the deterioration of the attitude occurred as a reaction of Ukrainians to such events.

It should be noted separately that there were no changes between 2024 and 2025 (the difference is within the margin of error). And this despite the fact that during the presidential election campaign in Poland in 2025, anti-Ukrainian narratives were openly exploited (including by the winner of the election).

At the same time, we emphasize that the deterioration that occurred after 2023 returned the indicators to the levels before 2022 (but not to worse ones), that is, it was the end of the romantic period of 2022-2023, but not a fundamental change in the attitude towards Poles. The indicators of the attitude towards them remain at a level that indicates a completely tolerant attitude.

Graph 2. Social distance towards Poles according to the Bogardus scale 

It is also worth recalling the results of a survey conducted by colleagues from the Rating Group this year, which found that 58% of Ukrainians would support sending Ukrainian troops to aid Poland in the event of a Russian attack[5].

Finally, we would like to mention the attitude of Ukrainians to various historical events. For example, in our 2023 survey on historical memory, we asked the question “In your opinion, how positive or negative role did such events play in the history of the Ukrainian people?” Respondents could choose the options completely / rather positive or completely / rather negative. The option “hard to say” was not read, so respondents could choose it only if they insisted. Thus, 68% positively assessed the struggle of the OUN-UPA, 17% negatively[6]. At the same time, in the survey for the Center for the Study of the Liberation Movement, which we mentioned at the beginning, 72% answered that they knew about the UPA and of them (if to take those who know, for 100%) 90% had a positive attitude towards recognizing the soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as fighters for the independence of Ukraine. At the same time, 52% knew R. Shukhevych.

At the same time, we have another question that we asked in 2013 (i.e. before the Revolution of Dignity), in 2022 (after the invasion), and in 2025. The question is “How do you, in general, assess the activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN-UPA) during World War II?” The respondents were given the answers “negatively,” “hard to say for sure, negatively or positively,” and “positively” (i.e. we read the option “hard to say for sure,” and the respondent himself could also say “don’t know”). With this question, we can trace the dynamics over more than 10 years, and it also localizes the attitude towards the OUN-UPA by its activities during World War II. And in addition, we openly “allowed” the choice of an option that reflects the uncertainty of the attitude (due to lack of awareness or for other reasons).

So, in 2013, 48% of respondents negatively assessed the activities of the OUN-UPA during World War II, only 19% gave positive assessments, and another 22% could not decide (the remaining 11% simply answered “don’t know”). In 2025, only 8% negatively assessed the activities of the OUN-UPA during World War II, and 37% assessed them positively. At the same time, 50% chose the option “hard to say for sure, negatively or positively” (the remaining 5% answered “don’t know”). Compared to 2022, uncertainty has become slightly higher and there have been fewer people who gave positive assessments. Although a consistently low share negatively assessed the activities of the OUN-UPA.

Thus, now, after the full-scale invasion, there is a mostly positive perception of the OUN-UPA and their struggle in general. Especially when we do not specify it and at the same time “motivate” respondents to choose a meaningful answer. However, there are also obvious gaps in awareness of the events of the past. Therefore, when there is more specification and when we directly mention the possibility of an indefinite answer, many people choose this option, which largely reflects the really poor awareness of many Ukrainians.

Graph 3. How do you, in general, assess the activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN-UPA) during World War II? 

A. Grushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

The results of our surveys show that, firstly, Ukrainian society approaches the issues of historical disputes with Poland quite maturely and constructively. Almost all Ukrainians are against imposing the Polish view of common history on Ukraine, and at the same time, only a small share of Ukrainians want to impose the Ukrainian view on Poland. For the majority, this issue should be depoliticized and not be part of interstate relations or a means of internal mobilization to score political points. That is, either each country deals with its heroes and does not interfere in the affairs of its neighbor, or joint commissions of historians, not politicians, try to form a consensus view.

At the same time, secondly, there are no anti-Polish moods in Ukrainian society, and even in 2025, after the election campaign in Poland with anti-Ukrainian slogans, we did not observe a significant deterioration in the attitude towards Poles. In general, in 2022-2023, our data reliably demonstrate an improvement in the attitude towards Poles, which was a consequence of Ukrainians' sincere gratitude to the Poles for the support provided. The dynamics after 2023 are a cooling (and provoked not by the actions of Ukrainians) and a return to the previous, completely normal, attitude. And at the same time, the majority of Ukrainians are ready to support the sending of troops to Poland in the event of an attack on it by Russia. Currently, no influential force or authoritative entity in Ukraine is building its communication on anti-Polish hysteria. We see that President V. Zelenskyy, representatives of the government, representatives of the opposition, and representatives of civil society emphasize their gratitude to the Polish people for the support they have provided.

Finally, Ukrainians and Poles of the millennium live side by side and, unfortunately, we have both heroic and tragic pages. Each nation has the right to its heroes, and to its pain and insults. Both Ukrainians and Poles can read each other a long list of claims and each side will have its own truth.

However, for the sake of the future, modern national identity cannot be built on uncompromising claims to a neighbor based on the events of the ancient past. Both nations must look to the future, see what they have in common now. The Russian enemy will only rejoice at the discord between Ukrainians and Poles and will try in every way to exacerbate the crisis in relations. Therefore, the events of the past should be left to specialists, and the elite of each nation must, out of responsibility to current and future generations, stop using historical issues for purely political purposes (to harass their opponents in their society or to mobilize the electorate in their support, based on the image of the "enemy" formed from the neighboring country).

Now a lot is being said about the formula “We forgive and ask for forgiveness,” and Ukrainian society, as we see from our data, is ready to follow it. It is important for Ukrainians to finally rediscover their own history (and not a history written in foreign capitals and imposed on Ukraine, as has been the case for the last few hundred years). Ukrainians will continue to reflect on the events of the past, we have a long way to go and we will certainly rethink many events and figures. But at the moment, Ukrainians are not building their identity on anti-Polish ideas. For Ukrainians, Poles are not enemies. For Ukrainians, it is important now to stand firm in the war with the Russian enemy, who again wants to destroy Ukraine. For this, it is necessary to mobilize all resources, both material and spiritual, symbolic, including drawing inspiration from the centuries-old struggle for Independence.

Therefore, we call on Ukrainian society to adhere to restrained and constructive views on resolving historical disputes, as well as to maintain a normal attitude towards our neighbors. At the same time, we call on Polish society to demonstrate similar balance and focus on a common future. Without a free Ukraine, there will be no free Poland - this formula remains as relevant as ever.

Appendix 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

There are disputes over history in Poland and Ukraine. Which approach do you support most? READ