Trust in President V. Zelenskyy and attitude towards holding elections: results of a survey conducted July 20-August 3, 2026

The press release was prepared by Anton Grushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

From July 20 to August 3, 2026, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey, to which, on its own initiative, added questions about trust in V. Zelenskyy and about the national elections. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assisted telephone interviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 974 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the margin of error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in “wartime” conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

KIIS regularly monitors the level of trust in President V. Zelenskyy. Below are the results of a survey that was conducted after high-profile personnel decisions and during the protests. Thus, we can assess how trust in V. Zelenskyy has changed over the past few months.

We asked our monitoring question “To what extent do you trust or do not trust Volodymyr Zelenskyy?” In this formulation, as can be seen, we do not “remind” respondents that he is the President. We also note that apart from V. Zelenskyy, we did not ask questions about trust in other public figures.

So, according to the results obtained, 55% now trust the President, 40% do not trust him (balance of trust-distrust - +15%).

The last time we asked the question was in May, when 61% trusted and 34% did not trust (balance – +27%). However, in May, firstly, we also asked question about trust in other public figures, except for V. Zelenskyy. According to our observations, this can create a context where V. Zelenskyy is perceived a little better (i.e. people hear other surnames, to which the attitude is worse, and against their background, the perception of V. Zelenskyy is a little better). Secondly, then, in addition to the surname, we also read out a short description of the person. For V. Zelenskyy, we “reminded” him that he is the President. For some respondents, this can activate the view of him as the personification of the institution, which is why the attitude becomes better (since there is a war now and we must unite).

Therefore, it would be more correct to compare it with April, when we asked the question in the same wording as now. In April, 58% trusted and 36% did not trust, the balance was +22%. That is, compared to April, we also record a decrease in trust in V. Zelenskyy. However, at least for now, we are not witnessing the collapse of trust due to high-profile personnel decisions that some politicians, experts, and observers might have expected. At the same time, we may be somewhat underestimating the impact of personnel decisions and protests on decrease in trust, since, for example, in June and the first half of July there could have been some increase in trust (against the backdrop of attacks on Russian logistics, etc.). That is, if we had a survey in early July and it recorded higher trust (than in the spring), then the magnitude of the decline would look higher compared to it. In addition, the decline in trust was likely offset by V. Zelenskyy’s partial satisfaction of the protesters’ demands, as well as his successful meetings with D. Trump (D. Trump’s statements that questioned the success of the meetings were made only in the last days of the field stage).

In addition, it should be taken into account that among the 54% who trust V. Zelenskyy, 20% trust him “completely”, and the remaining 34% trust him “rather”. At the same time, for balance, it is important to understand that among those who do not trust him, there is a division – 19% do not trust him “completely”, and 20% do not trust him “rather”.

Graph 1. To what extent do you trust or distrust Volodymyr Zelenskyy?

* The option “hard to say” was not read to respondents. It was only marked if the respondent requested it.

            We also regularly ask question about when elections should be held.

There is a stable trend that the majority of Ukrainians are against holding elections in the near future, before the end of hostilities. Only 15% now (last in March – 12%) believe that elections should be held even before the end of hostilities.

Another 23% believe that elections can be held after a ceasefire and security guarantees are received. Compared to March, the share of such people has increased from 13% to 23%.

However, since March, from 69% to 57%, fewer people believe that elections should be held only after a final peace agreement and a complete end to the war. However, the majority still believe that elections should be held only after the complete end of the war.

Graph 2. Imagine that a ceasefire really takes place and at the same time Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees: more weapons, peacekeepers from a European country, etc. Should Ukraine then hold national elections after that?

The graph below shows support for holding elections in terms of trust in the President.

So, among those who “completely” do not trust V. Zelenskyy, the demand for elections right now is noticeable, but still less than half (44%) talk about elections before the end of hostilities. Instead, 29% talk about elections after a ceasefire with security guarantees, and quite a few (21%) believe that elections should be held after a final peace agreement.

Among those who “rather” distrust the President, 44% believe that elections should be held after a final peace agreement, and 35% are ready to approve elections after a ceasefire with security guarantees. At the same time, only 17% of them insist on elections even before the end of hostilities.

And among those who completely or rather trust V. Zelenskyy, the vast majority supports holding elections only after a final peace agreement.   

Graph 3. Attitude towards holding elections depending on trust in President V. Zelenskyy

We also asked the question of which elections should be held first to positively influence the development of the country. Thus, 44% believe that presidential elections should be held first. In contrast, 32% insist on holding parliamentary elections first. Only 11% talked about holding local elections.

Graph 4. And when it is possible, what elections should be held first to have a positive impact on the country’s development?

A. Grushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

Despite significant public dissatisfaction with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's personnel decisions (which resulted not only in angry comments on social media, but also in fairly large-scale – especially by wartime standards – street protests), he still maintains fairly high trust ratings (at least for now). And although there have been a few more people who support elections in the near future or at least after a ceasefire, the majority is still against it.

At the same time, we cannot claim that recent events had only a limited impact on attitudes towards V. Zelenskyy. It can be assumed that the nature of the impact is more long-term. Now, despite all the criticism of the authorities’ personnel policy, most Ukrainians are aware of the existential threat from Russia and Russians, that is, the focus is still on war and achieving an acceptable peace. As we can see, Ukrainians are mostly against holding elections in the near future and even after a ceasefire. Accordingly, a conditional consensus remains that we have the institution of the President, with whom we must continue to resist together, and political responsibility will come after the end of the war in the elections. In this situation, such resonant events rather reduce the already limited potential for V. Zelenskyy to be re-elected in peacetime (if he decides to run again). That is, people's indignation has not reached the point of wanting to change the head of state right now (and in fact it is still far from that, especially since the President is still reacting to the protests and making at least partial personnel decisions, as outraged citizens demand). However, for the "post-war" period, the idea of the need for new leaders is becoming more crystallized.

In addition, to analyze the public perception of events, we recall that often the reactions in social media and among active publics are much more violent than among ordinary citizens. For example, in December 2025, shortly after the scandal surrounding the “Mindich tapes”, we asked questions about how informed people were about these events. And although it seemed that literally everyone should have known about it, in the survey 22% answered that they “don’t know anything about it”, and another 42% answered that they “just heard something, but don’t have a holistic idea”[1].

In any case, we call on all parties to exercise restraint and constructive dialogue, as we have a common goal – Victory in the war. This common goal should unite us and, within reasonable limits, work out compromise solutions. Taking the conflict to extremes will not help any of the pro-Ukrainian sides and only our enemy Russia and the Russians will benefit.

Appendix 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

To what extent do you trust or distrust Volodymyr Zelenskyy? READ

Imagine that there really is a ceasefire and at the same time Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees. Should Ukraine hold national elections after that? READ

And when it is possible, what elections should be held first to have a positive impact on the country’s development? READ