The press release was prepared by Anton Grushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

From July 20 to August 3, 2026, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey, to which, on its own initiative, added questions about war and peace. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assisted telephone interviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 974 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

To assess the situation at the front, respondents were asked to choose one of the statements with a more optimistic or more pessimistic interpretation.

The absolute majority of respondents – 77% – share the view that although Russia is advancing, it is slowly and with heavy losses, and Ukraine is able to continue effective resistance. Share a more pessimistic view, according to which Russia has made significant advances and victories, and Ukraine's resistance is hopeless – 12%. Another 11% could not decide on their opinion.

We previously asked a similar question in January 2026, and the results were completely identical then.

Graph 1. With which opinion about the situation at the front do you agree to a greater extent?

            KIIS has been asking since January 2026 whether Ukrainians are ready to withdraw troops from Donbas in exchange for security guarantees from the USA and Europe. In this survey, we re-asked this question (Graph 2, Tables 1-2), and also asked about attitudes to a scenario where hostilities are “frozen” behind the current front line (Graph 3, Tables 3-4).

Graph 2 shows the results for our monitoring question. Thus, 60% of respondents consider it categorically unacceptable to transfer the entire Donbas under Russian control in exchange for security guarantees. At the same time, 33% are ready for such a concession (although most of them admit that this is a difficult condition). Another 7% could not decide on their opinion.

Compared to April, fewer Ukrainians express readiness to approve this scenario. So, in April, 57% were categorically against it (now 60%), and 36% were ready to approve it (now 33%).

Graph 2. Now I will read a possible condition for achieving peace, and you tell me how acceptable it is to you. Use the scale “I easily agree with this condition”, “This will be a difficult condition, but generally acceptable”, “This condition is absolutely unacceptable”.

Ukraine withdraws its troops from the territories of Donbas that it currently controls, i.e. from Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, etc., and these territories pass under Russian control. In return, the USA and Europe give Ukraine security guarantees

The table below shows the data in terms of separate regions. It should be noted that few respondents were surveyed in each region (i.e., the margin of error is higher), but we can still see trends. At the same time, the current results are compared with the results in April.

So, firstly, in all regions, the majority rejects the proposal to withdraw Ukrainian troops in exchange for security guarantees. Secondly, compared to April, the rejection of such a proposal has slightly increased in Kyiv city, the Center / North, and the East. In the Lower Dnipro region, the indicators have not changed. And only in the West there are slightly more people who are ready to approve the proposal (although the majority is still against it).

Let us pay special attention to the Kyiv city. Despite the merciless campaign of bombing Kyiv city with ballistic missiles and other means, the readiness of the city’s residents to approve the proposal has even decreased – from 34% to 26%. On the other hand, the number of those who are categorically against it has increased from 62% to 69%.

Table 1. Readiness to approve the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the Donbas region in exchange for security guarantees from the USA and Europe

            The table below shows the data in terms of age. As can be seen, the trend continues that younger Ukrainians are more likely to approve the withdrawal of troops from Donetsk region. If among respondents aged 60+, 22% are ready to approve, then the indicator increases to 34% among those aged 45-59 and then to 39% among those aged 30-44 and 42% among those aged 18-29.

            At the same time, it is worth noting that among the youngest Ukrainians there is a tendency for the indicator to decrease compared to April (then 54% were ready to approve, now – 42%).

Table 2. Readiness to approve the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the Donbas region in exchange for security guarantees from the USA and Europe in terms of age

Now let's move on to another scenario - the end of the war on the current front line, without international recognition of the occupied territories as part of Russia and with Ukraine's support in the form of money and weapons.

In the case of this scenario of “freezing” the war on the current front line in exchange for security guarantees in the form of significant funding and weapons supplies, 59% are ready to approve it (although also mostly reluctantly). Categorically against this scenario – 31%.

Graph 3. Now I will read a possible condition for achieving peace, and you tell me how acceptable it is to you. Use the scale “I easily agree with this condition”, “This will be a difficult condition, but generally acceptable”, “This condition is absolutely unacceptable”.

The fire ceases along the current front line. Russia retains control over all occupied territories without international recognition. At the same time, Ukraine receives large amounts of money and all weapons to guarantee its security: missiles, air defense, aircraft, tanks, etc.

The table below shows the data in regional dimension. In all regions, the majority is ready to approve this scenario, while the highest number is in Kyiv (73%, in other regions – 53-59%).

Table 3. Readiness to approve the cease fire along the current front line in exchange for money and weapons in terms of regions

And in the table below, the data is presented in terms of age. Among respondents aged 18-59, 62-64% are ready to approve such a scenario. Only among those aged 60+ the indicator is 49% (however, there are more of those who are ready to approve than of those who are categorically against it – 35%),

Table 4. Readiness to approve the cease fire along the current front line in exchange for money and weapons in terms of age

            Only 21% of Ukrainians expect the war to end at least by the end of this year. And only 15% expect the war to end at least in the first half of 2027.

Instead, 45% expect the war to end either in the second half of 2027 or later. As before, a significant share (19%) has no definite opinion on this issue.

Thus, Ukrainians are mostly prepared for the war to continue for a long time.

Graph 4. In your opinion, when might the war end?

Since the beginning of this 2026, we have observed a decrease in the share of those who are ready to endure war as long as necessary – from 65% in January to 48% in April. At the same time between April and July-August the indicator returned to almost the previous level. So, now 61% answered that they are ready to endure as long as necessary.

At the same time, 20% of respondents now say a shorter period (several months to half a year) (in April it was 29%).

Graph 5. How much longer are you ready to endure war?

      The table below shows the results in terms of region. In all regions, half/more than half of respondents said they were ready to endure war as long as necessary.

      At the same time, compared to April, there is a tendency in all regions for the share of those who are ready to endure as long as necessary to increase. In particular, in Kyiv city, the indicator has increased from 61% in April to 69% now (and this is against the backdrop of an intensive campaign of attacks on the capital).

Table 5. How much longer are ready to endure war in terms of region

            And in the table below, the data is presented in terms of age. Among all age categories, the majority are ready to endure as long as necessary. Compared to April, there is a tendency for the indicator to increase among all categories.

Table 6. How much longer are ready to endure war in terms of age

A. Grushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

Our survey took place in a rather controversial period both in the context of the war and its prospects, and in the context of the socio-political situation. On the one hand, Ukraine and Ukrainians survived the difficult winter of 2025-2026, the Russian offensive slowed down, and at the same time, in recent months, effective (and spectacular) strikes have been and are still being carried out on Russian logistics and infrastructure in the occupied territories and in the Russian rear. On the other hand, against the background of a shortage of missiles for the air defense forces, the Russians mercilessly and brutally strike with ballistic missiles at any targets, including completely civilian ones. The war in Iran has raised oil prices, which helps Russia to hold on economically. Added to this is internal instability due to personnel changes that are not well understood by the public and, as a result, protests.

However, given the totality of circumstances, we see that Ukrainians still retain optimism and the intention to continue resisting the enemy. Although the Russian campaign of air strikes (especially with ballistic missiles) causes pain and suffering to Ukrainians, it does not break our will. Ukrainians understand that Russia and Russians are an existential threat, so the fight must continue.

At the same time, we would emphasize such signals that “send” the results of our survey to the following audiences:

• To Ukrainians: the enemy is trying to sow panic and despair among the population, trying to break us morally and psychologically. In particular, the enemy is using social media to promote defeatist narratives. But our data proves that the majority of Ukrainians have the will to continue the struggle and do not want to surrender. The dominance of anonymous commentators (or conditionally “popular” bloggers) in social media under the guise of “ordinary Ukrainians” who promote defeatist narratives does not at all reflect public moods (“is not representative” if to use sociological terminology). Therefore, it is worth not to succumb to their influence, but to understand that Ukrainians from West to East are determined to continue the struggle;
• To our allies in the West: if Ukrainians, despite all the endless difficulties and tragedies, are ready to continue their resistance, then all the more so should the West, with all its resources and capabilities, maintain and increase its resolve to support Ukraine. Shame on those politicians and experts in the West who are trying to limit support for Ukraine (or impose capitulation) in conditions when Ukraine itself is bleeding, but is demonstrating courage and not giving up;
• To our enemy Russia and the Russians: Ukrainians have long since emerged as a modern independent nation. For Ukrainians, preserving sovereignty and independence is very important, and Ukrainians understand that it is you – Russians – who are an existential threat. Therefore, your terrorist actions and war crimes, although they bring continuous pain, do not lead to the desire of Ukrainians to capitulate.

Appendix 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

With which opinion about the situation at the front do you agree to a greater extent? READ. ADD “OR” BETWEEN STATEMENTS. ORDER RANDOMIZATION

How much longer are you ready to endure war? READ

In your opinion, when might the war end? READ

“Now I will read a possible condition for achieving peace, and you tell me how acceptable it is to you. Use the scale “I easily agree with this condition”, “This will be a difficult condition, but generally acceptable”, “This condition is absolutely unacceptable”.