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Dynamics of trust in President V. Zelenskyy: results of a survey conducted on August 21-September 10, 2026

The press release was prepared by Anton Grushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

 

From August 21 to September 10, 2026, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey, to which, on its own initiative, added a question about trust in President V. Zelenskyy. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assisted telephone interviews, CATI) Based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,003 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, resided in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the margin of error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in “wartime” conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

 

 

KIIS regularly monitors the level of trust in President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Below are the results of a survey conducted after high-profile personnel decisions and during the protests. Thus, we can assess how trust in V. Zelenskyy has changed over the past few months.

We asked our standard monitoring question: “To what extent do you trust or do not trust Volodymyr Zelenskyy?” As can be seen from this wording, we did not “remind” respondents that he is the President. It should also be noted that, apart from V. Zelenskyy, we did not ask about trust in other public figures.

Thus, according to the results obtained, 54% currently trust the President, while 41% do not (the trust-distrust balance is +13%). In addition, it is important to note that among the 54% who trust V. Zelenskyy, 18% trust him “completely,” while the remaining 36% trust him “rather.” For the sake of balance, it is also important to understand the breakdown among those who do not trust him: 25% do not trust him ‘completely,” while 16% do not trust him “rather.”

In late July and early August, 55% of people trusted V. Zelenskyy, while 40% did not. In other words, the level of trust has remained virtually unchanged over the past month. It is worth noting that the field phase of this survey began immediately after the NABU and SAPO investigation “Forrest Gump”, which resulted in the dismissal of the Deputy Head of the President’s Office I. Mudra. Also, about half of the interviews were conducted since September 4, that is, after the new “Carthage” investigation into the Prosecutor General’s Office, but did not cover further events since September 14 (when the former Prosecutor General attempted to launch an attack on the NABU and the SAPO).

           

Graph 1. To what extent do you trust or do not trust Volodymyr Zelenskyy?

 

* The "hard to say" option was not read to respondents; it was marked only if the respondent specifically requested it.


The table below shows the level of trust among individual socio-demographic categories. If to compare them by the balance of trust-distrust, then V. Zelenskyy is trusted the most (the balance is 1.5 times or more higher than the national one, i.e. from +20% and above):

  • By gender – women (balance +23%);
  • By age – 18–29-year-olds (+23%);
  • By region – residents of the Center/North (+21%), South (+24%), and East (+21%);
  • By type of settlement – residents of villages (+20%), towns with a population of up to 20,000 / urban-type settlements (+26%), and towns with a population of 20,000–99,000 (+23%);
  • By education – people with complete secondary education or lower (+21%);
  • By occupation – military personnel / police officers (+32%), students (+34%), the unemployed (+39%).

 

V. Zelenskyy is trusted the least (with a balance 1.5 times or more lower than the national average—i.e., +9% or lower):

  • By gender – men (balance 0%, i.e. the same number trust and do not trust);
  • By age – 45–59-year-olds (+4%);
  • By region – residents of the West (+3%) and Kyiv city (-6%);
  • By type of settlement – residents of cities with a population of 100,000 or more (+4%);
  • By education – people with higher education (+7%);
  • By occupation – manual workers (+5%), entrepreneurs / self-employed / farmers (-12%), those managing a household (+3%);
  • By primary language spoken at home – Russian-speaking citizens (-4%);
  • By family income level – those with low (+8%) and very low (-9%) income.

 

Table 1. Level of trust in V. Zelenskyy in terms of socio-demographic categories

% in a row Trust Do not trust Hard to say
Gender      
Man 48 48 4
Woman 59 36 5
Age      
18-29 59 36 5
30-44 55 41 5
45-59 51 47 3
60+ 54 40 6
Region [1]       
West 50 47 3
Kyiv city 45 51 4
Center / North 58 37 5
South 56 32 13
Lower Dnipro 55 41 3
East 59 38 3
Type of settlement      
Village 57 37 6
Town with up to 20,000 inhabitants or UTS 61 35 3
Town with 20,000–99,000 inhabitants 58 35 7
City with 100,000 or more inhabitants 50 46 4
Education       
Complete secondary or lower 58 37 5
Secondary specialized or vocational 55 39 6
Higher 52 45 4
Main occupation       
Worker 50 45 5
Non-manual work not requiring higher education 59 41 1
Specialist 56 41 3
Entrepreneur, farmer, self-employed 42 54 4
Military or police personnel 63 31 6
Homemaker 48 45 7
Retired 55 39 6
Student 67 33 0
Unemployed 66 27 8
Language spoken at home      
Ukrainian 56 40 4
Russian 45 49 6
Ukrainian and Russian equally 54 41 5
Family income level      
Very low 42 51 6
Low 51 43 6
Average 55 41 4
High 57 39 4
Very high 56 40 4

 

 

 A. Grushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

 

V. Zelenskyy maintains fairly high levels of trust and, consequently, legitimacy as head of state.

At the same time, the cumulative negative effect of a number of high-profile anti-corruption investigations affecting the team and environment of V. Zelenskyy may ultimately be irreversible. It is worth recalling that Ukrainians react very strongly to corruption. For instance, in April 2026, when asked what posed a greater threat to the country – military aggression or corruption within the authorities – 54% chose corruption (compared to 39% who chose military aggression) [2]. One can debate the adequacy of such an assessment of fellow citizens, but if this is how Ukrainians subjectively see the situation, it may have quite practical objective consequences (which many may not like).

Since 2022, the lowest level of trust was recorded in December 2024 – 52%. However, amidst pressure from USA President D. Trump in the first half of 2025, we witnessed another “rally around the flag” effect, with the trust level rising to 74% by May 2025. Subsequently, this effect began to gradually dissipate, while anti-corruption investigations are only cementing a critical attitude toward the team in power.

Recall that the first “rally around the flag” in the spring of 2022 increased trust to 90% and generally lasted for a very long time (as late as the end of 2023, 77% trusted, i.e. the decrease was relatively insignificant in a year and a half). The second “rally around the flag” in the spring of 2025 peaked at just 74% (noticeably lower than the record highs of 2022) and lasted only a few weeks. Against this backdrop, it is difficult – or perhaps even unrealistic – to expect another significant and sustained surge in trust (unless, perhaps, there is a major improvement in the situation at the front). The President, his team, and his advisors need to recognize and factor this in when formulating their strategic political plans.

Thus, Ukrainians maintain their trust in the President as the country’s leader during a brutal war, but they also expect appropriate decisions and actions – particularly regarding the fight against corruption and suitable personnel appointments.

At the same time, it must be noted that while corruption remains a significant issue for Ukraine, repelling Russian aggression is a matter of survival for both the country and its people. Therefore, the Ukrainian authorities, anti-corruption bodies, and the public must strike a sensible balance: one that enables a decisive fight against corruption on the one hand, while avoiding the destabilization or weakening of state institutions in the face of wartime challenges on the other. Furthermore, the way the public is informed about investigations should not aim to generate hype or provoke an emotional reaction, as this is more likely to demoralize the population. Instead, the narrative covering these investigations should reassure citizens that the fight against corruption is underway and that positive progress is being made (rather than fostering a sense of hopeless corruption).

Therefore, first of all, all the aforementioned entities – the government, anti-corruption bodies, the public – must act as a single, coordinated team.

 

Appendix 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

 

To what extent do you trust or do not trust Volodymyr Zelenskyy? READ

1 Completely do not trust
2 Rather do not trust
3 Rather trust
4 Completely trust
5 HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ)
6 REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ)

 



[1] The composition of the macroregions is as follows: West – Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Khmelnytskyi, Chernivtsi oblasts; Kyiv city – only Kyiv city (without the oblast); Center / North – Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Cherkasy, Chernihiv oblasts; South – Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kherson oblasts; Lower Dnipro – Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia oblasts; East – Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts (formally, the macroregion also includes the Luhansk oblast, but due to the almost complete occupation, none of the respondents currently live there, although there are respondents who lived in this oblast until 2022).

[2] Level of optimism, need for unpopular decisions to obtain Western funding, perception of threats: results of a survey conducted April 20-27, 2026 // https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1611&page=1

 

17.9.2026
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