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Dynamics of trust in President V. Zelenskyy: results of a survey conducted on October 8-16, 2026
The press release was prepared by Anton Grushetskyi, executive director of KIIS
During October 8-16, 2026, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey “Omnibus”, to which, on its own initiative, added a question about trust in the President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assisted telephone interviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1031 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, resided in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022. Under normal circumstances, the formal margin of error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.0% for indicators close to 50%, 3.4% for indicators close to 25%, 2.4% for indicators close to 10%, 1.7% for indicators close to 5%. In addition, we compare the results obtained on October 8-9, 2026 (before the "diesel deal" and further pressure on Ukraine), and October 10-16, 2026 (i.e., after these events). During October 8-9, 274 respondents were surveyed (margin of error 7.7%), during October 10-16 – 757 respondents (margin of error 4.6%). Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in “wartime” conditions were previously cited by KIIS. In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population. In the press release, calculations are rounded to integer values. In some cases, the % sum may not add up to exactly 100% due to rounding. KIIS regularly monitors the level of trust in President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. We usually ask our monitoring question, “To what extent do you trust or do not trust Volodymyr Zelenskyy?” The following options were read to respondents: “Completely do not trust,” “Rather do not trust,” “Rather trust,” and “Completely trust” (the option “hard to say” was not read, but the respondent could choose it on his or her own initiative or simply refuse to answer). In this formulation, as can be seen, we do not “remind” respondents that he is the President. We also note that when asking about V. Zelenskyy, we did not ask about trust in other public figures before. So, 54% currently trust the President, while 41% do not (trust-distrust balance: +13%). In late August and early September, the indicators were completely identical. That is, the level of trust has practically not changed over the last month. It should be noted that among the 54% who trust V. Zelensky, 22% trust him “completely”, and the remaining 32% trust him “rather.” At the same time, for balance, it is important to understand that there is a division among those who do not trust him – 24% do not trust him “completely”, and 17% do not trust him "rather".
Graph 1. To what extent do you trust or do not trust Volodymyr Zelenskyy?
In the graph below, we compare the responses of respondents we surveyed on October 8-9 (before the “diesel deal” and subsequent pressure on Ukraine) and those we surveyed on October 10-16. So, during the period of October 8-9, 43% trusted the President, while 52% did not. However, during the period of October 10-16, 57% trusted him, and 39% did not. We have previously observed situations where trust in the President is slightly lower in the first days of the field stage than in subsequent days, meaning that there may be methodological reasons for such differences, at least in part. However, the differences were much smaller in the past, and the current nature of the differences suggests that we are most likely seeing a “rallying around the flag” effect following pressure from the USA.
Graph 2. Trust in President V. Zelenskyy: October 8–9 and October 10–16
A. Grushetskyi, comments on the survey results:
Among Ukrainians, there are indeed many who criticize President V. Zelenskyy for various problems facing Ukraine and Ukrainians. However, while Ukrainians may be sincerely outraged by cases of corruption among members of the head of state’s team or by unsuccessful personnel decisions, at the same time the voices of critics are much quieter when it comes to relations with other states, establishing support for the country in the field of defence, and generally defending Ukraine’s interests at the international level. Yesterday, we published the first part of the results of our survey on war and peace [1]. As we see, the public communication of President V. Zelenskyy is quite consistent with the public opinion of Ukrainians. (And compared to, for example, Russia, in Ukraine the government does not have a dominant influence on the formation of public opinion, that is, we are really talking about conditionally organically formed public sentiments that reflect the personal experience of Ukrainians and their communication with each other, along with the consumption of information from a diverse range of independent media.) So, Ukrainians are open to negotiations and difficult compromises, but not to surrender. Even if they try to wrap it in a more attractive wrapper, Ukrainians still smell the stench of surrender with its almost inevitable further genocide from Russia, not a sustainable peace. And what is especially important, the vast majority of Ukrainians – 73% – do not agree that the Ukrainian authorities should be more accommodating in negotiations with Russia (believe that the authorities should be more accommodating – a minority of 20%). When statements by public figures in the West or “analytics” from experts and the media are full of accusations against V. Zelenskyy for “intransigence” or “escalation” (creating the false impression that in the issue of the unprovoked Russian invasion, there is a separate V. Zelenskyy with his actions, and a separate Ukraine and Ukrainians with their other aspirations), then ordinary Ukrainians perceive this as an attack on Ukraine and Ukrainians in general. Ukrainians see this as unfair, because “for some reason” it is not V. Putin who is accused of “intransigence” or “escalation”. Of course, what kind of “escalation” is it when Russian murderers destroy another civilian house with its inhabitants or shoot a bus with its passengers? What kind of “intransigence” is it that the Russians directly demand to give them Ukrainian lands that they do not even control (we are talking not only about Donetsk region, but also about Zaporizhzhia and Kherson region) and also to deprive Ukraine of sovereignty, leave it defenceless and subordinate it to their will? Therefore, if the initiators of another pressure campaign expect that ordinary Ukrainians will believe their arguments against V. Zelenskyy, and not their own eyes, which see the killings and destruction that the Russians commit every day, then they are deeply mistaken. As a result, we see another “rallying around the flag” and a growth in trust in the President, because he publicly says what millions of Ukrainians feel and know from their bitter experience. At the same time, we do not know how significant and long-lasting the effect of “rallying around the flag” will be. In 2025, it was already smaller in scale and much shorter in time than in 2022. Maybe it will be even shorter now. If it weren’t for the “diesel deal” and further pressure on Ukraine, and if the trends we saw on October 8-9 had continued, we could have recorded (with this monitoring question) trust below 50% and a negative balance for the first time. To a large extent, the further trajectory of trust depends on the communication and actions of partners in the West (although both the President and his team must understand that their domestic steps have already cost them the loss of a significant part of trust, so domestic policy should be more balanced). In any case, after October 9, we observed a healthy reaction from a significant part of Ukrainian society (although, unfortunately, not all Ukrainian political actors were able to overcome their selfish interests and/or grievances and either directly flirted with those who pressure Ukraine into surrender, or shyly avoided public comments). This once again proves that regardless of the name of the President, Ukrainian society is aware of the existential challenges and “red lines”, and demonstrates its readiness to unite to continue the resistance and achieve an acceptable result.
Appendix 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire
To what extent do you trust or do not trust Volodymyr Zelenskyy? READ
[1] Opinions and views of Ukrainians on issues of war and peace: results of a survey conducted on October 8-16, 2026 // https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1643&page=1
20.10.2026
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