The press release was prepared by the Executive Director of KIIS, Anton Hrushetskyi

During February 14-22, 2023, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus". By the method of computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting), 2,002 respondents living in all regions of Ukraine (except the Autonomous Republic of Crimea) were interviewed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived on the territory of Ukraine (within the boundaries controlled by the authorities of Ukraine until February 24, 2022). The sample did not include residents of territories that were not temporarily controlled by the authorities of Ukraine until February 24, 2022 (AR of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left the country after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.1) did not exceed 2.4% for indicators close to 50%, 2.1% for indicators close to 25%, 1.5% - for indicators close to 10%, 1.1% - for indicators close to5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. In particular, if back in May, among all the respondents we interviewed, 2.5-4% lived in the territories occupied after February 24 (and this corresponded to the percentage of those who live there, because the generation of telephone numbers was random), now, due to the occupiers turning off the telephone connection, we managed to interview only 2 respondents (from 2002) who currently live in occupied settlements. It is important to note that although the views of the respondents who lived in the occupation were somewhat different, the general tendencies were quite similar. That is, the impossibility of interviewing such respondents does not significantly affect the quality of the results. There are other factors that can affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions (see Annex 2).

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of public moods of the population.

Immediate prosecution vs. a more thorough longer investigation

At the beginning of 2023, Ukraine was shaken by another high-profile discussion, this time around possible corruption in the Ministry of Defense. As could be seen from the discussion (the echoes of which are still going on), one side appealed to arguments like "don't rock the boat", especially in conditions where, from their point of view, the level of journalistic investigations in Ukraine is far from always objective and unbiased. The other side emphasized zero tolerance for even the slightest opacity in the field of defense procurement and the need for immediate personnel decisions, because in their understanding, such possible corruption poses significant threats to the state and defenders.

In February 2023, we asked the respondents a question, and what is their attitude to the investigations of possible corruption in the Ministry of Defense: should these be immediate personnel decisions against the background of acute importance during the war, or should they be thorough, albeit possibly longer, investigations in order not to provoke instability in the ministry and not harm the defense. As can be seen, this question polarized Ukrainians: 46% believe that it is better to investigate more thoroughly and for a longer time, while at the same time the same number of respondents (47%) believe that there should be immediate decisions on the slightest suspicion of corruption.   

Graph 1. There is a discussion in society about the Ministry of Defense. Some people believe that everyone should be immediately removed from office and prosecuted for the slightest suspicion of corruption, because this is especially important in times of war.

Others believe that this will provoke instability within the Ministry of Defense and negatively affect the country's defense capabilities and the acquisition of weapons from the West, so it is better to investigate such suspicions more thoroughly, albeit for a longer time. With which of these statements regarding the Ministry of Defense do you agree to a greater extent?

In the graph below, the data are shown in regional dimension. In all regions of Ukraine, the opinions of the population were divided almost equally.

Graph2. Attitude to possible corruption cases in the Ministry of Defense in the regional dimension

At the same time, it is important to see that the position in the high-profile case surrounding the Ministry of Defense is not related to "zradophile" or "depressed" moods. Graph 3 shows data on readiness for territorial concessions depending on the attitude to possible corruption cases in the Ministry of Defense. As can be seen, both among those who demand quick decisions and among those who want a more thorough investigation, the absolute majority is against the concessions of the aggressor.

Graph 4 shows data on how these two categories of respondents perceive Russia's margin of safety in the war against Ukraine. It can also be seen that on this issue both sides (in the conflict over the Ministry of Defense) show equal optimism in the war with Russia.

Graph3. Readiness for territorial concessions depending on the attitude to possible corruption cases in the Ministry of Defense in the regional dimension

Graph4. Perception of Russia's margin of safety in the war against Ukraine depending on the attitude towards possible corruption cases in the Ministry of Defense in the regional dimension

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

Ukraine will obviously continue to face situations of internal destabilization. Regardless of whether the seeds for potential conflicts are sown by the Russian enemy (or by short-sighted selfish Ukrainian actors) or have an objective Ukrainian origin, there is a very fertile ground for corruption scandals in Ukraine. We are talking about chronic mistrust in the institutions that should ensure justice in society - the courts and the prosecutor's office. Ukrainians now show sincere admiration and high trust in defense institutions, such as the Armed Forces or the SBU. Even with regard to the police, which is perceived as an important institution of resistance, we see a rapid increase in trust. However, the worst and lowest indicators of trust are in the courts and the prosecutor's office.

Ukraine as a society is undergoing a significant transformation against the background of the war. It is important that, on the one hand, the authorities show commitment to real reforms and we see a truly systematic development of the institutional sphere, especially in the sphere of ensuring justice. On the other hand, the public, sensitive to corruption cases, should act as a balanced partner in institutional changes and remember the principle of "do no harm" that is critically important during wartime.

Ukrainians as a nation demonstrate miracles of resistance to the enemy and Ukrainians as a nation must be capable of civilized discussions and constructive dialogue in building a better Ukraine.

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

There is a discussion in society about the Ministry of Defense. Some people believe that everyone should be immediately removed from office and prosecuted for the slightest suspicion of corruption, because this is especially important in times of war.

Others believe that this will provoke instability within the Ministry of Defense and negatively affect the country's defense capabilities and the acquisition of weapons from the West, so it is better to investigate such suspicions more thoroughly, albeit for a longer time. With which of these statements about the Ministry of Defense do you agree to a greater extent? RANDOMIZATION OF THE ORDER

 (% among all respondents)

Annex 2. Methodological comments on the representativeness of telephone surveys conducted during the war

Even before the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, there were a number of factors that negatively affected the representativeness of the polls (for example, the absence of a census for more than 20 years). A full-scale war, of course, greatly affects representativeness and complicates the work of sociologists, but does not make it impossible. Access to reliable data on the state of public moods remains relevant both for Ukrainians themselves and for our foreign partners (who, as the events of recent months have shown, often underestimated and did not understand Ukraine and Ukrainians).

At the same time, in order to maintain objectivity, it is necessary to understand what limitations the war imposes on the conduct of sociological surveys. First of all, we pay attention to large-scale population movements. As of December, the UN estimates the number of Ukrainian refugees at almost 7.9 million. Obviously, due to various reasons, it is difficult to consider these data unequivocally accurate, but in general, the quite significant scale of departure from the country is understandable. There is no exact data on how many of them are adult citizens, but, most likely, it is about half. Among about 30 million adult citizens (estimated at the time of the full-scale invasion), it can be roughly estimated that about 15-20% have left the country, and it is impossible to reliably survey these citizens using telephone interviews. Even more citizens have become internally displaced persons, but they have a much smaller impact on the quality of telephone surveys, since almost all of these citizens have mobile phones and are reachable to participate in the survey (in fact, 12% of the respondents of this survey are IDPs).

Another important problem is the accessibility for the survey of the population of the territories that were occupied after February 24, 2022, due to the conduct of intensive military operations or due to interruptions in telephone communication. Now there is practically no connection. In May, 2.5-4% of respondents lived in these territories, now in the sample of residents of these territories - only 2 respondents out of 2002 surveyed. According to our estimates, the territory occupied by Russia as of the beginning of September (occupied after February 24, 2022) accounted for about 9% of the entire adult population. Taking into account the mass exodus of the population from these territories (most likely, we are talking about at least half of the population), as well as the fact that significant territories of Kharkiv and Kherson regions were liberated from this period, we estimate that no more than 3-5% of the total adult population of Ukraine were unavailable due to communication problems.

In our opinion, a more significant impact on representativeness can be either a generally lower willingness of citizens with "pro-Russian" attitudes to participate in surveys, or the insincerity of those who did take part in the survey (taking into account the obvious facts and prevailing opinions in the media regarding the Russian invasion , some citizens will not want to say what they really think "in public"). If to talk about the general willingness of respondents to participate in the survey, then in recent surveys we see either the same indicators or somewhat lower (although it should be borne in mind that the lower willingness to participate of "pro-Russian" citizens can be compensated by the higher willingness to participate of "pro-Ukrainian"-minded citizens).

We conducted a methodical experiment in May, which shows that the citizens who are currently participating in the surveys in terms of demographic characteristics and meaningful attitudes are close to those who participated in the surveys until February 24, 2022. Preliminarily, we see some shift in the direction of "pro-Ukrainian"-minded citizens, which is reflected in up to 4-6% deviations for individual questions (in the direction of more frequent selection of answers that correspond to the "pro-Ukrainian" interpretation of events). In our opinion, in the current conditions, this is a rather optimistic indicator.

However, this experiment does not give an answer as to how sincere the respondents are now in their answers. To assess the sincerity of responses to sensitive questions, in July we conducted another experiment using the "imagined acquaintance" method. The results showed that the respondents generally answered the survey questions honestly. That is, we have reason to say that during the interview, the respondents really answer our questions sincerely.