The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

From December 2 to 17, 2024, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative,  added a question about the level of optimistic / pessimistic moods regarding the future of Ukraine and the unity of Ukrainians. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 985 respondents were interviewed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

Under the conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

By the end of 2024, the voices of observers who speak of pessimistic moods among the population of Ukraine are becoming increasingly louder (for example, such opinions can often be found on the pages of reputable Western media publications, as well as heard from Western opinion leaders). At the same time, it is worth focusing on the results of surveys, which allow for a more reliable assessment of the state of public moods.

In December 2024, we asked Ukrainians two questions related to the development of Ukraine – what is the future of Ukraine in the relatively long term (“in 10 years”) and whether Ukrainians are moving towards unity (or, conversely, moving towards division). We asked these questions in December 2023, so in addition to assessing the current situation, we can also assess what changes society has undergone over the past year.

For many Ukrainians, the current difficulties are perceived as a conditional investment in the future, that is, efforts and losses now will be rewarded later - both Ukrainians themselves and their children and grandchildren will have the opportunity to live in happier conditions. At the same time, the opposite logic may also operate - disbelief in the future may force some people to think in categories that the current resistance is meaningless. That is why, since 2022, we have been asking how Ukrainians see the future of Ukraine “in 10 years” - more likely as a prosperous country in the EU or more likely as a country with a destroyed economy and population outflow.

The graph below shows the results of the surveys at the end of 2022, 2023, and 2024. We can talk about two classes of results.

First, there is a steady trend towards a decline in the share of those who are optimistic about Ukraine's future. While at the end of 2022, 88% believed that Ukraine would be a prosperous country in the EU in 10 years, by December 2023 their share had decreased to 73%, and by December 2024 – to 57%. At the same time, the share of those who believe that Ukraine will have a ruined economy has increased from 5% to 28%. It is important to note that although the share of optimists has decreased by 16 percentage points over the past year, not all of them have turned into pessimists (their share has increased by 9 percentage points). That is, a significant part of Ukrainians is more likely to talk about high uncertainty.

At the same time, secondly, when we analyze the results, we should also focus on the actual current indicators in addition to the dynamics. We see that now, despite a difficult year and its difficult end, the majority of Ukrainians (57%) are generally inclined to an optimistic view of the country's future. And although the share of pessimists is significant (28%), it is still significantly inferior to the share of pessimists.

Graph 1. How do you see the future of Ukraine in 10 years?

In the graph below, the data are shown in a regional dimension[1]. There is a downward trend in all regions and to a similar extent. Although in the East and South the mood is slightly more pessimistic, in fact, in general the situation between the regions does not differ significantly. Thus, in all regions about half / a little more remain optimistic about the future of Ukraine.

Graph 2. How Ukrainians see the future of Ukraine in a regional dimension

Our other question was about the perception of unity in society. We didn’t ask what unity is right now, but we were interested in the direction of change – are we moving towards more or less unity.

Over the past year, there have indeed been fewer people who believe that Ukrainians are gradually overcoming contradictions and moving towards a united political nation – from 69% in December 2023 to 53% in December 2024. Instead, from 25% to 33%, the number of those who believe that the contradictions are only deepening and Ukrainians are heading towards a split has increased (and also from 6% to 14%, the number of those who have undecided opinions on this issue has increased).

However, as in the case of the country's future, it is worth analyzing the current state of affairs separately. Again, in the face of complex and serious challenges (which psychologically break many), we still have about half of Ukrainians (53%) who believe in the movement towards unity, and the share of those who believe in the movement towards a split, although alarmingly significant, is inferior to conditional optimists.

It is also important that current assessments of social cohesion are significantly better than they were in 2020 (when there was no full-scale invasion yet).

Graph 3. And how do you assess unity among Ukrainians and overcoming contradictions?

* In 2020, due to a different socio-political context, the formulations were similar in content, but somewhat different: "Ukraine as a country is being stitched together, is on the path of unification" and "Ukraine as a country is falling apart, is heading towards division.".

The graph below shows the data in a regional dimension. The trends are quite similar in all regions and in fact the situation between regions does not differ significantly.

Graph 4. Are Ukrainians moving towards regional unity

When experts and ordinary people see similar results on related questions, it gives the false impression that we are talking about the same people. Yes, we have 57% of those who are optimistic about the future of Ukraine, and there are 53% who believe that Ukrainians are moving towards unity. We can assume that we are talking about mostly the same people. However, although there is indeed a certain correlation, these aspects are not identical in the minds of Ukrainians. As a result, the perception of reality by Ukrainians is much more complex and multi-layered than it might seem from the results of answers to one simple question.

In Table 1 below, we have provided the “intersection” of the answers to the two questions. As can be seen, for example, almost a quarter of those who are optimistic about the future of Ukraine believe that Ukrainians are now heading towards a split (13% out of 57%). At the same time, every fifth respondent who believes in the movement towards the unification of Ukrainians paints a pessimistic scenario for the country’s future (10% out of 53%).

Graph 5 below illustrates the dynamics of the share of those who have consistently optimistic views (believe in Ukraine as a member of the EU with a prosperous economy and believe that we are now moving towards unity), and those who have consistently pessimistic views (believe that we will have a destroyed economy and at the same time we are now heading towards a split). So, we now have 37% of those who have consistently optimistic views, compared to 57% in December 2024. In contrast, the share of those who have consistently pessimistic views has increased from 10% to 16% over the past year. Most of the increase, it turns out, was due to an increase in the share of those who have undecided or conflicting views.

Along with this, although 37%, of course, cannot be considered a high indicator, it is still more than 2 times higher than the share of consistent pessimists (16%).

Graph 5. Share of Ukrainians who have consistently optimistic views and consistently pessimistic views on Ukraine's development

In addition, we can somewhat “ease” the criteria and include as optimists those who have a positive answer to one question, and to the second question – at least “hard to say” (for example, I believe that in 10 years Ukraine will be in the EU, but it is difficult to say whether we are moving towards unity now). In this case, 50% will be conditional optimists versus 23%, who will be conditional pessimists.

Table 1. Common matrix of opinions about the future of Ukraine and the unity of Ukrainians

100% – sum of all cells (in rows and columns).

Dark blue and dark orange indicate consistent optimists/pessimists. Light blue and light orange indicate those who tend more towards optimism/pessimism

And finally, the share of consistent optimists/pessimists in the regional dimension. As can be seen, in general, the situation between regions does not differ significantly.

Graph 6. Share of Ukrainians who have consistently optimistic views and consistently pessimistic views on Ukraine's development, in regional dimension

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

In our publications, we constantly emphasize that a number of indicators of public moods should be compared not only with the previous period (such as 3 or 6 or 12 months ago), but also taking into account the specific circumstances when the survey was conducted. We can, of course, be upset that from December 2023 to December 2024, from 73% to 57%, there were fewer people who believe in Ukraine as a prosperous country within the EU. But let us recall that since December 2023, Ukraine has gone through (and is going through) a long period of limited Western support, a pre-election / inter-governmental period in the US, the gradual occupation of new territories by enemies, a traumatic (for public opinion) process of personnel changes, complex internal processes (we are talking about cases of corruption, and about mobilization, and about destabilization like "illegitimate power"). Against this background and taking into account living under conditions of almost three years of full-scale invasion, one could expect a much lower level of optimism among Ukrainians. That is, although the level of optimism is now lower, it is much higher than it could be under such objective conditions.

At the same time, maintaining a healthy atmosphere among the public is an important direction and responsibility of all Ukrainian subjects (from the authorities to journalists and public activists). We trace a strong connection between optimism/pessimism and other important social indicators. For example, among consistent optimists, 60% are against any territorial concessions, while among consistent pessimists, 65%, on the contrary, are generally ready for territorial concessions. Or also among consistent optimists, 71% trust the President, and among consistent pessimists, 65% do not trust him. Although distrust is quite normal in a democratic society, in the current Ukrainian realities, the category of the population that does not trust the authorities and that looks at the situation pessimistically may be particularly vulnerable to hostile propaganda actions.

You can criticize the “victorious narratives from the authorities” as much as you want (by the way, if you analyze the public messages from the authorities, then such an interpretation of “victories” does not actually correspond to reality, that is, official messages are often very restrained and cautious). However, now, on the contrary, the “decadent narratives” that predict various almost apocalyptic scenarios for Ukraine are doing more harm. Moreover, many public figures for some reason believe that if you scare the population, it will mobilize people more to resist, but this is not so. Ukrainians are currently in a situation of restrained long-term pragmatic optimism. It is worth looking for a balance in which at least such a construction will be preserved without transitioning to a purely depressive worldview.

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from questionnaire

How do you see the future of Ukraine in 10 years? RANDOMIZATION OF THE ORDER

And how do you assess unity among Ukrainians and overcoming contradictions? RANDOMIZATION OF THE ORDER