The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

KIIS regularly monitors the attitude of Ukrainians towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration. In the media, one can often find information about high support among Ukrainians for joining the EU and NATO, but the level of support varies greatly depending on the survey. Correct identification of the sources of differences in the results of support for European and Euro-Atlantic integration is an important component of the correct interpretation of Ukrainian public opinion.

In this publication, we use data from three KIIS surveys from 2024 (all conducted by telephone interviews and representing the adult population of the territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine) to illustrate that Ukrainians’ attitudes towards the EU and NATO have different dimensions. As a result, depending on which dimension is investigated (and, in particular, which question wording is used), the results can differ significantly (and, unfortunately, become the subject of manipulation and speculation by public figures in Ukraine and abroad).

So how many Ukrainians support joining the EU and NATO? This question may seem simple, but even for it there is no unity among sociologists and other experts on how to measure it. For example, we can simply ask people directly whether they want to see Ukraine in the EU or NATO or whether they support/do not support joining these unions. In our May 2024 survey, commissioned by NDI[1], we asked respondents the question “By 2030, would you like Ukraine to be… an EU/NATO Member State?” with possible answers “yes”, “no”, “don’t know”, “refusal to answer”.

Another approach is based on similar considerations, but expects people to be ready to demonstrate a proactive stance. That is, if the issue of joining the EU and/or NATO is really important to a person, then they should be ready to take the time and visit a polling station if a referendum is held. Accordingly, such questions are formulated as hypothetical referendums and we ask how the respondent will act (will he vote at all and if so, will he vote “for” or “against”). In September 2024, in our own survey (1000 respondents, margin of error 4.1%), we asked the question “Imagine, please, that a referendum is currently taking place on the issue of whether Ukraine should join the European Union/NATO. You can vote for joining this union, against joining or abstain – not to participate in the vote. What is your choice?”. Respondents could answer “for joining”, “against joining”, “would not participate in the vote” or “hard to say” / “refusal”.

Also, the perception / support of European and Euro-Atlantic integration can be interpreted through the indicators of trust in the respective unions. And in December 2024, in our own survey (1000 respondents, margin of error 4.1%), we asked the question “Now I will name some social institutions and public figures. Please tell me how much you trust those whom I will name.” and the list included the EU, NATO (and also the USA). Respondents had to choose between “completely trust”, “rather trust”, “hard to say”, “rather do not trust”, “completely do not trust” (whereas “hard to say” was immediately read and respondents could choose it).

The graph below shows the main results of the above surveys (full results are in the Appendix). For convenience, all data are calculated for all adult residents of the territories controlled by Ukraine. So, as can be seen, 90% of Ukrainians want to see Ukraine as part of the EU, and 84% want to see Ukraine as part of NATO. Such data, of course, allows us to speak about the absolute commitment of Ukrainians to European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

However, fewer Ukrainians are ready to demonstrate a proactive position. So, in the event of a referendum on joining the EU, 68% of all Ukrainians are ready to come to the polling stations and vote "for". In the event of a referendum on NATO, 68% are also ready. Would vote against – 9% and 10%, respectively (see Appendix). (Data on hypothetical referendums are often subject to manipulation, since, in terms of those who will vote in the referendum, 88% support joining the EU, and 87% support joining NATO. However, when these data are presented without a percentage among all respondents, the false impression of almost total support is created.) Thus, we see that in the case of the EU there are approximately 22%, and in the case of NATO – 16% of those who generally see Ukraine in these unions, but for certain reasons do not want to actively manifest this position in the referendum.

In the questions above, we at least see a clear majority in favor of joining. However, in the question about trust, we see that 46% trust the EU (19% do not trust it), and 43% trust NATO (25% do not trust it). That is, these unions are rather trusted (the balance of trust-distrust is positive), but not overwhelmingly so, and, as we can see, there are many critical views among Ukrainians. Accordingly, there are many Ukrainians who distrust or have doubts about the EU and/or NATO, but still see Ukraine in these alliances.

Graph 1. Dimensions of attitudes towards the EU and NATO

In the table below, the data are given in the regional dimension[2]. We emphasize that it is important to provide data in a regional context to refute widespread stereotypes about the supposedly different views of residents of different regions of Ukraine (larger differences did indeed occur before, but after the full-scale invasion we see a significant leveling of the situation).

As can be seen, by all indicators, there are slightly fewer people who support European and Euro-Atlantic integration from West to East. At the same time in all regions, the majority wants to see Ukraine in the EU and NATO, and the majority is also ready to confirm this by voting in a referendum. That is, despite certain differences, it is more correct to speak of a consensus on moving towards the EU and NATO. At the same time, in all regions (and to a slightly greater extent in the South and East) there is criticism of these unions and, as a result, not such high trust.

Table 1. Dimensions of attitudes towards the EU and NATO by region

In the case of the EU and NATO, it is also important to understand which alliance is a higher priority for Ukrainians. As can be seen in the graph below, more Ukrainians want to see Ukraine in NATO (46%) than in the EU (22%). That is, although membership in both alliances is important for the majority of the population, the priority is NATO (apparently due to the acute demand of Ukrainians to have reliable security guarantees).

It is also worth noting that over the past year, there have been more people who say that membership in any union should not be a priority (12% in October 2023 and 22% in December 2024). At the same time, there have been fewer people who say that membership in NATO should be a priority (54% previously and 46% now) (for the EU, the figures have hardly changed).

Graph 2. What should be a priority for Ukraine – membership in the EU or NATO?

When we discuss Ukrainians’ perception of the West, in addition to the EU and NATO, the USA occupy an important place. Of course, in this case we cannot talk about the attitude towards “accession” to the USA, but we can and should know whether Ukrainians trust the USA. The graph below shows trust in the USA as a whole and for individual regions (we recall that in addition to the options “trust” and “don’t trust”, the respondent was immediately given the option “hard to say”).

So, trust the USA – 40%, do not trust it – 23%. The remaining 36% have an undecided attitude (i.e. they trust in some things, they don’t trust in others, and when there is a direct opportunity, they prefer to choose this option). Thus, Ukrainians tend to trust the USA (since the balance of trust-distrust is positive), but at the same time there is quite a lot of criticism.

Graph 3. Trust in the USA

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

There is a consensus among Ukrainians (both at the level of the country as a whole and at the level of the population of individual regions) that Ukraine should be a member of both the EU and NATO. Considering that 93% of Ukrainians have a bad attitude towards Russia, and 84% – towards ordinary Russians [3], in the case of the geopolitical vector for the EU / NATO there is no competition and we can speak of an unambiguous choice of Ukrainians.

However, the situation cannot be considered completely “rosy” and there are disturbing trends, first of all – not very high trust in the EU and NATO. Obviously, Ukrainians are grateful to the West for the support provided and understand its critical importance, but part of the population has a bitter impression of untimelyness and inadequate volume (and, in particular, that is why at the beginning of October already 38% believed that the West does not want a fair peace for Ukraine [4]). It can, of course, be said that both Ukraine and Ukrainians do not do all the “homework”, but for the majority of Ukrainians who live in conditions of full-scale war, have relatives in the Defense Forces, have painful losses, the consequences of untimely assistance are quite obvious.

At the same time, on the one hand, the prevalence of trust in the West with simultaneous critical reflections can have positive consequences for Ukraine and Ukrainians. Yes, this is a greater subjectification of Ukraine, an increase in self-esteem and an understanding of the importance of building one's own strength. In this context, the West is a good example for us and we are really moving towards this club, but we also understand that we have the right to our own opinion and critical remarks about the fact that not everything in the West works as effectively as it should be.

On the other hand, there are considerable risks of destroying the legitimacy of the Western vector and the growth of populist Eurosceptic forces. That is, we are unlikely to hear objections that Ukraine should not join the EU/NATO at all. Instead, we will hear, for example, that Ukraine “must defend national interests during negotiations, even at the cost of a longer accession process” (where, under the vague “national interests” that are incomprehensible to most, there will often be speculation on the emotions of war-weary Ukrainians). Or discussions will flare up about the correspondence of the value profile of Ukrainians to modern European values. There may be many subjects for such discussions, which domestic populists of various directions can (and, unfortunately, will) skillfully use.

But the worst thing, of course, is the general destruction of faith in Western ideals and the West as a whole. Even if the modern West does not meet high moral standards (and our inflated expectations), it is still the best vector for Ukrainians. Delegitimization of the West can turn into total disbelief and a feeling that “nothing can be changed.” Obviously, our enemy – Russia – wants to achieve exactly this.

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire and distribution of responses

December 2024

Now I will name some social institutions and public figures. Please tell me how much you trust those I will name. %

What should be a priority for Ukraine – membership in the EU or NATO? %

September 2024

Imagine, please, that a referendum is currently taking place on the question of whether Ukraine should join the European Union. You can vote for joining this union, against joining, or abstain – not to participate in the vote. What is your choice? %

And what would be your choice in the event of a referendum on joining NATO? %

May 2024 (survey for NDI)

By 2030, would you like Ukraine to be…  EU member State? %

By 2030, would you like Ukraine to be… NATO member state? %