The press release was prepared by Anton Grushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

From May 15 to June 3, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey “Omnibus”, to which, on its own initiative, added a monitoring question about readiness for territorial concessions, and also conducted an experiment on how different interpretations of “territorial concessions” affect the results. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assisted telephone interviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 2,004 respondents were surveyed (about 500 randomly selected respondents answered each of the 4 versions of questions about territorial concessions). The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the margin of error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 2.9%. the margin of error for the sample around 500 respondents does not exceed 5.8% .

Under the conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

Since May 2022, KIIS has been regularly asking questions in its own surveys about the population’s readiness to make territorial concessions in order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence. Prior to the current survey, KIIS last asked this question in February 2025[1]. The question was formulated as “Which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree with to a greater extent?”, and the respondent was asked to choose one of two such statements (the statements were read to different respondents in different orders to reduce the order effect):

• “In order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence, Ukraine may give up some of its territories”
• “Under no circumstances should Ukraine give up any of its territories, even if this makes the war last longer and threatens the preservation of independence”

We specially emphasize that the first statement does not specify which territories may be the subject of concessions, and also what “territorial concessions” are in question. Another factor is that our formulation provides a more socially acceptable form of accepting losses, since in exchange “the war ends” and “Ukraine retains its independence”. Our experiment in February 2025 showed that Ukrainians strongly react to “preserving sovereignty” and consider it one of the fundamental points for any peace deal. In particular, some respondents could, for example, understand “preserving independence” as receiving security guarantees. That is, their interpretation may be broader than the question directly implies.

It is especially important to emphasize that there are several interpretations of “territorial concessions”, so this time, in addition to the original monitoring question, we formulated three alternative formulations, where we more clearly specified what we mean by “territorial concessions”. The respondent was asked a randomly selected 1 of 4 questions. This issue will be considered in more detail in the next paragraph (before graph 2), and first we propose to consider what changed the answers of Ukrainians to our typical monitoring question (where we do not specify the definition of “territorial concessions”).

Особливо важливо підкреслити, що є декілька інтерпретацій «територіальних поступок», тому цього разу крім оригінального моніторингового запитання ми сформулювали три альтернативні формулювання, де ми більш чітко конкретизували, що маємо на увазі під «територіальними поступками». Респонденту ставилося випадково обране 1 з 4 запитань. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the next section (before graph 2), but first we propose to consider how Ukrainians’ responses to our typical monitoring question (where we do not specify the definition of “territorial concessions”) have changed.  

Graph 1 shows the respondents’ answers. Compared to February 2025, the situation has not changed. Thus, 52% of Ukrainians are firmly against any territorial concessions (in February 2025 – 50%). 38% are ready to accept certain territorial losses (in February 2025 – 39%).

Graph 1. Which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree with to a greater extent?

Now it is worth considering how specifying “territorial losses” affects the results. In the other three versions of our question, the wording was as follows.

v Version “Official recognition of occupation” – Ukraine officially recognizes certain territories as part of Russia and no longer claims them:

• «In order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence, Ukraine could officially recognize certain territories as part of Russia and give them up forever»
• «Under no circumstances should Ukraine officially recognize certain territories as part of Russia and give them up forever, even if this means the war will last longer and there will be threats to the preservation of independence»

v  Version “Transfer of unoccupied territories to Russia” – Ukraine transfers control of territories that it currently controls, such as the cities of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, etc.:

• «In order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence, Ukraine could transfer territories currently controlled by Ukraine, such as the cities of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, etc., under Russian control»
  • «Under no circumstances should Ukraine transfer territories currently controlled by Ukraine, such as the cities of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, etc., under Russian control, even if this means the war will last longer and there will be threats to the preservation of independence»

v  Version “De facto recognition of occupation without de jure” – Ukraine de facto recognizes Russia’s control over certain territories, but does not recognize it officially:

• «In order to achieve peace as soon as possible and preserve independence, Ukraine agrees that Russia retains control over the occupied territories, but Ukraine and the world do not officially recognize this»
  • «Under no circumstances Ukraine should agree and allow Russia to maintain even unofficial control over the occupied territories, even if this means the war will last longer and there will be threats to the preservation of independence»

Therefore, if we are asking about the official recognition of certain territories as part of Russia, then the vast majority (68%) will be against. Ready to accept – 24% (note that we are talking about “certain territories”, not all occupied territories; depending on the territories, there may be significant differentiation).

Also, the absolute majority – 78% – reject the transfer of territories controlled by Ukraine under Russian control. Ready to accept – only 15%.

The only option where there is at least room for discussion is de facto recognition of Russian control without de jure recognition. Even in this case, 43% are ready to accept, and 48% are categorically against. However, as other KIIS polls have shown, if the “peace deal” includes security guarantees and other components important for the future of Ukraine, then more than half (though without enthusiasm) could accept such a scenario for ending the war.

Thus, from the point of view of public opinion, any option that would include the official recognition of Ukrainian territories as part of Russia or, even more so, the transfer of unoccupied territories under Russian control will be rejected. However, Ukrainians maintain healthy flexibility and, even in the context of control of territories, are ready to discuss a compromise option of recognizing de facto Russian control without recognizing it de jure.

In addition, we see that the results of the answers to our original question (where we do not specify the understanding of “territorial concessions”) are closest to the version of “de facto recognition of the occupation without de jure recognition.” This shows that when Ukrainians are currently discussing “territorial concessions,” they mostly interpret them as a de facto recognition that Russia temporarily controls certain territories, while Ukraine and the world do not recognize this.

Graph 2. Which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree with to a greater extent?

The table below shows the data broken down by region of residence of respondents[2]. Since each question was answered by around 500 respondents, there were not so many respondents per region and the results below should be taken as tendencies.

In all regions (i.e., the West, the Center, the South, and the East), the vast majority (64-71%) reject the option of official recognition of the occupation. Similarly, the absolute majority, regardless of the region (76-80%), reject the transfer of unoccupied territories under Russian control. That is, if we talk about such interpretations of “territorial concessions,” we see a consolidated position that does not differ significantly in all regions of the country.

At the same time, in the case of the option with de facto recognition of the occupation without de jure recognition, we can already see some variability (although we cannot draw reliable conclusions due to the size of the sample). Thus, in the West and East there are slightly more people who are ready to accept the option, compared to those who categorically reject it. And in the Center and the South there are slightly more people who categorically reject this option, compared to those who want to accept it. However, in any case, in all regions a significant share chose each of the two answers. As we noted earlier, this is actually the only option where there is room for discussion and compromises for Ukrainians.

Table 1. Readiness for territorial concessions in the regional dimension

KIIS regularly studies the perception of peace deal packages, because some unpleasant things may be approved by Ukrainians if the package contains other, more important conditions for Ukraine (for example, security guarantees). In this survey, we did not study individual packages, because this was the subject of our other survey in May 2025 and we have already published the results[3].

At the same time, in the current survey, we see that in general 78% of Ukrainians and 76-80% in all regions reject the demand to transfer the unoccupied territories of Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk regions under Russian control. However, this demand is one of the core of the Russian Memorandum, handed over to Ukraine on June 2, 2025. Therefore, in the graph below, we remind you how Ukrainians generally relate to the Russian “peace plan”.

Thus, 82% categorically reject it and only 10% are ready to accept it. Moreover, we read out only 6 points to the respondents (one of which was the possibility of Ukraine moving towards the EU, which, apparently, was not part of Russia’s proposal in Istanbul), although the real Memorandum includes more points and a greater number of strict demands for Ukraine. That is, if the respondents were familiarized with the full list of points of the Memorandum, most likely, we would have an even higher % of those who are categorically against it.

Graph 3. Readiness to accept the Russia’ peace plan

A. Grushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

Our survey shows that the issue of territorial losses is extremely sensitive for Ukrainians and, in particular, how exactly “territorial losses” are interpreted plays a significant role. At the same time, this means that (un)readiness for territorial losses can become the subject of manipulation and information campaigns against Ukraine (given that different interpretations of losses have different perceptions by the population).

At the same time, based on the survey results, we can say, firstly, that over the past few months, the resilience of Ukrainians has not wavered. We see this from our monitoring question on readiness for territorial concessions, which has not changed (and from another question on readiness to endure war, even more people are now ready to endure as much as necessary). Secondly, Ukrainians have clear “red lines” on territorial issues, such as the official recognition of occupied territories as part of Russia or the transfer of unoccupied territories under Russian control. These demands are unacceptable and will not be approved by the majority of the population. Third, Ukrainians retain a healthy flexibility and are ready to make painful concessions regarding territories, but only in the form of recognition of de facto occupation without legal legalization and only regarding the currently occupied territories. And even in this case, in order to gain approval from the majority of the population, the package must include reliable security guarantees and other important parameters.

Thus, Ukrainians want peace, Ukrainians are ready for difficult discussions and compromises, but Ukrainians reject demands for surrender.

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from questionnaire

DIVIDE THE SAMPLE INTO 4 GROUPS. EACH GROUP IS ASKED ONE QUESTION VERSION

A. Which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree with to a greater extent? RANDOMIZE ORDER

B. Which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree with to a greater extent? RANDOMIZE ORDER

C. Which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree with to a greater extent? RANDOMIZE ORDER

D. Which of these statements regarding possible compromises to achieve peace with Russia do you agree with to a greater extent? RANDOMIZE ORDER