The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

From May 15 to June 3, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added a question about trust in President V. Zelenskyy. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,011 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population

The level of trust in President V. Zelenskyy has been steadily growing since December 2024 and reached 74% in early May 2025 (did not trust – 22%).

However, already in the second half of May-early June 2025, we observe a decline in trust, although the current indicators remain higher than before the aggravation of relations with the new USA leadership. So, according to the results of the current survey, 65% of Ukrainians trust V. Zelenskyy, 30% do not trust him. Accordingly, the balance of trust-distrust is +35%. These indicators are lower than they were at the beginning of May 2025 (74% trusted, and the balance of trust-distrust was +52%), but remain higher than they were at the beginning of February 2025 (then 57% trusted, and the balance of trust-distrust was +20%).

Graph 1. To what extent do you trust or do not trust Volodymyr Zelenskyy?

* The option “hard to say” was not read to respondents. It was only marked if the respondent requested it.

As can be seen, the level of trust has decreased over a relatively short period of time, which inevitably raises questions about the reasons. We do not have additional information about the specific reasons for the decrease in trust. This requires conducting panel researches, where we survey the same people over a certain period of time and can ask why their opinion has changed compared to the previous survey. However, there are several factors that need to be taken into account when interpreting the dynamics of trust in the President:

• weakening of the effect of rallying around the flag – since February 2025, amid the worsening relations with the new USA leadership, there has been a rather sharp increase in trust and unity. Now, in a few months, the population may be “acclimating” to the new international context and its influence on the perception of the President may decrease. At the same time, other factors, such as the internal situation, may again have a stronger influence on how Ukrainians assess the President’s activities and form their attitude towards him. It is worth recalling that at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the level of trust sharply increased to 90%, which was also a vivid reflection of the effect of rallying around the flag. However, the effect gradually weakened and therefore we saw a steady decline in trust until December 2024 (and for a democratic society during a terrible war, even 52% trust in December 2024 is a rather high indicator);
• short-term impact of signing the Minerals Agreement – the previous survey (which recorded an increase in trust to 74%) was in early May 2025, immediately after the signing of the Agreement. Perhaps this caused a short-term surge of optimism and hope in some people, which was also reflected in higher trust in the President. After such surges, there is usually a return to more “normal” indicators (which in statistics is called regression to the mean);
• lack of progress in ending the war – some people may have had inflated expectations about the nearness of the end of the war, in particular, due to various negotiations that took place during May 2025. However, the events of this period did not indicate that the end of the war was approaching. On the contrary, the increase in Russian attacks in various directions (in particular, in the Sumy oblast, approaching the Dnipropetrovsk oblast, etc.), large-scale air attacks, and the destructive behavior of the Russians in the negotiations before/during/after Istanbul, on the contrary, indicated the opposite intentions. That is, the average Ukrainian could easily see that the Russians did not want peace. This could have affected the general mood (some disappointment and disbelief in the approaching end of the war) and, accordingly, trust in the President;
• context of the questionnaire and questions – in our survey in early May 2025, we asked about trust in 10 politicians. We read the politicians to different respondents in different orders. Our analysis shows that the later we read “Volodymyr Zelenskyy,” the higher the trust. For example, when we asked about trust in V. Zelenskyy at the beginning of the list, about 70% expressed trust. When we asked about trust in V. Zelenskyy at the end of the list, the level of trust reached about 80%. That is, the context of other politicians had some influence on the perception of V. Zelenskyy. Moreover, this effect applies not only to V. Zelenskyy, but also to other politicians. For example, when we asked about P. Poroshenko at the beginning, the level of trust was about 22%. When we asked about trust in P. Poroshenko at the end of the list, the indicator increased to about 30%. In the current survey, we asked about trust only in V. Zelensky and in the block of questions about war and peace (the question about trust was asked after the questions about readiness for territorial concessions and how much they are ready to tolerate war).

Below, the graph shows the dynamics of trust in the terms of regions of Ukraine[1]. Firstly, residents of the West trust the President more – among them, 73% trust V. Zelenskyy, compared to 61-63% in other regions.

Secondly, compared to the beginning of May 2025, the largest decrease occurred in the South and the Center (although in these regions trust indicators still remain higher than they were before February 2025). There were no changes in trust in the East (however, the East was still distinguished by lower trust compared to other regions in the beginning of May 2025). In the West, trust also decreased, but only slightly (when compared to the Center and the South).

Graph2. Trust in President V. Zelensky in the regional dimension

Previously, we published results on the population's readiness for territorial losses[2]. The table below shows how those who trust the President and those who do not trust him feel about territorial concessions.

As can be seen, those who do not trust the President are more ready to make territorial concessions, even in more severe cases. For example, among those who trust V. Zelenskyy, 36% are generally ready for territorial concessions (if we do not specify what we mean) versus 46% among those who do not trust him.

The differences are more significant when we specify the territorial losses. Thus, only 13% of those who trust V. Zelenskyy are ready to officially recognize certain territories as part of Russia. At the same time, among those who do not trust, 44% are ready to officially recognize certain occupied territories as part of Russia.

In the event of the transfer of unoccupied territories (such as the cities of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, etc.) to Russia's control, 9% of those who trust the President are ready for this. Among those who do not trust, 23% are ready.

In the case of de facto recognition of part of the territories under Russian control without de jure recognition, 38% of those who trust V. Zelensky are ready for this. Among those who do not trust him, 55%.

Table 1. Readiness for territorial concessions among those who trust / do not trust V. Zelenskyy

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

Trust in President V. Zelenskyy has decreased recently, but it still remains high (and as our data showed in early May 2025, he still retains the highest trust compared to other politicians)[3]. On the one hand, the decline in trust was expected, as the rallying-around-the-flag effect was the main driver of the rise in trust since February 2025. The duration of this effect has a limit, and we are now seeing it begin to wane in the current context. Therefore, the decline in trust is in some ways a return to greater “normality.”

On the other hand, as the rallying around the flag effect weakens, Ukrainians will pay more attention (and react more sharply) to internal factors, in particular, Russia's summer offensive, corruption, personnel appointments, reforms, etc. All these areas require effective solutions and adequate communication from the authorities. If Ukrainians do not see an appropriate response from government representatives, this may lead to a further downward trend in trust.

A separate comment concerns politicians, media representatives and public activists who are critical of the President (and how they will interpret and use the results presented in the press release). We draw attention to the fact that the group of those who do not trust V. Zelenskyy is not homogeneous in their worldview. Of course, some of those who do not trust V. Zelenskyy are true patriots who seek more effective governance to repel aggression, and that is why they do not trust him. But a significant part does not trust the fact that V. Zelenskyy does not accept offers to capitulate, they would like peace under any conditions: almost half of those who do not trust the President are ready to officially recognize certain occupied territories as part of Russia, and a quarter are even ready to transfer control over Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, etc. to Russia.

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

To what extent do you trust or do not trust Volodymyr Zelenskyy?