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Dynamics of trust in President V. Zelenskyy in 2019-2025

The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

 

From July 23 to August 4, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative,  added a question about trust in President V. Zelenskyy. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,022 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

 

Dynamics of trust in President V. Zelenskyy in 2019-2025

 

After the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, the level of trust in the President reached 90%, but continued to decline, and we recorded the relatively lowest indicator in December 2024 - 52% (which, however, still indicated a fairly high level of trust and the preservation of a positive balance of trust-distrust). In the first half of 2025, mainly due to the new administration in the USA, the level of trust in the President increased and reached a maximum of 74% in early May 2025 (immediately after the signing of the Minerals Agreement and on the eve of the resumption of negotiations with Russia, with which some citizens associated optimistic expectations). However, already in the second half of May - early June 2025, trust began to decline and by the beginning of the summer was 65%.   

The current survey began on July 23, 2025, that is, the day after the resonant vote in the Verkhovna Rada on Law No. 12414. As can be seen in graph 1, currently 58% of Ukrainians trust the President (i.e., compared to the beginning of June, we see a decrease from 65%), and 35% do not trust him (an increase from 30% in early June). The trust-distrust balance has decreased from +35% in early June to +23% in early August. However, current trust indicators are higher than the minimum during the full-scale war, which was in December 2024.

 

Graph 1. How much do you trust or distrust Volodymyr Zelenskyy?

 

* The option “hard to say” was not read  to respondents. It was only marked if the respondent requested it.

 

When analyzing the dynamics of trust in the context of events surrounding Law No. 12414, it should be taken into account that we already observed a downward trend in early June, so perhaps by July 22, 2025, trust was already below 65%. That is, not all of the decrease in trust (7 percentage points) can be attributed to the adoption of Law No. 12414. However, this event undoubtedly had an impact, since some respondents indicated this vote as the reason for distrust in the President (see Graph 4 below).

At the same time, during the field phase, we saw a trend that among the first 500 respondents, the level of trust was 55%, and among the second 522 respondents (i.e., those interviewed later) it was already 60%. That is, perhaps immediately after July 22, 2025, there was a somewhat deeper decline in trust, but further, in early August 2025, there was some improvement in the situation (possibly due to actions to repeal the Law and additional focus on issues of international relations / war).

The graph below shows the dynamics of trust in terms of regions of Ukraine[1]. Compared to the beginning of June 2025, the greatest decrease in trust is observed in the West - from 73% to 55%. If at the beginning of the summer the West had the highest trust in the President, now it does not stand out against the background of other regions.

In the Center, the level of trust has not changed (63% at the beginning of the summer and the same now). In the South and East, there is also a decrease, but to a lesser extent than in the West. Thus, in the South, the level of trust has decreased from 61% to 55%, in the East - from 61% to 54%.

At the same time, in all regions, the majority continues to trust the President and a positive balance of trust-distrust remains in all regions.

 

Graph 2. Trust in President V. Zelenskyy in the regional dimension

 

 


Since the protesters (at least visually) were largely represented by young people, it is worth considering how trust has changed among individual age groups. Below, we compare the level of trust in early June and early August for each age group.

As can be seen, trust has indeed decreased the most among young people under 30 – if at the beginning of the summer 74% trusted the President, now it is 59% (-15 percentage points). The decline in trust is also observed among other age categories, but to a lesser extent – from 62% to 55% among 30-44 year olds, from 61% to 56% among 45-59 year olds, and from 65% to 62% among 60+ year olds.

The situation between different age categories has now leveled out (i.e., the level of trust is quite similar regardless of age). In addition, despite the downward trend, a majority in each age category now trusts the President.

 

Graph 3. Trust in President V. Zelenskyyin terms of age

 

 


Reasons why Ukrainians don't trust the President

 

Respondents who answered that they did not trust the President were asked an additional open-ended question (i.e., without pre-formulated answer options) about why they did not trust him. Graph 4 shows the top answers of respondents (the full list of answers is in the Annex).

Respondents gave various reasons why they do not trust, and there is no single reason that the majority would say. At the same time relatively most often respondents expressed dissatisfaction with corruption (mainly in the form of corruption in the country/in government and only in isolated cases was the President himself accused of corruption) and war.

Separately, we note that 6% of such respondents directly stated that they were dissatisfied with the vote on July 22, 2025 and because of this they do not trust the President. 

 

Graph 4. And for what specific reasons do you not trust Volodymyr Zelenskyy? (open question)

% among those who do not trust V. Zelensky, top answers

 

 

 

 

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

 

President V. Zelensky, despite the rather large-scale protests and the violent reaction in the media, retains a fairly high level of trust (and legitimacy) among the Ukrainian public. Perhaps this was facilitated by the rapid response to the protests and the prompt submission of a new law to the parliament. However, the persistent downward trend is a worrying signal that requires attention and thoughtful decisions from the authorities.

The war (as a basis for criticizing the President) is an objective circumstance, where the unconditional culprit is Russia and it is Russia that is responsible for its continuation and the death and destruction in Ukraine. So, many Ukrainians emotionally accuse the authorities of allegedly insufficient preparation for the war or of the alleged inability to end it now, but for the absolute majority of the population there is a consensus of full responsibility of Russia (and in general of an existential nature for the Ukrainian nation). Another thing is corruption, since it is perceived as a purely internal problem for Ukraine, and for which the Ukrainian authorities should bear responsibility.

Various surveys indicate a sharp perception of injustice in society, especially in the context of a full-scale war and the uneven distribution of its burden among different social strata of the population. Cases of corruption and illicit enrichment during the war and the absence (from the subjective point of view of the average Ukrainian) of fair punishment are a powerful trigger for the absolute majority of the Ukrainian public. It should be emphasized that Ukrainians see regular arrests of corrupt officials and politicians, but simple arrests / investigations are not perceived as evidence of a dedicated fight against corruption. The KIIS experiment showed that Ukrainians are ready to wait for long court proceedings against corrupt officials (for example, 5 years), if in the end the culprit will receive a real term behind bars, and the family will be deprived of illegally obtained property[2]. Apparently, Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the final verdicts (or lack thereof) and this forms a critical perception of the current situation in the fight against corruption.

Therefore, any careless actions in the field of anti-corruption activities (and which are also related to the European future of Ukraine) will provoke a sharp negative reaction from the public. The current survey results do not show the delegitimization of the authorities or that the authorities have lost all support from the population. However, the growth of criticism and the potential destabilization of the institutions of power (against the backdrop of the war, which continues to carry existential risks) requires effective, constructive and mutually polite interaction between the authorities and the public. Ultimately, we are all interested in Ukraine surviving the war and moving towards a happy European future.

 


           

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

 

 

How much do you trust or distrust Volodymyr Zelenskyy?

  %
Completely don't trust 18
Rather, don't trust 17
Rather trust 33
Completely trust 25
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT) 6
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ) 1

 

And for what reasons exactly do you not trust Volodymyr Zelenskyy?

Open-ended question, respondents' answers were recorded and then coded

% among those who rather or completely do not trust the President

  %
Corruption 21
Full-scale war has begun, insufficient preparation for it, unable or unwilling to complete it 20
The President's entourage/team: ineffective, covered up from investigations, working for Russia, etc. 10
Does not have the necessary competence to be President 9
Did not fulfill election promises, did not live up to expectations 9
"Words differ from actions", does not do what he is supposed to do or what he himself says 9
Does not act in the interests of ordinary people (in particular, pensioners) 8
Ineffective decisions in domestic policy (without specifying) 7
Often lies or hides important information 7
Adoption of the Law on Restricting the Independence of NABU and SAPO 6
Insufficient attention to defense, military personnel 3
Dependence and influence of Andrii Yermak, is not independent in making decisions 3
Illegal actions during mobilization 3
Did not trust from the very beginning of political activity 2
In general, unfavorable situation in the country (without specification) 2
Violates the Constitution and Laws of Ukraine 2
Do not consider him my President 2
Difficult economic situation (in general / price increase) 2
Valerii Zaluzhnyi's resignation, resignation / cases against generals 1
Does not accept criticism 1
Consider the President a traitor 1
Spending budget money on useless things (e.g. roads) instead of sending it to the Defense Forces 1
Usurpation of power, lack of democracy 1
5-year term of office has expired 1
Doubts about his reliability 1
Don't trust anyone 1
Sabotaging integration into the EU and NATO 1
Ineffective decisions in foreign policy (without specification) 1
Unfair distribution of humanitarian aid 1
Disorder in the country 1
Pressure on entrepreneurs, tax increases 1
Not Ukrainian 0.5
Evaded military service himself 0.5
Launching the land market 0.4
Work of the Verkhovna Rada 0.4
Attitude of commanders towards ordinary soldiers 0.3
Disrespectful attitude towards Ukraine and Ukrainians 0.2
Necessary reforms are not being carried out 0.2
Courts do not administer fair justice 0.2
He is run by the USA 0.2
No military service / demobilization terms 0.2
Limitations on media activities 0.2
Did not fulfill the promise to imprison Petro Poroshenko 0.2
Persecution of Petro Poroshenko 0.2
Suspect that he personally helps the Defense Forces with his own funds 0.2
Agreement on subsoil 0.2
Failed counteroffensive in 2023 0.1
Could not explain 9

 



[1] The composition of the macroregions is as follows: Western macroregion - Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Khmelnytskyi, Chernivtsi oblasts; Central macroregion - Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Kyiv oblasts, Kyiv city, Southern macroregion - Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Odesa oblasts, Eastern macroregion - Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv oblasts.

[2] Which court cases and sentences against corrupt officials do Ukrainians consider fair // https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1533&page=1


6.8.2025
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