The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

 

From September 2 to 14, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative,  added questions related to war and peace. By the method of telephone interviews(computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,023 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of a sample of 1023 respondents (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) does not exceed 4.1%. Most of the questions considered in this press release were asked to all respondents. At the same time, an experiment was implemented in the question about possible peace plans and we found out the opinion of respondents about one of two randomly selected peace plans (to avoid the effect of the order of answers). Each peace plan was evaluated by about 500 respondents, which gives an error (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) of no more than 5.8%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow for a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

 

This press release presents the results of the survey, which relate to various aspects of Ukrainian public opinion about war and peace: belief in the possibility of Ukrainian victory, perception of individual peace plans and their consequences, actions in case of termination of support from the USA, expectations when the war may end, how long Ukrainians are ready to endure the war, readiness to personally join the Defense Forces and defend Ukraine with weapons. We have asked some questions before and can assess the dynamics, some we asked (in these formulations) for the first time.

Usually, we publish such data in separate thematic press releases (for example, how much more Ukrainians are ready to endure the war). However, in this case, we decided to collect all the relevant results in one press release so that Ukrainian and foreign (especially in Ukraine's allied countries) journalists, experts, and policymakers could find all the main answers regarding Ukrainian public opinion on war and peace.

In the press release, each issue is discussed in more detail (and in the Annex you can find tables with a regional breakdown). At the same time below we draw attention to the main results and conclusions:

• 76% of Ukrainians believe in the possibility of Ukraine's victory with proper support from sanctions against Russia and the provision of sufficient weapons and money;
• The latest version of the Russian peace plan (including the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Donbas) is categorically rejected by 75% of Ukrainians (17% are ready to accept such a plan). At the same time, if such a plan is implemented, 65% will consider it a failure for Ukraine (and only 7% will consider it a success), and 69% will expect that Russia will try to attack again;
• At the same time, 74% of Ukrainians (albeit without enthusiasm) are ready to support a peace plan between Europe and Ukraine, which includes a freeze behind the current front line without any legal recognition and with Ukraine receiving security guarantees. Although only 30% would consider such a peace a success for Ukraine, only 18% would consider it a failure (44% would consider it partly a success, partly a failure). At the same time, in the event of such a peace, the majority (56%) would still expect Russia to try to attack again;
• 76% of Ukrainians believe that even if the USA stops aid to Ukraine, resistance to Russia should continue with the support of European allies (in March 2025 the indicator was 82%);
• Only 18% of Ukrainians expect that peace can be achieved in 2025;
• 62% of Ukrainians are ready to endure war as long as necessary (at the beginning of June 2025 it was 60%);
• 54% of all adult men and women who are not currently serving in the military are ready, if necessary, to join the Defense Forces and defend Ukraine with weapons in their hands (among men – 63%, among women – 46%).

 

 

 

The absolute majority of Ukrainians – 76% – believe in the possibility of winning the war, if Ukraine is properly supported by the sanctions policy and receives enough weapons and money. Believe that even under such conditions Ukraine is not capable of winning – 15%. The remaining 9% could not decide on their opinion.

In December 2023 and September 2024, we asked the question in a slightly different, but similar, wording (in particular, we talked not about victory, but about achieving success). Thus, in September 2024, 81% believed that Ukraine was capable of achieving success and 14% believed that this was impossible even with proper support from the West[1]. Thus, the current indicator of belief in victory is almost the same as the similar indicator of belief in success one year ago. That is it can be reasonably assumed that over the past year there has been no significant decline in belief in the possibility of victory, and at the same time, victory is possible for the overwhelming majority - with proper support from the West (which is not expected to send troops, but at least effective sanctions and sufficient weapons are expected).

            Graph 1. In your opinion, is Ukraine capable of winning the war if Europe and the USA:

 

• will strengthen and introduce new significant sanctions against Russia and its partners
• will provide Ukraine with the necessary money and in sufficient quantities all the necessary weapons - long-range missiles, air defense systems, aircraft, tanks, etc.?

 

 

KIIS regularly monitors Ukrainians' perception of various possible peace plans. Last time, in early August 2025, we investigated attitudes towards the conditional peace plans of the USA, Europe and Ukraine, and Russia[2]. However, significant changes have occurred since then, and now it is more likely that we can discuss the concept of a peace plan from Europe and Ukraine and the concept from Russia (de facto surrender, but a little softer than before).

In a regular survey (especially a telephone survey), we cannot discuss the plans in detail with respondents, as each plan includes many components. Therefore, we have prepared two shortened versions with, in our opinion, particularly important (from the point of view of public perception) elements. One of two plan options was randomly selected and read to the respondent. We did not say that this plan was from Europe with Ukraine / from Russia. That is, we only read out the conditions and asked to answer how acceptable this plan was in general. Below is what we read to the respondents.

Conditional plan of Europe and Ukraine:

• Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees from Europe and the USA, which include a steady supply of weapons and money to Ukraine in sufficient quantities, as well as the closure of Ukrainian skies from Russian attacks
• The current front line is frozen, Russia retains control over the occupied territories, but Ukraine and the world do not officially recognize this
• Ukraine is moving towards joining the EU
• Sanctions against Russia remain until a stable peace is established and the threat of a second attack by Russia disappears

Conditional plan of Russia:

• The USA and Europe lift all sanctions against Russia
• The Russian language receives official status
• Ukraine must significantly reduce its army and limit its armaments
• Ukraine permanently abandons NATO membership, and the West can no longer supply weapons to Ukraine
• Russia has the right to determine what security guarantees will be for Ukraine, and will be one of the guarantor countries of Ukraine's security
• Ukraine withdraws troops from the part of Donetsk oblast it currently controls, i.e. from Kramatorsk, Sloviansk and other cities
• Ukraine officially recognizes Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as part of Russia and renounces them forever
• Russia retains control over the occupied parts of Kherson region and Zaporizhzhia

 

For each plan, we asked three questions: (1) how acceptable it is, (2) how successful/unsuccessful it is for Ukraine, (3) how likely it is that Russia will try to attack Ukraine again in the event of such a peace.

Graph 2 shows data on the readiness to accept the specified plans. So, the Russian plan is categorically unacceptable – 75% of Ukrainians consider it completely unacceptable. Only 17% of Ukrainians are ready for the Russian version of peace.

At the same time 74% of Ukrainians (although mostly without enthusiasm) are ready to approve the Europe and Ukraine plan. Only 15% categorically reject it.

In the regional dimension, 61-80% in all regions reject Russia's plan. In contrast, 72-77% are ready to approve the plan of Europe and Ukraine.

Graph 2a. There are different options for ending the war. Now I will read you one option, and you tell how you would react to it. Use the scale "I easily agree to this option", "this will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable" or "this option is completely unacceptable".

 

 

If Russia's plan were to become a reality, 65% of Ukrainians would consider it unsuccess for Ukraine. Only 7% would consider it a more or less complete success, and there are another 19% who would consider it a 50/50 success and failure.

In the case of the Europe and Ukraine plan, 30% would consider it a more or less complete success, while another 44% would consider it a 50/50 success for Ukraine. Only 18% would consider it a failure for Ukraine.

 

Graph 2b. In your opinion, if peace is concluded on such terms, to what extent can it be considered a success for Ukraine? Rate from 0 to 10, where 0 is absolutely not a success of Ukraine, 5 is a success in some ways, not in some ways - it is difficult to say anything more, and 10 is an unconditional success of Ukraine.

 

 

Graph 3 below shows whether Russia would attempt to attack again in the event of a corresponding peace. In the case of Russia's plan, 69% believe that with such a peace, Russia will try to attack again. Another 16% estimated the probability at 50/50. Only 7% believe that with such a peace, Russia will not attack again.

At the same time, 56% believe that even if the Europe and Ukraine plan is implemented, Russia will try to attack again. Another 28% estimated the probability at 50/50. And only 10% believe that Russia will not attack again.

That is, the Europe-Ukraine plan, although it may be approved by the majority of the public, is emotionally perceived quite restrained and will not be considered an unequivocal success. And at the same time, there will be an expectation of repeated aggression from Russia. However, at the same time, this plan will not be perceived as a failure. Russia's plan will mainly be perceived as a failure for Ukraine with a high expectation that after this Russia will attack Ukraine again.

 

Graph 3. Як In your opinion, in the event of such a peace, will Russia try to attack Ukraine again or not?

 

 

 

In the table below, the expectations from each plan (success / failure of Ukraine and whether Russia will try to attack again) are shown in terms of those who are ready to accept the plan and those who categorically reject it.

 

So, in particular, even among those who are ready to accept Russia's plan (if they are counted as 100%), only 22% would consider it a success (another 36% would consider it a restrained 50/50 success, and 39% would consider it a failure).

And among them, 33% believe that Russia will attack again (another 43% estimated the probability of another attack as 50/50, and only 20% believe that Russia will not attack again).

 

Table 1. Expectations from Europe-Ukraine and Russia peace plans

% in the column	Europe-Ukraine Plan		Russia's plan
	Can approve	Categorically against	Can approve	Categorically against
Success or failure of Ukraine
Mostly or complele success (8-10)	20	8	16	4
Rather success (6-7)	16	6	6	1
Success in some ways, not in some ways (5)	50	25	36	12
Failure (0-4)	11	54	39	77
Hard to say	4	7	3	7
Will Russia try to attack again
Definitely or rather will attack	54	71	33	80
50/50	32	14	43	10
Definitely or rather won't attack	10	12	20	5
Hard to say	4	2	5	5

 

Although many Ukrainians criticize the current government, 63% have a good attitude towards the United States in general and 90% have a good attitude towards ordinary Americans living in the United States[3]. The USA remains a strategically important partner. At the same time, information in the media about possible restrictions on the supply of weapons cannot but worry Ukrainians. In March 2025, after the termination of weapons supplies, we first asked the question of how to act in a situation of lack of support from the USA. Now we have asked this question again.

 

So, The absolute majority of Ukrainians – 76% – believe that even without the USA support, Ukraine should continue the fight together with its European allies.

Only 14% believe that under such conditions Ukraine should agree to any demands from Russia. Moreover, since March 2025, although there have been slightly fewer people who are willing to fight, it is quite insignificant. That is, the opinions of Ukrainians on this issue have hardly changed in recent months.

 

Graph 4. And if the USA stops all support for Ukraine, what option would be better for Ukraine?

 

 

 

Against the backdrop of intensified negotiating efforts by the current US administration, many foreign observers have had the (predictably erroneous) idea that Ukrainians see this as the end of the war in the near future. We, sociologists and citizens of Ukraine, have not had such an observation. And to test our observations, we asked the question: when, in the opinion of Ukrainians, the war could end.

Thus, only 18% of Ukrainians expect the war to end by the end of 2025. Instead, 27% say 2026, 32% say 2027 and later. Every fourth respondent (23%) answered “don’t know.”

 

 

Graph 5. In your opinion, when might the war end?

 

 

At the same time the majority of Ukrainians (61%) continue to say that they are ready to endure the war as long as necessary (at the beginning of June 2025, the indicators were identical). Another 4% answered that they are ready to endure for about a year.

21% of respondents say a shorter period (six months or several months) (practically unchanged over the last few months).

 

Graph 6. How much more time are you ready to endure the war?

 

 

Among those expecting completion this year, 41% are ready to endure as long as it necessary. The figure among those expecting completion in 2026 is 63%, among those expecting completion in 2027 and later is 74%. And among those who answered “don’t know,” 61% are ready to endure as long as it necessary.

 

 

Among Ukrainians (both men and women aged 18+), 54% respond that they are rather or definitely ready, if necessary, to join the Defense Forces and defend Ukraine with weapons in their hands. Of them, 23% are definitely ready, and another 31% are rather ready.

Rather not ready – 15%, definitely not ready – 23% (i.e. 38% are not ready in general, although only some of them categorically reject such readiness).

For comparison with other countries - according to Gallup (2023), for example, in Poland 45% are ready to fight for their country, in the USA - 41%, in Germany - 23%, in the UK - 33%, in the EU countries in general - 32% (although not all countries were surveyed) (for the same period in Ukraine, according to this formulation, it was 62%)[4].

At the same time, it should be taken into account that for Ukrainians this question is not hypothetical and abstract, it is quite real, that is, from Ukrainians we can expect an answer that is closer to real behavior.

 

Graph 7. You can choose not to answer if you don't want to. If necessary or if the situation develops, are you personally ready or not to become part of the Defense Forces to defend Ukraine with weapons in hand?

% among those not currently serving in the military

 

In the graph below, readiness to defend Ukraine with armed forces is shown in terms of gender and age. As can be seen, among men under 60 the majority (60-64%) are ready to join the Defense Forces if necessary.

It is important to emphasize that among Ukrainian women, a significant number are ready to defend Ukraine with weapons if necessary as part of the Defense Forces.

 

Graph 8. Readiness to join the Defense Forces in terms of gender and age

 

 

 

 

 

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

 

The respondents’ answers to each question discussed above can be discussed and supplemented with comments and deeper analysis. However, in our opinion, three main conclusions should be emphasized.

First, Ukrainians believe in the possibility of victory. That is, Ukrainians believe that Russia’s resistance is not hopeless and, despite the scale and cruelty of the enemy, we can emerge victorious. At the same time, Ukrainians are not asking allied countries to send their troops to Ukraine. Ukrainians are only asking for effective sanctions against Russia and a sufficient amount of weapons and money (which should have been provided to Ukraine back in 2014, not to mention 2022, given the obligations of a number of countries under the Budapest Memorandum). However, if in 2022 Ukrainians had romantic expectations of support from allies, now there is more pragmatism (or even cynicism).

As a result, secondly, Ukrainians demonstrate readiness to be flexible, even on difficult issues. We see that the conditional Europe-Ukraine peace plan, which involves freezing the front line and de facto maintaining control by the occupiers over a large part of Ukrainian territories, can be approved by the majority of the population. That is, Ukrainians are open to dialogue and open to difficult compromises. Therefore, the barrier to achieving peace was and remains exclusively Russia.

 Third, despite the accumulated fatigue and not always confidence in the determination of the allies, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians reject the possibility of surrender and retain the will to continue the fight (and a significant part of Ukrainian men and women are ready to defend Ukraine with weapons in their hands). Even the deceptive softening of Russia's demands recently (in particular, in the context of "only" the demand to withdraw from Donbas) is not able to deceive the majority of Ukrainians. Ukrainians do not expect the war to end in the near future, but Ukrainians are determined to resist under any circumstances until the parameters of peace are acceptable.

 

           

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

 

 

HALF OF RESPONDENTS ASKED OPTION A, HALF ASKED OPTION Б

 

OPTION А: There are different options for ending the war. Now I will read you one option, and you tell how you would react to it. Use the scale "I easily agree to this option", "this will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable" or "this option is completely unacceptable". POINTS ARE READ IN A DIFFERENT ORDER

 

• Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees from Europe and the USA, which include a steady supply of weapons and money to Ukraine in sufficient quantities, as well as the closure of Ukrainian skies from Russian attacks
• The current front line is frozen, Russia retains control over the occupied territories, but Ukraine and the world do not officially recognize this
• Ukraine is moving towards joining the EU
• Sanctions against Russia remain until a stable peace is established and the threat of a second attack by Russia disappears

 

* Here and further for questions about peace plans. In total, the sample includes 78 respondents who currently live in the East. Of these, 42 answered the question in option A, 36 in option B. That is, the sample in this region is small and the calculations are therefore indicative.

 

In your opinion, if peace is concluded on such terms, to what extent can it be considered a success for Ukraine? Rate from 0 to 10, where 0 is absolutely not a success of Ukraine, 5 is a success in some ways, not in some ways - it is difficult to say anything more, and 10 is an unconditional success of Ukraine.

 

 

In your opinion, in the event of such a peace, will Russia try to attack Ukraine again or not?

 

 

 

OPTION Б: There are different options for ending the war. Now I will read you one option, and you tell how you would react to it. Use the scale "I easily agree to this option", "this will be a difficult option, but generally acceptable" or "this option is completely unacceptable". READ IN ORDER AS BELOW. READ ALL 8 POINTS

 

• The USA and Europe lift all sanctions against Russia
• The Russian language receives official status
• Ukraine must significantly reduce its army and limit its armaments
• Ukraine permanently abandons NATO membership, and the West can no longer supply weapons to Ukraine
• Russia has the right to determine what security guarantees will be for Ukraine, and will be one of the guarantor countries of Ukraine's security
• Ukraine withdraws troops from the part of Donetsk oblast it currently controls, i.e. from Kramatorsk, Sloviansk and other cities
• Ukraine officially recognizes Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as part of Russia and renounces them forever
• Russia retains control over the occupied parts of Kherson region and Zaporizhzhia

 

 

In your opinion, if peace is concluded on such terms, to what extent can it be considered a success for Ukraine? Rate from 0 to 10, where 0 is absolutely not a success of Ukraine, 5 is a success in some ways, not in some ways - it is difficult to say anything more, and 10 is an unconditional success of Ukraine.

 

In your opinion, in the event of such a peace, will Russia try to attack Ukraine again or not?

 

 

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ASKED TO EVERYONE

 

In your opinion, is Ukraine capable of winning the war if Europe and the USA:

 

• strengthen and introduce new significant sanctions against Russia and its partners
• provide Ukraine with the necessary money and in sufficient quantities all the necessary weapons - long-range missiles, air defense systems, aircraft, tanks, etc.? READ BOTH POINTS

 

RANDOMIZATION OF READING ORDER 1-2

 

 

How much more time are you ready to endure the war?

 

In your opinion, when might the war end?

 

And if the USA stops all support for Ukraine, what option would be better for Ukraine? RANDOMIZATION OF STATEMENTS

 

 

[DO NOT ASK IF RESPONDENT IS CURRENTLY UNDERGOING MILITARY SERVICE] And our last question. You can not answer if you do not want. If necessary or if the situation develops, are you personally ready or not to become part of the Defense Forces to defend Ukraine with weapons in hand?