The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi, executive director of KIIS

From September 2 to 14, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added questions related to language policy in Ukraine. By the method of telephone interviews (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 2,012 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of a sample of 2012 respondents (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) does not exceed 2.9%. In this case, we implemented an experiment and the respondent was read one of three randomly selected language policy options (to avoid the effect of the order of responses). Each peace plan was evaluated by about 666-675 respondents, which gives an error (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) of no more than 5.1%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

KIIS has a long experience in studying the attitude of Ukrainians to the language issue. For example, since the 1990s, KIIS has been asking questions about the status of the Russian language, and according to the latest data in 2024, 64% were in favor of the Russian language being removed from official communication (and another 15% believed that the Russian language could be official in some regions, but were against such a status in their region)[1]. Another question we have been asking since the 1990s is whether it is appropriate to study Russian in schools. In 2025, we asked this question again and 58% said that Russian should not be studied at all. At the same time, 38% said that to some extent, but it is possible to continue studying[2].

At the same time, we see two important points that need to be taken into account. First, not all people understand what exactly can include (or not include), for example, the “official status” of a language. In Belarus, the Belarusian language has state status, but this does not help it to survive at all. There is also a mixing of the official and private spheres and not everyone understands that, for example, the official use of the Ukrainian language does not deny that Russian-speaking citizens can freely speak Russian in everyday life. Second, it must be taken into account that an effective language policy must enjoy support among the main language and regional groups. That is, there must be a search and development of such a policy that will be accepted by all groups.

Therefore, in this survey, we decided to find out the attitude of Ukrainians to three language policy options, which we described to respondents in a more expanded format.

So, we read out three conditional language policy options to respondents. Each option had four points (see details below) and all of them were read out (at the same time, we did not read out the research title to respondents, i.e. we did not say that we were asking them about, for example, “hidden Russification”). Only one (randomly selected) option was read out to the respondent and we asked how acceptable this option was. Although these options are simplified, they provide an understanding of possible directions of language policy. Below is a detailed description for each option.

• “Strategic Ukrainization” – can also be called gentle Ukrainization, i.e. strengthening the position of the Ukrainian language, but in the long term without pressure on the everyday use of the Russian language:
  • Ukrainian is the only state and official language
  • The main language of education in schools, etc. is Ukrainian
  • Ordinary citizens who want to or are used to it can speak Russian without pressure or condemnation
  • The gradual, without coercion, spread of the Ukrainian language is encouraged: more high-quality content on the Internet in Ukrainian, books, etc.

• “Radical Ukrainization” – stigmatization and pressure on Russian-speaking citizens to switch to Ukrainian, banning the use of Russian even at the everyday level:
  • Ukrainian is the only state and official language
  • The main language of education in schools, etc. is Ukrainian
  • The Russian language is forbidden to be used everywhere, in particular in everyday / family / friendly communication
  • All Russian-speaking citizens are forced to completely switch to the Ukrainian language

• “Hidden Russification” – the use of an allegedly democratic approach (“if the majority of the population wants it”, “choice of students’ parents”) to actually strengthen and spread the Russian language at various levels:
  • Ukrainian is the only state language, but Russian can be used in the official sphere in regions where the majority of the population wishes it
  • The language of education in schools, etc. is at the choice of parents, it can be either Ukrainian or Russian, if the parents want it
  • Ordinary citizens who want or are used to it can speak Russian without pressure or condemnation
  • The gradual, without coercion, spread of the Ukrainian language is encouraged: more quality content on the Internet in Ukrainian, books, etc.

It is important to consider each option in three dimensions: (1) support at the national level (which option enjoys greater support), (2) support at the regional level (to what extent is the option consensual between regions or, conversely, conflictual), (3) support among language groups (the same thing - does this option enjoy the support of all language groups or, conversely, provoke polarization).

Graph 1 below shows the data for the first measurement. As can be seen, although it is somewhat paradoxical, all three options can receive approval from the formal majority of the population. That is, most respondents consider each option to rather or completely acceptable (perhaps some citizens do not care and are ready to accept any option, or they cannot fully assess the consequences of language policies). However, there is a clear differentiation, that is, there are options that enjoy greater support.

Let's start with the option that enjoys relatively little support. For example, 54% of Ukrainians would be willing to approve an option that is actually a hidden Russification. However, only 21% of them consider this option to be completely acceptable (and the remaining 33% consider it to be rather acceptable). It is also important that this option faces quite significant resistance – 39% consider it to be rather or completely unacceptable.

The option of radical Ukrainization has slightly higher support – 63%. Although again, it should be taken into account that the share of those who fully support this option is 33% (the remaining 30% tend to support it). At the same time, 32% of Ukrainians consider this option rather or completely unacceptable.

And finally the most widely supported language policy option is strategic Ukrainization. 87% of Ukrainians completely or rather support it, and 53% of them completely support it (another 34% rather support it). Only 10% of respondents said that this option is rather or completely unacceptable to them.

Graph 1. Please imagine that the following option of language policy in Ukraine is being discussed. For you, this option is …?

The table below examines two other dimensions – the extent to which such language policy options can be consensual from a regional perspective [3] and language of communication. The option of hidden Russification is not consensual, because it is approved only by the majority in the East and South (with a high proportion of opponents). Although the majority in the Center may also approve, it is only a small majority and with a significant proportion of opponents. In the West, there are more people who are against this option. In addition, there is no consensus in terms of language groups. Thus, the option of hidden Russification is acceptable for those who communicate mainly in Russian or equally in Russian and Ukrainian at home. At the same time, among those who communicate in Ukrainian at home, opinions are divided equally, that is, in the largest language group there is a clear opposition to hidden Russification.

The radical Ukrainization option has the opposite tendency. It may be approved by the majority of the population in the West and Center, but there is already noticeable resistance in the South, and in the East the majority consider it unacceptable. Among language groups, this option is ready to be approved by the majority of those who communicate in Ukrainian at home, but it is rejected as unacceptable by the majority of those who communicate in Russian at home (among those who communicate in both languages, opinions are divided equally).

The only option that enjoys absolute support from residents of all regions (81-90% depending on the region) and all language groups (83-88% depending on the language of communication at home) is strategic Ukrainization. That is, this option not only has the greatest support at the national level, but also ensures consensus between the regions and between the language groups of Ukraine.

Table 1. Attitude towards language policy options in terms of region and among language groups

Below in Table 2, we also provide additional data broken down by age of respondents.

Table 2. Attitude towards language policy options in terms of age group

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

In the face of a full-scale invasion, Ukrainians demonstrate amazing unity in resisting the Russian enemy. We see hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, regardless of their region of residence, language of communication, social status, religion, etc., holding arms to hold back the Russian invasion. Millions of Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking Ukrainians are trying to contribute to national defense and are concerned about the future of Ukraine as a free, sovereign European state.

However, although the language issue has lost its sharpness among the Ukrainian public, we still see, unfortunately, attempts to exploit it to create fault lines and incite hostility in society. And if such attempts by the enemy are at least understandable (the Russian enemy is interested in having more fault lines in Ukraine), then the public activity of individual Ukrainian subjects is disappointingly surprising. On the one hand, some subjects are trying to persistently protect and expand the public status of the Russian language and culture in Ukraine. Often, such subjects distort and present measures to support the Ukrainian language in a distorted form, thereby actually discrediting the development of the Ukrainian language. On the other hand, individual subjects from the other camp may resort to aggressive rhetoric or rhetoric of stigmatization even for the use of the Russian language at the household or family level.

The results of our survey show that there is a completely consensual, balanced approach to language policy, which is approved by the absolute majority of our citizens in general and, in particular, by the absolute majority of both Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking citizens. Thus, Ukrainians recognize that the Ukrainian language should retain the status of the only state and official language, and the Ukrainian language should be the main one in the field of education. Ukrainians also favor non-aggressive encouragement of the transition to the Ukrainian language. At the same time, Ukrainians demonstrate a tolerant attitude towards the fact that Russian-speaking citizens communicate in Russian.

This language policy formula is quite simple, contributes to the long-term development of the Ukrainian language, and most importantly, it is unifying for society. We hope that Ukrainian officials and politicians, public activists, media representatives, and public figures in matters of language policy will adhere to the above-mentioned approach, so that we can finally turn the unfortunate page of language battles.

Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

Please imagine that the followingoption of language policy in Ukraine is being discussed: RANDOMLY CHOOSE 1 OPTION. ITEM 1 IS ALWAYS READ FIRST, OTHERS ARE RANDOMIZED IN ORDER. For you such option is…

Option А:

• Ukrainian is the only state and official language
• The main language of education in schools, etc. is Ukrainian
• Ordinary citizens who want to or are used to it can speak Russian without pressure or condemnation
• The gradual, without coercion, spread of the Ukrainian language is encouraged: more quality content on the Internet in Ukrainian, books, etc.

OptionБ:

• Ukrainian is the only state and official language
• The main language of education in schools, etc. is Ukrainian
• The Russian language is prohibited from being used everywhere, including in everyday / family / friendly communication
• All Russian-speaking citizens are forced to completely switch to the Ukrainian language

Option В:

• Ukrainian is the only state language, but Russian can be used in the official sphere in regions where the majority of the population wishes it
• The language of education in schools, etc. is at the choice of parents, it can be either Ukrainian or Russian, if the parents want it
• Ordinary citizens who want or are used to it can speak Russian without pressure or condemnation
• The gradual, without coercion, spread of the Ukrainian language is encouraged: more quality content on the Internet in Ukrainian, books, etc.

Scale: