Press release prepared by Volodymyr Paniotto and Anton Grushetskyi

The absolute majority of Ukrainians (at least 90%) support the Independence of Ukraine. Only 1% believe that Ukraine should unite with Russia. Absolute support for Independence was a fait accompli before 2014, but now this support has become even higher.

Attitudes towards Ukraine’s Independence Day have changed radically from 2013 to 2026. In 2013, this holiday was the most important or favorite for 12% of Ukrainians, and in 2026, it was for 54%. In 2013, it was one of the least popular holidays (only Constitution Day was less popular), and now it is one of the most popular holidays in Ukraine, second only to the two main religious holidays.

Survey methodology:

In the analysis of attitudes towards Independence and the Independence Day holiday of Ukraine, we used data from omnibus surveys conducted by KIIS from 2013 to 2026. The question about which holidays are the most important or favorite depends on the date of the survey. The closer to this holiday, the more often respondents mention it. Therefore, to study the dynamics, we usually ask about holidays every year at the same time (in January-February). Questions about attitudes towards Independence and questions about the consequences of being part of the USSR are less dependent on the data collection season.

The surveys conducted before February 2020 were conducted using face-to-face interviews, and after that, using computer-assisted telephone interviews. By geography of coverage, the surveys until February 2014 included all territories of Ukraine, after February 2014 they did not include the temporarily occupied Crimea and certain territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. After February 2022, the surveys do not include new temporarily occupied territories. The sample of each survey was 600-2000 respondents (respectively, the margin of error with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect 1,3 – from 5.3% to 2.9%).

For the current year 2026, we used the results of two surveys: one survey, in which we asked question about holidays, was conducted on January 9-14, 2026 (a total of 601 respondents were surveyed). The second survey, in which we asked about Independence and the legacy of the USSR, was conducted on May 7-June 3, 2026 (a total of 1,000 respondents were surveyed).

 KIIS regularly asked the question “What would you like to see Ukraine’s relations with Russia be like?” in its surveys, where respondents were offered three answer options:

• Ukraine's relations with Russia should be the same as with other states - with closed borders, visas, customs;
• Ukraine and Russia should be independent, but friendly states - with open borders, without visas and customs;
• Ukraine and Russia should unite into one state.

The question was formulated by the president of KIIS, professor of NaUKMA V. Khmelko back in the 1990s and now, due to the change in context, it needs to be adapted for the future. However, in recent surveys we have asked it in the same wording, since this allows us to correctly analyze the dynamics of public moods.

In the context of attitudes towards Independence, the first two options together correspond to support for Independence, and the third option indicates opponents of Independence. Together, the remaining respondents who have not decided can be interpreted differently, depending on the data collection period. As of 2026, taking into account the various surveys conducted, we believe that the vast majority of them are hesitating between the formats of relations with Russia, but at the same time do not doubt that Ukraine should be independent. That is, the first two options together give the lower limit of those who want to see Ukraine independent, but the majority of those who are “undecided” with the answer can also be added to them.

The graph below shows data in dynamics since 2013, that is, there is both data for the period before the Revolution of Dignity and currently relevant opinions and views of the population. It is important to emphasize that as of February 2013 (i.e. almost a year before the Revolution of Dignity), the absolute majority of Ukrainians – 81% – supported the Independence of Ukraine (16% sought unification with Russia) (if to look further, in the 1990s an average of 64% supported Independence and 32% wanted unification with Russia, in the 2000s an average of 73% supported Independence and 23% wanted unification with Russia).

Currently, the indicator of those who see Ukraine as independent (the lower limit) is at least 90% (and the share of those who seek unification with Russia is 1%). In addition, 8% are currently undecided about their answer to the question. They could either hesitate and “get closer” to the camp of opponents of Independence, or hesitate about the format of relations with Russia, but support Independence. In our opinion, as we noted above, most of them are actually supporters of Independence and are rather hesitant about what the configuration of relations with Russia (between Independent Ukraine and Russia) should be. Therefore, the actual level of support for independence is higher than the stated 90% and, most likely, is at least 94-96%.

Graph 1. % Ukrainians who support and do not support the Independence of Ukraine, 1991-2026

            * For 1991 – referendum results, recalculated to the entire population.

In addition, we note that a total of 78% among all respondents answered that they want borders, visas and customs to be closed between Ukraine and Russia. And only 13% answered that they want the countries to be independent, but friendly - without borders, visas, customs.

Back in February 2022 (before the invasion), 44% insisted on closed borders, visas, and customs, and in February 2014 (before the occupation of Crimea) – 15%. After the full-scale invasion, a stable absolute majority – 75-79% – talk about closed borders, visas, and customs with Russia. Moreover, in the regional dimension, now (in 2026) from 60% in the East to 84% in the West believe that Ukraine and Russia should have borders, visas, and customs.

 It is worth noting that KIIS has also used a more direct indicator of support for Independence for many years – asking respondents how they would vote if a referendum on the declaration of state independence of Ukraine were held today. We do not have data for 2026, but data from previous years confirm the dynamics we have just described. In 1991, 64% of all respondents were ready to vote for the Act of Independence (89% among those who decided on a choice). This study was conducted before the 1991 referendum and is the first nationally representative study by KIIS (KIIS then operated under a different name, we changed the name to KIIS in 1992). The forecast turned out to be quite accurate, 90% of those who participated in the referendum voted for the independence of Ukraine. Then came economic problems, rising poverty, and some disillusionment with Independence, but after 2000 these problems were overcome and support for Independence began to grow. In 2006, 53% (70% of those who had made up their minds) were ready to vote for the Act of Independence, in 2011 – 52% (67%), in 2016 – about 64% (87%), in 2017 – 70% (90%), in 2018 – 66% (84%), in 2019 – 71% (89%), in 2020 – about 66% (84%), and in the last such survey, conducted in June 2021 – 70% of all respondents and 90% among those who had made up their minds.

To assess what the actual result of the referendum might be, the share of those who have made up their minds is more indicative. A significant part of those who have not made up their minds during the survey, in the event of a real vote, as a rule, do not come to the polling stations, and those who eventually make up their minds and take part in the vote usually do not radically change the ratio between the main options. Therefore, the figure among those who have made up their minds is closer to the expected distribution of votes among the referendum participants. The experience of the 1991 referendum itself is indicative: in the survey on the eve of it, 89% of those who had made up their minds were ready to vote for Independence, and in fact, 90% of the participants voted for the Act of Proclamation of Independence in the referendum.

 Another dimension of the perception of Independence is how important this holiday is considered, in particular in the context of other public holidays. KIIS regularly asks the question “Which of these Public Holidays of Ukraine are the most important or favorite for you?” and the respondent has to choose up to 5 answers. Thus, the respondent chooses those holidays that are most important or favorite for him or her.

According to our research data, in 2026, the majority of the population of Ukraine (approximately 66-67%) call Christmas and Easter the most important or favorite holidays, followed by Independence Day of Ukraine (54%) and Defenders of Ukraine Day (53%).

New Year, which is celebrated all over the world and which for many years shared the first place with Christmas and Easter, is only in fifth place in 2026 with a percentage of 40%. Constitution Day, Trinity, International Women's Day, have 28%, 27%, 24%, respectively. The least popular holidays this year are Victory Day and Labor Day (May 1) – only 11% and 5% percent of Ukrainians celebrate these dates as favorite or important.

Graph2. What holidays are the most popular (important or favorite) among the population of Ukraine, January 2026

 As we can see, the attitude towards Ukraine's Independence Day has changed radically. In 2013, this holiday was the most important or favorite for 12% of Ukrainians, and in 2026 – 54%. In 2013, it was one of the least popular holidays (only Constitution Day was less popular), and now it is one of the 3 most popular holidays in Ukraine, second only to the two main religious holidays. Moreover, the most significant changes occurred after the large-scale invasion.

      At the same time, it can be seen that if in 2023 63% and in 2024 64% called Independence Day the most favorite holiday, then in 2025 and 2026 the indicator slightly decreased to 54%. Such dynamics may reflect the situation that during the first years after the full-scale invasion there was a peak of emotional mobilization, after which the situation stabilizes and consolidates. In any case, the perception of Independence Day is currently at a high level (and significantly higher than in the period before 2014).

Graph3. % of those who consider Independence Day of Ukraine the most important or favorite holiday, 2013-2026

In addition, we also asked Ukrainians question about their perception of the consequences of Ukraine's being part of the USSR. Moreover, we asked this question both in the period before 2014 (in 2013), in the period until 2022 (in 2020), and now (in 2026).

In 2013, 52% of Ukrainians believed that being part of the USSR brought Ukraine more benefits, and only 17% said that it brought more harm. By 2020, there were fewer than 35% who spoke of benefits, and instead, there were more than 28% who said that the USSR brought Ukraine more harm.

Now, in 2026, 45% believe that being in the USSR was mostly harmful for Ukraine, and only 10% claim that it brought more benefits. At the same time, a significant share of Ukrainians (41%) believe that there was both benefit and harm, and it is difficult for them to say which was more.

Graph 4. Overall, in your opinion, being part of the Soviet Union brought Ukraine …?

V. Paniotto, A. Grushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

When we came to prepare our interpretations / comments on the results of the above surveys, we found that our considerations, which we published in 2023-2024, remain absolutely relevant (which, in particular, also indicates the stability of public moods regarding Independence Day and Independence itself). It is appropriate to recall them once again:

      “More than 20 years ago, in 2000, a friend of Ukraine, Andrew Wilson, a British researcher, published a book on the history of Ukraine with the interesting title “Ukrainians: The Unexpected Nation.” Although for a significant part of the Western public, Ukraine was an “unexpected nation” (and even remained so until 2022), it was not so for Ukrainians themselves.

KIIS surveys (which throughout the entire period of Ukraine's independence surveyed the opinions and views of the population) showed an awareness of the importance and growth of support for Independence, the formation of a modern Ukrainian civic nation. So, discussions on certain issues and vectors of Ukraine's development were very emotional. However, Ukrainians themselves saw Ukraine as an independent state.

We specifically “recalled” public moods in 2013, before the Revolution of Dignity and before the start of Russia’s aggression. And during that period – before the dramatic events – the absolute majority of Ukrainians saw Ukraine as independent. That is why Russia first failed in 2014 with the “Russian Spring”, and in 2022 failed with the rapid occupation of Ukraine. The Ukrainian nation and the cultivation of Independence were being formed even before 2014, and Russia’s aggression only accelerated the inexorable historical processes. In the crucible of a cruel war, the Ukrainian nation finally tempered its strength and demonstrated an iron will to life.”

            At the same time, the results of our survey on the legacy of the USSR show that although significant changes have occurred in historical issues (and in the recent past), there is still no consolidation and consensus. For example, we see that there is a consensus in society, for example, regarding the figure of Stalin (Ukrainians have a predominantly critical perception of the Soviet dictator) [1]. But in general, the experience of the USSR, as we see, is perceived ambiguously. In addition to the data considered in the press release, in 2024 we asked whether Ukraine had statehood as part of the USSR. So, then 54% answered that Ukraine did not have statehood, and 26% (which is quite a lot) answered that it did (the remaining 19% had some doubts, which is also quite indicative) [2].

The lack of consensus among Ukrainians regarding the legacy of the USSR is a consequence of the lack of a common view among both professional historians and political elites of Ukraine. Moreover, even if professional historians develop a conditional consensus view, the responsibility of Ukraine’s public and political leaders will still be a problem. It is worth understanding that individual Ukrainian subjects (from all camps) will certainly try to turn historical discussions into a tool for achieving political goals (especially when many are in the waiting mode of new elections and therefore any emotional tools for mobilizing supporters will be used).

We hope that the path to developing a consensus view will still be through constructive, reasoned discussions, primarily between specialists, with correct media coverage and involving the experience and worries of ordinary citizens. At the same time, the "political" influence will be minimized. Ultimately, we must come to a point where the view of our history finally unites us, rather than creating new fault lines.
Appendix 1. Question formulation

Which of these Ukrainian public holidays are the most important or favorite for you? Please indicate no more than 5 holidays. NO MORE THAN 5 ANSWER OPTIONS

January 2026

What would you like to see Ukraine's relations with Russia be like?

May 2026

Overall, in your opinion, being part of the Soviet Union brought Ukraine …?

Appendix 2. Results in regional terms

Results on Independence, Independence Day holiday, legacy of being in the USSR in a regional dimension

Appendix 3. Dynamics

Which of these holidays are the most important or favorite for you? Please list no more than 5 holidays.

What would you like to see Ukraine's relations with Russia be like?