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Are Ukrainians moving towards unity and how do Ukrainians see the future of Ukraine

The press release was prepared by Anton Hrushetskyi,executive director of KIIS

 

From September 19 to October 5, 2025, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted its own all-Ukrainian public opinion survey "Omnibus", to which, on its own initiative, added a question about the level of optimistic / pessimistic moods regarding the future of Ukraine and the unity of Ukrainians. By the method of telephone interview (computer-assistedtelephoneinterviews, CATI) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers (with random generation of phone numbers and subsequent statistical weighting) in all regions of Ukraine (the territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine), 1,008 respondents were surveyed. The survey was conducted with adult (aged 18 and older) citizens of Ukraine who, at the time of the survey, lived in the territory of Ukraine controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The sample did not include residents of territories temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities (at the same time, some of the respondents are IDPs who moved from the occupied territories), and the survey was not conducted with citizens who left abroad after February 24, 2022.

Formally, under normal circumstances, the statistical error of such a sample (with a probability of 0.95 and taking into account the design effect of 1.3) did not exceed 4.1% for indicators close to 50%, 3.5% for indicators close to 25%, 2.5% for indicators close to 10%, 1.8% for indicators close to 5%.

Under conditions of war, in addition to the specified formal error, a certain systematic deviation is added. Factors that may affect the quality of results in "wartime" conditions were previously cited by KIIS.

In general, we believe that the obtained results are still highly representative and allow a fairly reliable analysis of the public moods of the population.

 

KIIS continues to study how optimistic/pessimistic Ukrainians are. In particular, over the past few years, KIIS has regularly asked questions about whether Ukrainians are moving towards unity/split, as well as how Ukrainians see the future of Ukraine in 10 years – as a prosperous EU member state or, conversely, as a ruined country with a significant outflow of population.

The last time KIIS asked these questions was in May 2025, and the results of that survey showed a significant decline in optimism among Ukrainian society about the country's future[1]. In the current survey, conducted in the second half of October 2025, we re-asked these questions to understand the dynamics of public moods over the past few months.

 

Ukrainians are moving towards unity/split and how they see Ukraine in 10 years

 

Graph 1 below shows how Ukrainians feel about unity (or division) in society. So, currently the majority of respondents – 63% – believe that Ukrainians are overcoming contradictions and are on the path to a united nation. At the same time, a third of the population (30% now) believe that internal contradictions are deepening and Ukrainians are heading towards a split.

In May 2025, 61% of Ukrainians believed that the country was moving towards unity, while 33%, on the contrary, believed that the country was moving towards split. The difference compared to current indicators is within the margin of error, i.e. formally, there have been no changes in public moods on this issue over the past few months.

           

Graph 1. And how do you assess unity among Ukrainians and overcoming contradictions?

 

 

* In 2020, due to a different socio-political context, the formulations were similar in content, but somewhat different: "Ukraine as a country is being stitched together, is on the path of unification" and "Ukraine as a country is falling apart, is heading towards split.".

 


Graph 2 below shows how Ukrainians see Ukraine in 10 years. From October 2022 to May 2025, there was a steady trend of decreasing optimism in Ukrainian society, and in May 2025, we first recorded a predominance of pessimistic moods. Thus, in May 2025, 47% believed that in 10 years Ukraine would be a country with a ruined economy and a large outflow of population, compared to 43% who believed that in 10 years Ukraine would be a prosperous member of the EU.

However, as of early October 2025, we are seeing a return to optimism, with 56% now optimistic about the country's future (up from 43%). On the other hand, the number of those who believe that in 10 years Ukraine will be a ruined country with a significant population outflow has increased from 47% to 31%. Current indicators have almost recovered to December 2024 indicators (which, however, were the lowest between 2022 and the end of 2024).

 

Graph 2. How do you see the future of Ukraine in 10 years?

         

 


 

Level of optimism/pessimism in the regional dimension

 

The table shows the answers broken down by region of residence of the respondents[2]. In all regions, there is a tendency for the share of those who are optimistic about the future of the country to grow. At the same time, the West stands out against the background of other regions, where the increase in optimism is relatively the lowest (and in general, there are slightly fewer optimists in this region than in other regions). In addition, the West stands out because it is the only region where, compared to May, there are fewer people who believe that the country is moving towards unification (in other regions, the indicator has either remained unchanged or increased).

 

Table 1. Do Ukrainians move towards unification and how they see Ukraine in 10 years in terms of region of residence

% in a row Whether are going to unity Future in 10 years
May-June 2025 September-October 2025 May-June 2025 September-October 2025
Split Unity Split Unity Pessimists Optimists Pessimists Optimists
West 30 65 33 57 47 44 31 50
Center 33 60 26 67 43 47 29 60
South 35 59 32 62 39 49 33 58
East 37 54 32 65 42 47 33 58

 


Level of optimism/pessimism in terms of age of respondents

 

The table shows the answers broken down by age of respondents. Across all age groups, optimism about the country's future has increased compared to May 2025.

However, the trend still persists that younger Ukrainians are more pessimistic. Thus, among respondents aged 18-29, 49% believe that Ukraine will be a prosperous country in 10 years, while 39%, on the contrary, see it as destroyed. That is, the balance of optimistic-pessimistic assessments is +10% (at the level of Ukraine as a whole, the indicator is +25%). Among those aged 30-59, the balance of assessments is +23%, and among those aged 60+ – +39%. A similar trend is observed in the case of assessments of the movement towards unity / split.

 

Table 2. Are Ukrainians moving towards unity and how they see Ukraine in 10 years in terms of age

% in a row Whether are going to unity Future in 10 years
May-June 2025 September-October 2025 May-June 2025 September-October 2025
Split Unity Split Unity Pessimists Optimists Pessimists Optimists
18-29 years 40 56 34 55 52 43 39 49
30-44 years 38 58 35 59 49 42 34 57
45-59 years 34 59 33 61 43 43 29 51
60+ years 24 68 20 74 46 45 26 65

Attitude towards territorial losses depending on the assessment of the country's movement towards unity/split and the assessment of Ukraine's future

 

In this survey, we also asked questions about Ukrainians' readiness to suffer territorial losses to end the war[3]. The table below shows how those who have different perceptions of the unity and future of Ukraine relate to territorial losses.

As can be seen, those who are pessimistic about the unity of society and the future of the country are much more prepared for territorial losses, including the most severe ones. Thus, among those who see Ukraine destroyed in 10 years, 42% are ready for the official recognition of certain occupied territories as part of Russia (versus 22% among those who believe that Ukraine will be prosperous in 10 years), and 35% are even ready to transfer territories currently controlled by Ukraine to Russia (versus 9% among optimists). A similar trend is observed regarding the perception of unity in society.

 

 Table 3. Readiness for territorial concessions depending on optimistic/pessimistic assessments of unity and the future

% in the column Whether are going to unity Future in 10 years
Split Unity Pessimists Optimists
The original question (without specifying "territorial concessions") is whether, in general, are ready for territorial losses        
Can accept territorial losses 68 30 59 37
Categorically against territorial losses 28 62 37 57
Hard to say 4 8 4 7
Official recognition of the occupation – whether are ready to officially recognize some territories as part of Russia        
Can accept territorial losses 39 20 42 22
Categorically against territorial losses 49 74 52 72
Hard to say 12 6 6 6
Transfer of unoccupied territories to Russia's control – whether are ready to transfer Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, etc. to Russia        
Can accept territorial losses 33 13 35 9
Categorically against territorial losses 58 81 54 88
Hard to say 9 6 10 3
De facto recognition of the occupation without de jure – whether are ready for the option of de facto recognition of Russian control, but without official recognition        
Can accept territorial losses 39 36 51 30
Categorically against territorial losses 51 59 42 64
Hard to say 9 4 7 6

 

A. Hrushetskyi, comments on the survey results:

 

In one of our recent publications on the perception of the fight against corruption, we noted that this issue is particularly vulnerable from the point of view of Ukraine's information security[4]. So, belief in the narrative of a “hopelessly corrupt Ukraine” is associated with a higher proportion of those who are ready for any, even the most difficult, conditions to end the war (and, by the way, those who consider Ukraine hopelessly corrupt are much more pessimistic about the future). And therefore, the spread and entrenchment of such a narrative among the Ukrainian public seriously undermines national security (which is what our enemy is particularly interested in).

A similar situation applies to the assessment of Ukraine's future. The narrative about the "gloomy and joyless future of Ukraine" demoralizes people and reinforces the idea that there is no point in resisting the enemy. And we see that indeed those who look pessimistically at the future of Ukraine are much more ready even to surrender. Therefore, the spread of such a narrative deals a serious blow to Ukraine's security.

In the case of corruption, we cited the proposal of Ya. Hrytsak “… stop talking about Ukraine as a very corrupt country, it is worth talking about Ukraine as a country that is fighting corruption”. In the case of the future of the country, we also believe that it is worth saying that although our path is thorny, we are moving towards a better future. Better times await us, but for this we must now make all the necessary efforts to survive this extremely difficult period.


Annex 1. Formulation of questions from the questionnaire

 

How do you see the future of Ukraine in 10 years? RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER

Ukraine in 10 years will be a prosperous country within the European Union 1
Ukraine in 10 years will be a country with a ruined economy and a large outflow of people 2
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ) 3
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ) 4

 

And how do you assess unity among Ukrainians and overcoming contradictions? RANDOMIZATION OF ORDER

Ukrainians are gradually overcoming internal contradictions and moving towards a united political nation 1
Internal contradictions among Ukrainians are only deepening and Ukrainians are moving towards a split 2
HARD TO SAY (DO NOT READ) 3
REFUSAL TO ANSWER (DO NOT READ) 4

 



[1] Are Ukrainians moving towards unity and how do Ukrainians see the future of Ukraine // https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1540&page=1

[2] The composition of the macroregions is as follows: Western macroregion - Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Khmelnytskyi, Chernivtsi oblasts; Central macroregion - Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Kyiv oblasts, Kyiv city, Southern macroregion - Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Odesa oblast, Eastern macroregion - Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv oblasts.

[3] Dynamics of readiness for territorial concessions and the role of the interpretation of "territorial concessions"

 // https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1559&page=1

[4] Perception of the fight against corruption in Ukraine and the attitude of Ukrainians towards criticism of the authorities' actions during the period of full-scale invasion // https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1562&page=1


31.10.2025
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